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ABSTRACT 
The overarching objective of this doctoral research is to integrate key 
political and conflict-related variables in the analysis of war-torn 
economies. For, as we conclude from a critical review of the literature on 
war, reconstruction and the economy, politics must be fully taken into 
account in economic analysis and planning. This is especially true during 
the fragile transition from war to peace to the extent that rebuilding efforts 
are vain if the conflict rekindles. In this dissertation, we elaborate on two 
complementary methodological approaches aiming at including 
distributional and political concerns in economic research on conflict-
ridden countries. We test them in a case study on Guatemala and discuss 
their respective merits and limitations. 
The dissertation first focuses on the social accounting framework as a tool 
for distributional analysis. We construct a social accounting matrix (SAM) 
for Guatemala, based on which we calculate accounting multipliers. 
Multiplier effects are decomposed into transfer, open-loop and close-loop 
effects following the logic of the circular flow of income. The ensuing 
SAM-based model serves to simulate the distributional impact of several 
fiscal reform options on different socioeconomic groups. This in turn helps 
design politically-informed economic reform. 
We then present an analytical model that enables to capture the 
fundamental interactions between the economic and political spheres. We 
address in particular the dilemma posed by the diverging agendas of peace-
building and economic reform, both of which are required in the aftermath 
of a protracted conflict to put the economy back on track and consolidate 
peace. The analytical framework highlights how the optimal policy mix 
from a government's perspective differs from the economic optimum 
advocated by the international financial institutions. Subsequently, a 
macroeconometric model is built, and tested in the context of our 
Guatemalan case study which requires the construction of ad hoc political 
and economic data sets. 
We then ask how coherent are the different responses devised by the 
international community to assist war-torn countries rebuild themselves. 
To this end, we run simulations of external interventions in the form of 
increased conditionality related either to economic reform or to peace-
building. The outcome highlights stark contradictions between these two 
i l l 
types of conditionality because of their induced effects in the economic 
and political spheres, thus calling for increased coherence in the global 
response of the international community. 
The dissertation is structured under three modules: critical literature 
review, distributional analysis, and politico-economic interactions. The 
originality of this doctoral research lies in the inclusion of conflict- and 
peace-related variables in distributional analysis and macroeconometric 
modelling. In the case of Guatemala, the model proves to have a stronger 
forecasting ability than traditional models limited to economic variables 
only. The politico-economic approach elaborated in this dissertation offers 
an avenue for further research on war-torn economies, all the more so that 
the major methodological obstacles are being removed: the lack of reliable 
data is being addressed by a more systematic collection of information on 
violence and conflicts while recent econometric software packages 
considerably ease the computational process. 
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!.INTRODUCTION 
A European economist who served as an adviser to the Rwandan 
Government from 1990 to 1994 was recently invited to assess his 
performance in retrospect of the 1994 Genocide. As his advisory job was 
strictly confined to macroeconomic issues, he insisted on the fact that he 
was not supposed to analyse the political impact of economic measures. 
Although fully aware of the gravity of ethnic tensions, he admitted that he 
never raised these sensitive political issues with his Rwandan counterparts 
in the framework of his mandate. As soon as violence flared up in April 
1994, he returned to his capital, transmitted his files to other colleagues in 
charge of humanitarian and political affairs, and was then assigned to a 
similar position in another developing country. With hindsight, he rightly 
questioned: what is sound economic advice worth if the distributional and 
political consequences contribute to exacerbate hatred among different 
ethnic groups and to lead to such a dramatic outbreak of violence and 
destruction? 
This exemplifies how much economic policy advisers and the international 
financial and development institutions they staff have been uneasy about 
getting involved in war-torn countries. This is worrying to the extent that 
armed conflicts have long been pointed out as both a major source and 
consequence of failed development. AU major regions of the developing 
world have been plagued by civil wars or regional conflicts since the end 
of World War II, least developed countries being particularly affected. In 
war-prone settings, we contend that political stability cannot be relegated 
to a lower priority than - and should often prevail over - economic 
efficiency. For reconstruction activities are nullified if war starts anew, and 
efforts to restore confidence among investors and consumers cannot 
succeed without a minimal level of political stability. As we elaborate in 
this dissertation, advances over the last two decades in the fields of 
distributional analysis and political economy provide several tools to look 
into politico-economic interactions. Unfortunately, policy advisers widely 
neglected the political consequences of their economic recipes as they 
lacked both the will and the mandate to tackle the highly sensitive, yet 
crucial, interactions between the economic and political spheres in war-
prone settings. 
i 
1.1 OBJECTIVE AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The objective of this dissertation is to develop - and test in the framework 
of a case study on Guatemala - two complementary methodological 
approaches to integrate political and conflict-related factors in the 
economic analysis of war-torn countries. 
• The first approach focuses on distributional analysis through a 
presentation of the social accounting framework and the decomposition 
of accounting multipliers (Pyatt and Round, 1979; Defourny and 
Thorbecke, 1984). We build a social accounting matrix (SAM) for 
Guatemala and calculate the transfer, open-loop and close-loop 
multipliers. Several simulations show the distributional impact of 
various fiscal reform options. Fiscal reform ranges among the key 
challenges in the direct aftermath of a civil war, as is the acute case in 
Guatemala. This results both from the necessity to pay for peace-related 
expenses as well as from the political and distributional issues at stake. 
SAMs further have the merit of providing a coherent framework to 
reconcile the sparse and inconsistent data characteristic of countries at 
war. 
• In the second approach, we depart from traditional neo-classical 
economics and draw on recent political economy literature. Concretely, 
we elaborate on the analytical framework developed by Haggard, Lafay 
and Morrisson (1995) to assess the political feasibility of stabilisation 
programmes in developing countries. This methodological approach 
makes it possible to trace both the impact of economic reform on the 
behaviour of social groups and the effect of political instability on 
economic outcome and policy decisions. It also permits to assess the 
relations between public policy choices and the economy via the whole 
politico-economic cycle, including armed conflict. Based on this, we 
present a macroeconometric model and estimate its parameters with a 
set of quarterly political and economic indicators which we calculate 
for Guatemala. We then simulate the impact of economic conditionality 
on peace-building as well as the incidence of peace-related 
conditionality on economic policy. 
This dissertation thus focuses on the typical dilemma of a war-torn country 
which has to deal simultaneously with the diverging requirements of 
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peace-building and economic reform, and shows that attempts to 
implement both agendas at the same time conflict with one another. 
The originality of this doctoral research resides in its emphasis on the 
interactions between economic reform and peace-building, and the 
inclusion of political and conflict-related variables in economic modelling. 
More specifically, we first run simulations on a SAM-based model that 
directly relate to one of the Guatemalan peace accords: the introduction of 
a more progressive tax system. We combine our simulation outputs in 
terms of distributional analysis with a basic understanding of the dynamics 
underlying Guatemalan politics in order to identify policy reforms that are 
politically feasible or not. Second, we introduce into a macroeconometric 
model variables such as conflict intensity, political repression and peace-
building conditionality to assess the interactions between the Guatemalan 
economy and polity throughout the peace process. We may add that 
econometric modelling has not been applied to war-torn countries before 
1997-98. Since then, econometric testing has been used in the framework 
of cross-country studies while this doctoral research is the first attempt to 
do so in a specific country case study. 
The dissertation is organised under three modules: 
The first one looks at the economic literature on conflict and 
reconstruction, identifying strengths and weaknesses with a view to laying 
the ground for the following two modules. More specifically: 
• the remainder of chapter one discusses methodological difficulties 
related to economic research on countries at war and postconflict 
rebuilding, and sets out the limitations of our methodological 
approaches in dealing with war-torn economies. 
• The second chapter analyses the thrust of peace economics, which 
could also be referred to as the economics of war. It briefly looks into 
its main developments after World War II. We review the few empirical 
studies whose findings are grounded on econometric modelling and 
rigorous testing, studies which only emerged in the last two or three 
years. The chapter shows that research on developing economies at war 
has been chiefly limited to the interpretation of descriptive statistics. It 
further highlights that many essential contributions to understanding the 
dynamics underlying war-torn economies have been brought by non-
economists. Chapter two also reviews relevant literature on economic 
policy challenges in the transition from war to peace. We conclude on 
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the need to better integrate distributional and political issues in 
economic analysis on war-torn countries. 
The second module focuses on distributional analysis and introduces the 
social accounting framework. In chapter three, we construct a social 
accounting matrix (SAM) for Guatemala from which we draw a linear 
multiplier model and decompose accounting multiplier effects. We then 
run simulation of various changes in government spending and taxation, 
and assess how they affect income distribution at the household level. 
The third module deals with the study of politico-economic interactions 
during the fragile transition from war to peace: 
• The fourth chapter outlines an analytical framework tailored for the 
study of politico-economic interactions. It focuses on the relationships 
between domestic and external actors, the government, economic and 
political events, and economic and political measures. The chapter 
elaborates on microeconomic considerations that underlie both this 
analytical framework and the macroeconometric model developed in 
chapter eight. Based on a government's political support function, we 
discuss how politico-economic interactions take shape and illustrate 
how and why the optimal policy-mix from the standpoint of 
government leaders diverges from the economic optimum advocated by 
the international financial institutions (IPIs), and how economic and 
political conditionality interact with domestic priorities. 
• Chapter five dwells on Guatemala. Following a historico-analytical 
approach, we describe the Guatemalan economy and polity along the 
lines of the politico-economic framework outlined in chapter five. This 
chronological analysis of political and economic events and policy 
decisions serves as a basis for constructing the data sets that are needed 
to estimate our macroeconometric model (see chapter seven). 
• Chapter six presents a politico-economic model and its application to 
Guatemala. Estimation issues are discussed before presenting and 
interpreting the model's outputs. Detailed explanations are provided on 
the quantitative and ordered qualitative variables entering the model, 
which require the construction of quarterly national accounts for 
Guatemala. The goodness of fit of our macroeconometric model is 
compared with the descriptive capacity of more traditional models that 
focus exclusively on economic variables. We then run simulations of 
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different types of interventions by foreign actors and analyse their 
impact on the economic and political spheres. Chapter seven concludes. 
1.1.1 Limitations of the Methodological Approach 
A multitude of factors all coexist and interact simultaneously during the 
transition from war to peace, be they economic, political, military, cultural, 
psychological, religious, or other. These multifaceted interactions require 
extensive exchanges and mutual understanding among social scientists in 
different fields. The specific contribution of this doctoral research is 
limited to better integrating the political dimension into economic analysis 
and policy advice. This dissertation therefore does not address fundamental 
challenges facing war-torn societies such as the decentralisation of power, 
demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, institutional 
reforms, etc. 
While hints have been made as to their strengths and specific 
contributions, it is important to underline that the methodological 
approaches which we develop here cannot apply to all war-torn economies. 
For a certain number of conditions must be met - or specific hypotheses 
must hold - for the models to be applicable: 
• SAMs correctly portray the interdependence between production and 
the primary and secondary distributions of income. But as for input-
output analysis, SAMs remain fundamentally applicable in contexts 
which are characteristic of fixed-price models with excess production 
capacity and absence of substitution. Consequently, they cannot be 
applied to study shocks that involve important changes in the economic 
structure of a country, changes which are often associated with the 
destruction of the productive apparatus and infrastructure as a result of 
war, and/or with major shifts in relative prices characteristic of 
adjustments in developing countries. 
• The limitations associated with the politico-economic model developed 
in chapter VIl derive from the assumption of constant coefficients in 
the structural equations. The assumption that equation coefficients 
remain constant throughout the study period limits the model's 
application only to cases in which the war does not fundamentally alter 
the socio-political and economic structures. To the extent that a conflict 
inflicts severe physical damage to production facilities and the 
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infrastructure of a country, coefficients would have to be adjusted 
accordingly to account for the ensuing structural changes. 
Yet the tools developed in this dissertation remain basically valid for many 
of today's war-torn economies where the conflict did not result in 
substantial direct damage to the physical capital nor to the infrastructure. 
The assumption of constant coefficients thus holds for countries such as 
Guatemala where the sectoral composition of GDP did not change much 
during the conflict. In the Guatemalan case, it probably remained even 
more stable than what would have happened, had there been no civil war: 
the share of agriculture did not change much between 1979 and 1996, and 
still accounted for one fourth of GDP by the end of the conflict, while this 
share tended to decline in neighbouring countries at peace over the same 
period. 
1.2 METHODOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES 
The study of contemporary war-torn countries poses major conceptual and 
methodological challenges which partly account for the paucity of solid, 
rigorous economic research on developing countries at war, as illustrated 
in the next chapter. The major methodological challenge often mentioned 
in the framework of traditional economic research is the difficulty of 
conducting empirical research because of an acute lack of reliable data on 
conflict-ridden economies (Stewart et al., 1997). This may be due in part to 
the impossibility of collecting and processing data during hostilities, not to 
mention the weakness of the statistical system in many contemporary war-
torn countries even before the conflict started. Another reason is that the 
release of accurate socioeconomic data may be regarded as counter-
productive or even dangerous, in particular in countries where the 
distribution of income and assets is highly concentrated (e.g. Guatemala). 
Besides, the information available often fails to include the informal, 
illegal and criminal activities that tend to flourish during conflicts. In the 
case of the Horn of Africa, for instance, survival strategies have increased 
the share of subsistence agriculture in the overall economy, while growing 
informal or underground sectors have pushed a considerable portion of 
economic activities outside the scope of national accounts (Brown et al., 
1992). Kinshasa provides another typical example: GDP per capita stood 
slightly above USD 100 in 1998, according to official statistics, while 
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household surveys carried out in the city reported that the average annual 
expenditure per capita was around USD 260 that same year. In this 
context, the social accounting framework may represent an efficient tool to 
reconcile data from different sources in a consistent manner. 
Even when accurate data is available, it is often impossible to distinguish 
socioeconomic changes that can be attributed solely to the war from effects 
caused simultaneously by other factors (e.g. changing international terms 
of trade). Counterfactual analysis might provide some assistance but is 
even more difficult to carry out than under normal circumstances. First, 
prewar economic conditions are often radically altered during the conflict. 
Second, comparison with similar countries at peace is questionable since 
differences in initial economic conditions may actually account for the 
emergence of a conflict in the war-torn country under analysis. Third, data 
deficiencies make economic modelling of war-affected countries very 
difficult, if not impossible in some cases. 
The greatest challenge may yet lie elsewhere. During civil war as well as in 
its direct aftermath, politics tends to take precedence over economics. 
Questions such as how economic reform affects the structure and balance 
of power between the major social forces involved in reconstruction are 
crucial in understanding the rationale and behaviour of investors, 
consumers, landowners, peasants, urban workers, etc. We contend that 
economic policy advice to war-torn countries requires taking fully into 
account fundamental issues such as political stability and institutional 
capacity for peaceful conflict management. This requires the inclusion of 
political and conflict-relative information - most of the time qualitative 
data - in quantitative economic analysis, which makes the analysis more 
complicated. 
Another difficulty relates to panel data for cross-country analysis. 
Economies at war do not lend themselves to simplistic generalisation, as 
each and every conflict-ridden country faces different challenges. 
Researchers have nonetheless attempted to find common features among 
countries at war, with a view to forecasting the likely effects of conflict on 
the economy, devising appropriate preventive responses and providing 
sound policy advice. Yet, there is no such thing as a typology for the 
analysis of conflict economies. The lines between situations of political 
violence, widespread criminality, civil disorder, and armed conflict have 
become blurred. As a result, scholars have selected and categorised war-
torn countries according to different criteria (e.g. causes of conflict, kinds 
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of actors involved, number of battle-related deaths, degree of state 
regression or collapse) depending on the purpose of their research, which 
makes cross-study comparison difficult1. 
1 To give a few examples, Stewart et al. (1997) consider only conflicts in which more than 
1,000 people died in a given year as a direct or indirect outcome of the fighting to assess the 
costs of war. In another study on war and development, Smith (1993) takes into account all 
conflicts having inflicted a cumulative number of casualties of several hundreds and in which 
more than 25 people were killed in a given year. Nafziger (1996) identifies countries with at least 
2,000 war casualties in 1992-94 or at least 100,000 internally displaced persons in 1995 to 
analyse the economics of complex humanitarian emergencies. 
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II. WAR AND PEACE ECONOMICS 
11.1 PEACE ECONOMICS VERSUS TODAY'S WARS 
Economists have studied the many facets of warfare for decades, often 
with the explicit objective of helping mitigate its effects, if not avoiding it 
altogether. During the Cold War, the "peace economists" were primarily 
concerned with issues linked to East-West confrontation, such as the 
strategic balance between the two superpowers, the arms race and arms 
control, the impact of defence expenditures, conflict management analysis, 
etc. Extensive use was made of game theory which was originally 
developed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 to explain economic 
behaviour and to analyse conflicts and their resolution. Anderton and Isard 
(1992: 1-55) produced a concise survey of the main strands of thought in 
the literature on peace economics during the Cold War. The review 
highlights that economists focused on the following issues: standard 
resource allocation analysis and strategic behaviour (game framework); 
arms race models; analysis of military expenditure impact on 
macroeconomic stability (Keynesian and general equilibrium framework) 
and disaggregated (micro-) analysis of defence spending; impact of 
military outlays on investment, productivity and growth (endogenous 
growth); and political economic analysis (e.g. pressures from the military 
industrial complex on the governments). 
Contemporary conflicts do not conform to traditional images of 
battlefields. Internal war has become the rule rather than the exception: all 
thirty of the major wars in 1995 were conflicts within a state and around 
90% of the victims (casualties, wounded and displaced persons) were 
civilians (SIPRI, 1990). More than half of these conflicts have lasted for 
over a decade, often taking the form of intermittent warfare that erupted 
only from time to time. Today's conflicts obviously do not fit into the 
former conceptual framework of bipolar confrontation. Former peace 
economics is therefore of limited help in meeting the complex challenges 
facing contemporary war-torn societies. In a literature review on peace 
economics, Fischer and Schwartz (1992: 239) note that economists and 
development agencies generally considered civil war as an external event 
which is not amenable to economic analysis. The two authors add that war 
has been rather treated as "an event which disrupts from time to time more 
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normal conditions under which economic laws apply." Economic research 
on conflict-ridden countries and postwar reconstruction has nonetheless 
intensified over the past few years under mounting demand from 
multilateral and bilateral development agencies. We will return to that 
issue later in this chapter. 
As for the economic analysis of peace-building and reconstruction, much 
research has focused on the Marshall Plan, which still represents a 
milestone in the field of the economic rebuilding. However, most of the 
lessons drawn from rebuilding Europe after 1945 do not apply to 
contemporary postconflict countries. As Lake points out (1990: 10-17), 
there are probably more differences than similarities between the 
challenges of European recovery after 1945 and the plight of war-torn 
societies in the developing world at the end of the twentieth century. The 
author makes the following points: 
• The challenge of developing economies is often to build basic 
infrastructure and create new capacities, whereas European countries 
had the remnants of an extensive physical infrastructure, as well as 
political and entrepreneurial traditions conducive to growth and 
stability. One might add to Lake's analysis that literature on 
contemporary conflicts reveals that the differences in agenda between 
donors and recipients are often larger today than they were between 
the United States and Europe after World War II - not to mention 
differences in cultural ties and values. 
• The military victory of the Allied Forces was undisputed, and peace 
could be firmly restored, whereas the initial challenge facing many 
postconflict countries today consists in restoring a minimal level of 
security and stability. 
• Although Europe itself accounted for 80% to 90% of the capital 
formation during the first two years of the Marshall Plan, the 
American contribution was immense, amounting to US $13.2. billion 
from 1948 to 1951 (equivalent to some 80 billion in 1996 US dollars), 
or 2.5% of the recipients' GDP. The repetition of such a large 
contribution seems unlikely in the context of budgetary constraints 
and diverging political agendas among donor countries. In addition, 
the ability of local governments and other domestic institutions to 
make the best use of foreign assistance is much smaller in low-income 
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postwar countries nowadays, their absorptive capacity remaining 
sadly limited. 
But other features of the Marshall Plan may commend themselves to 
contemporary planners of reconstruction programmes. Lake (1990) 
particularly stresses the necessity to rely on local planning and initiative, 
and the advantages of adopting a regional rather than national perspective 
to reconstruction. De Long and Eichengreen (1991) argue that the major 
contribution of the Marshall Plan to European recovery was not financial 
aid itself, but rather the conditions attached to it: aid was for instance 
granted provided recipient governments made a commitment to keep 
budget and inflation under control. In addition, the Marshall Plan strongly 
encouraged recipient governments to deregulate the postwar economy, 
promote regional integration and make greater reliance on market 
mechanisms2. De Long and Eichengreen nonetheless recognise that the 
Plan did play a major role in alleviating resource shortages. The massive 
inflow of financial aid facilitated the implementation of sound economic 
policies by reducing the costs of adjustment to be bome by competing 
distributional interests: "It did not obviate the need for sacrifice. But it 
increased the size of the pie available for division among interest groups." 
(p. 45). 
Economic analysis of developing war-torn countries has been rather rare. 
In a seminal book on The Industrialisation of Backward Areas, 
Mandelbaum (1945) made one of the earliest studies dealing with the 
reconstruction of nonindustrial countries, i.e. backward areas of eastern 
and south-eastern Europe "which were left virtually untouched by the 
vigorous industrial development of western Europe in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries". The author selected this region partly because 
information about conditions in this part of the world was slightly more 
plentiful than that dealing with other less advanced areas. However, only 
pre-World War II material was used and no account was taken of the 
changes in the region since 1939. Consequently, the book deals more with 
the process of industrialisation of backward pre-war economies than with 
the reconstruction of postconflict countries, even though this enquiry was 
part of a wider research project on problems of international 
reconstruction. The book by Bonne (1945) on The Economic Development 
2 The two authors note that conditlonality was not necessarily felt as a constraint by the 
recipient European governments as the requirements imposed by the United States often 
matched their own objectives. 
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of the Middle East is another early reference on postwar reconstruction in 
the developing world. 
As for the international community, humanitarian and development circles 
initiated a vivid debate at the beginning of the 1990s to bring emergency 
relief, rehabilitation and development activities into a more effective and 
coherent framework (e.g. UNDP, 1994 and 1995). The donor community 
has been working on the formulation of policy orientations for 
development co-operation in conflict prevention and postconflict recovery 
under the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC). In May 1997, 
the resulting guidelines were endorsed by DAC members at a High-Level 
Meeting in Paris (OECD, 1997). They provide valuable indications on 
recent, collective views of donor countries on how the international 
community should address issues such as conflict prevention, peace-
building and postwar reconstruction. The same year, the Governing Board 
of the World Bank endorsed a policy paper for the Bank's involvement in 
postconflict reconstruction. A "Postconflict Unit" was established to 
respond to the needs of the Bank's operations in war-torn countries (World 
Bank, 1997a). 
11.2 ECONOMIES AT WAR: THE DESCRIPTIVE 
APPROACH 
A review of the recent literature on war-torn economies sheds light on the 
extreme paucity of rigorous economic modelling to date. The bulk of 
socioeconomic research into the causes and consequences of civil war is 
limited to reviewing and interpreting the statistical information available 
(cross-sectional statistical tables), without formal modelling nor rigorous 
testing. In other words, researchers have generally adopted a historical 
perspective to understand the evolution of - and interactions between -
conflicts, peace-building and the economy. It was not until the mid-1990s 
that a few economists pioneered more rigorous research on the roots and 
impact of civil wars in developing economies. 
Sections II.2 and III.3 concentrate on the more descriptive inputs of 
economists and other social scientists, while section III.4 provides an 
overview of these recent "scientific" advances in peace economics. Our 
purpose here is not to minimise the contributions brought by historical and 
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narrative analyses. To the contrary, we argue that it is imperative to adopt a 
wide, multidisciplinary perspective to understand the multifaceted and 
complex challenges facing war-torn countries. The distinction between the 
"scientific" and "descriptive" approaches only serves the purpose of 
methodological clarity. 
A few years before the modelling attempts reviewed in section 111:3, 
economists initiated statistical research on contemporary war and the 
economy from the end of die Cold War onwards. Frances Stewart and 
Volpy FitzGerald in particular have pioneered research on war costs in 
developing countries as well as on the impact of conflict on war-torn 
economies. In the framework of a first cross-country statistical survey of 
this sort, Stewart et al. (1997) assess in particular the economic effects of 
war for some sixteen countries affected by major conflict in the 1970s and 
1980s, in which over 0.5% of the population died as a direct or indirect 
result of war. Their survey is primarily based on the World Bank's World 
Development Reports and World Tables. Before turning to their findings, it 
should be kept in mind that statistical surveys of war-torn economies are as 
reliable as the data available. They generally neglect a substantial portion 
of economic activities such as informal exchanges, barter trade, 
consumption of own subsistence production, illegal economic activities, 
etc. 
The cross-country survey by Stewart et al. confirms, as one would expect, 
that GDP growth rate and income per capita tend to be negatively affected 
by conflict. The authors conclude that even if the most visible effects of 
war hit the economy directly through damages to physical and social 
infrastructure, the indirect effects may have more dramatic implications for 
long-term development. More specifically, the social and cultural 
disintegration of war-torn societies has a dramatic impact on the economy: 
in the absence of minimal political stability, mutual trust, and respect for 
property and the rule of law, economic relations break down (see also 
Stewart, 1993). This in turn may have multiplier effects on the fall of 
domestic production and income. Thus, most human misery and deaths in 
poorer countries are not a result of direct violence, but of the more general 
effects of protracted conflict on economic and administrative structures, 
such as the collapse of basic public services, famine and large-scale forced 
migration. 
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11.2.1 Winners and Losers 
Recent studies have shown that war typically spurs radical changes in the 
allocation of resources and activities among sectors and institutions 
(primary income distribution) as well as among households and social 
groups (secondary income distribution). As a result, a small minority of 
people often acquires a vested interest in the continuation of conflict 
("winners"), while the vast majority slides towards, or below, the absolute 
poverty line ("losers"). This sub-section analyses the impact of war on 
living standards and assesses how war costs are distributed, i.e. who stands 
to win or to lose from the war. 
Methodologically, Stewart et al. (1997) extend Amartya Sen's original 
concept of entitlements3 to assess how living standards are affected by 
conflicts. The authors introduce the notions of public entitlements (goods 
and services provided by the state), civil entitlements (production and 
transfers arising from the community and NGO sources) and non-legal 
acquisition or loss of assets and incomes arising from the conflict. They 
argue that the breakdown of the formal private and public economy is one 
of the major causes of decline in market entitlements stricto sensu. Yet, 
this decline can be countered by alternative forms of public and civil 
entitlements provided by emerging social networks and the burgeoning 
informal economy, or by rebel groups and/or humanitarian agencies. The 
emergence of alternative forms of entitlements generates winners as well 
as losers. Some groups may acquire a vested interest in the continuation of 
conflict as they draw substantial profits out of quasi-rents created by 
market shortages, or out of illegal and predatory activities encouraged by 
widespread impunity and legal system breakdowns (FitzGerald and 
Stewart, 1997: 6). 
The empirical results obtained by Stewart et al. (1997) confirm that war 
costs appear to be higher in cases of geographically pervasive conflicts 
where the government has lost its capacity to collect taxes and provide 
basic services. Where "quasi-government structures" were able to maintain 
core functions, these costs could be limited to a certain extent. The 
findings also show that international wars tend to have less harmful effects 
than internal conflicts, due especially to the fact that in the former case, the 
3 Entitlements as originally defined by Sen are legally-based claims of households to the goods 
and services supplied by the market or derived from their own production (Sen, 1992). 
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State usually strives to maintain basic social services throughout the 
country as part of its war effort. 
Differing conditions in the nature of conflicts and of the countries in which 
they occur may explain why there are considerable differences between the 
consequences of wars. Stewart et al. (1997: 18-19) point to several factors 
that are positively correlated with the economic costs of war: (i) duration, 
magnitude and geographical spread of a conflict; (ii) imposition of a strict 
international trade embargo; (iii) public service and state collapse, and (iv) 
the lack of alternative support networks such as family, rebel forces or 
humanitarian agencies. The characteristics of the economy prevailing 
before the war also determine the extent of later war costs, particularly (i) 
the initial import dependence ratio; (ii) the level of subsistence production 
in the country; and (iii) how near the poverty line or survival limit people 
were situated in the first place. 
Stewart (1993) insists that famine results mainly from entitlement failure, 
falling income and breakdown in the distribution system, rather than from 
a drop in aggregate food supply. Household survival strategies are 
associated with the spread of parallel and extra-legal activities which 
might themselves provoke further tensions and the transfer of assets or 
population (Duffield, 1994: 50-69). Coping strategies often rely on "job 
diversification", that is a shift of household members on the labour market 
to ensure maximal liquid income and entitlements. Access to public 
entitlement and security may require a given household to maintain some 
of its members in the public sector or join the armed forces, while other 
members may emigrate to richer countries and send remittances. To the 
extent that soldiers and security forces are not adequately remunerated by 
the state, they have an incentive to resort to systematic corruption and 
looting to improve their own situation. Another survival strategy for some 
household members is to rely more permanently on foreign assistance. The 
most profitable, but most risky, option is to engage in illegal activities. As 
a last resort, the most vulnerable groups may be forced to sell or pledge 
their subsistence and production assets such as land and livestock, or 
personal assets like jewellery, that other people ("winners") acquire at 
rock-bottom prices. Migration often remains the ultimate survival strategy 
(Stiefel, 1994: 16). 
At the household level, FitzGerald (1997: 53) finds that the social group 
likely to be worst affected by war is the urban poor and landless, who have 
less access to informal quasi-rents and fall outside the official welfare net. 
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It is then largely the poor who "pay for the war", especially if the 
increasing fiscal deficit is met by inflation rather than by an increase in 
taxation or external finance, as is often the case in conflict economies. 
Inflation may de facto help contain the real budget deficit by reducing the 
real wages paid by the government to public sector employees, but it 
severely affects their living standards. On the other hand, nominal 
revenues accruing from activities in the informal sector rise as prices 
increase. Therefore, households which enjoy wide access to quasi-rents 
resulting from supply shortages in the formal market are in a position to 
maintain entitlements, or even make substantial gains. But the growing 
number of petty traders in the urban informal sector benefit from rising 
demand for goods and services on parallel markets only to a limited extent 
as the labour supply rapidly increases in this sector and exacerbates 
competition. As for peasant farmers, they may benefit from higher food 
prices when selling their production but they also have to pay more for 
agricultural inputs. In short, FitzGerald (1997) concludes that the 
distributional effects of war on real income among households depend on 
internal terms of trade, consumption patterns, employment opportunities 
and real wages, as well as access to scarce resources. 
Within households, war profoundly changes traditional gender relations as 
men are mobilised, wounded, or killed. Research on gender and conflict 
shows that women should not be seen only as war victims: they often 
acquire greater responsibilities and a more prominent role as household 
head and chief provider. Yet, it has been highlighted that households 
without male adults tend to be more vulnerable to loss of market and 
public entitlements such as food shortage or escalation in the prices of 
staple goods and basic services. For further reference on gender and 
postconflict rebuilding, see S0rensen, 1998. 
11.2.2 Dynamics Underlying Civil War Economies 
Statistical surveys on war economies and studies on survival strategies are 
useful contributions when coming to grips with peace-building and 
reconstruction strategies. However, one may argue that it is necessary to 
have a better understanding of the underlying dynamics of civil war 
economy in order to assess the politico-economic interactions at play in a 
civil war. 
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Ownership and distributional issues often lie at the heart of conflict. Some 
analysts have recently suggested that contemporary conflicts can be better 
understood if considered as a logical outcome of the struggle between 
different social groups for access to - and control over - resources such as 
land and humanitarian aid as well as trading routes and activities (Keen, 
1997). The objective of warring parties is not invariably to seize power and 
gain control over the state, but may also be more narrowly economic, as 
exemplified at certain stages in Liberia or Sierra Leone. Even if war is 
costly and seems irrational with regard to the society as a whole, it is a 
very profitable business for the particular groups who can secure control 
over resources and draw benefit from them (King, 1997). Leaders may 
have a direct personal interest in continuing the war as they are bound to 
lose power through negotiated peaceful settlement. 
In their book on civil war economies, Jean and Rufin (1996) adopt an 
original approach to contemporary armed struggles by analysing how 
internal conflicts are financed. In order to understand today's complex 
humanitarian emergencies and the recent evolution of countries at war, the 
authors examine the ways that conflicts affect the structure and 
organisation of the economy. For them, the economic analysis of civil war 
represents one of the most promising approaches to building a new 
counterinsurgency theory, or a theory on civil war. They stress that in the 
aftermath of the Cold War, our conceptual framework must be updated to 
account for the increasing importance of local economies over foreign 
assistance, be it military and financial support or "humanitarian 
sanctuaries", i.e. refugee camps located in neighbouring countries. 
As a result of falling foreign financial and military support, warring parties 
have to depend primarily on their own natural assets, i.e. exploiting and 
trading domestic resources such as tropical timber, rubber, mines, gems, as 
well as arms and drugs (see also Labrousse, 1996: 467-494). 
Consequently, fierce fighting takes place in and around strategic areas as 
opposing groups try to secure territorial control over key resources and 
trading routes. Rufin (1996: 53-55) argues that the increasing 
fragmentation of armed groups is mainly the result of heightened internal 
struggles among parties in conflict to exploit and market local resources. 
Countries at war are then plagued by a surge in economic criminality and 
predatory behaviour. Rufin adds that in an environment of extreme 
scarcity, humanitarian aid is another resource that has been subject to 
increasing attacks in recent years. The author also remarks that opposition 
groups have increasingly appealed to their diaspora established in richer 
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countries for financial support (see also Angoustures and Pascal, 1996: 
495-542). 
All these issues are fundamental in a socio-political perspective, but should 
not be ignored by economists to the extent that they greatly contribute to 
understanding the dynamics at work in civil war economies and in 
rebuilding processes. Somewhat surprisingly, essential issues such as 
widespread criminalisation of the economy, the impact of international 
criminal networks, and the effects of competition for the control over 
resources and trading routes have been brought up by political scientists 
and humanitarian practitioners rather than by economists themselves. 
Analysts such as Jean and Rufin, for instance, are humanitarian 
practitioners who underlined such basic questions as the development of 
survival strategies in the midst of conflict, the role and impact of the 
booming informal sector, the issues of endemic corruption, etc. It is 
obviously difficult to include these variables in economic analysis. 
Although most economists tend to acknowledge the relevance of these 
factors in the rebuilding process, they tend to pay lip service rather than 
give them substantive attention, and serious attempts to integrate them into 
economic analysis and planning are still very limited. This may derive, 
among other things, from paradigmatic and methodological difficulties 
related to economic research on contemporary conflicts. Filling this gap 
requires pioneering work on relatively new ground. 
11.3 ECONOMIC POLICY AND POSTWAR REBUILDING 
During the fragile transition from war to peace, domestic authorities have 
to wrestle with competing demands from the international community 
through the economic and political conditions attached to external 
assistance. While economic conditionality often requires drastic cuts in 
government expenditure, political or peace-related conditionality implies 
increased public spending to cope with the pressing requirements of the 
peace agenda. On the one hand, economic stabilisation is required as 
flawed economic policies have often been followed prior to war, and 
macroeconomic imbalances tend to worsen during conflict. Some authors 
therefore argue that macroeconomic stability remains one of the most 
important elements of any economic rehabilitation endeavour (e.g. Kumar, 
1997: 30). Other analysts contend that peace-building political stability 
should have priority over any other objective, as economic rebuilding 
18 
efforts would be automatically impaired if war starts anew. For postwar 
states are in dire need of resources, among others to (i) rehabilitate the 
state apparatus, the security system and public services such as education 
and health; (ii) restore physical infrastructure and productive assets; (iii) 
reintegrate ex-combatants and returnees; and (iv) clear mines (for more 
details on the role of the state in rebuilding the economy see WSP, 1997a). 
In this section, we review recent literature on the most crucial economic 
policy challenges facing governments during the transition from war to 
peace. For these policies involve substantial distributional shifts between 
socioeconomic groups that can spur renewed political violence. 
11.3.1 Trade Policy 
The empirical survey by Stewart et al. (1997) reveal that war conditions 
lead to a fall in exports as trade routes may be disrupted, and transportation 
means and infrastructure destroyed. As a result of decreasing export 
earnings, the import capacity falls unless net external finance increases to a 
greater extent than the fall in exports, which is most unlikely in the case of 
low-income countries at war. In a vicious circle, the drop in imported 
production inputs in turn reduces export capacity. 
Official trade flows are affected by the fact that conflict disrupts traditional 
migratory and trading routes. On the other hand, unofficial cross-border 
trade tends to develop and sometimes becomes the main form of 
interregional trade activities in the aftermath of a conflict, as shown by 
McSpadden (1996) in the case of the Horn of Africa. Illegal trade tends to 
flourish as a combined consequence of increasing arms and drug trade and 
tight border controls or embargoes (e.g. Labrousse, 1996: 467-494; Kopp, 
1996: 425-465). Once the conflict is over, illegal traders are likely to resist 
any attempt to reintegrate into the formal sector as they seek to maintain 
their profits. In addition, systematic customs corruption and an excessive 
administrative burden discourage formal trade. Customs administration 
thus deserves particular attention if trade is to serve as a catalyst for 
growth (WSP, 1997a: 8). 
As for postconflict trade policy, conventional reform relies on trade 
liberalisation measures involving the reduction or removal of tariff and 
nontariff barriers and other anti-export bias. Commercial policy includes 
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the set of measures that have direct implications for the domestic prices of 
importables and exportables. Border opening benefits export-oriented 
interests and harms import competing ones. Devaluation of the exchange 
rate affects the relative prices of tradables versus nontradables. The global 
effect on real wages depends on the combined share of 
tradables/nontradables and exportables/importables in the income and 
consumption pattern of a given household. As forcefully highlighted by 
Rodrik (1994), these measures may have a major impact on income 
distribution between social groups and production sectors. In a fragile 
peace process, this cannot be relegated to second-order priority4. 
Rodrik (1994: 61-88) presents a political cost-benefit ratio (PCBR) as a 
way to determine and illustrate the distributional impact of trade policy 
reform. The PCBR shows how many dollars of income are shuffled from 
one group to another for every dollar of net efficiency gain. When a policy 
is purely redistributive and achieves no net gain, the value of the index 
goes to infinity. When a policy increases some groups' income without 
taking income from any other group, i.e. is Pareto efficient, the index takes 
a value of zero. The income which is redistributed between socioeconomic 
groups corresponds to the political cost incurred by policy-makers. The 
political cost-benefit ratio can be written as: 
J^1 I Aincomej \ —net gain 
net gain 
whereby the PCBR is the ratio of the political cost divided by the overall 
economic gain, as it divides the redistributed by the net efficiency gain 
accruing from the trade reform. The result is divided by two to correct the 
double counting of income variations which include both gains and losses. 
Rodrik calculates that the PCBR lies above 5, meaning that for each dollar 
of net income generated, 5 dollars are being reshuffled among different 
groups. Trade reform is thus politically costly. In addition, losers may be 
well known while potential winners do not know that they might gain from 
the reform, and are consequently not supportive of such reform. That is 
why the author argues that such reforms tend to be implemented only 
4
 Economic theory predicts that first-order effects affect primary or functional income distribution 
through changes in output levels, in relative prices of tradable versus nontradable and 
exportables versus importables, through job losses in previously protected sectors and job 
creation in emerging export sectors, etc. These changes in turn affect personal or household 
welfare depending upon how incomes are distributed by market institutions. 
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under specific circumstances which help reduce the overall costs for the 
politicians in power: trade reforms are often implemented together with 
drastic political changes (coups, new governments) or when they can be 
gradually introduced against the background of a long growth period (e.g. 
GATT rounds). Rodrik further contends that trade reform is easier to 
implement when combined with a stabilisation package in a crisis-ridden 
economy. For the stabilisation programme aims at curbing an acute 
economic crisis and should bring rapid improvement to the overall 
situation (e.g. price stabilisation). 
One might add that in the case of trade agreements and stabilisation 
packages, governments are in a position to blame outsiders (GATT, IMF) 
for the negative impact of reform such as large redistribution of income 
among different groups. This tends to reduce the political cost incurred by 
the government because of a lower attributability factor (see Frey and 
Eichenberger, 1994). But it is important to underline that in the fragile 
transition from war to peace, the expected benefits of trade reform may be 
delayed for years because of the very low supply response and a general 
lack of investor confidence which characterise war-torn economies (see 
below). Even under normal circumstances, distributional effects tend to be 
felt immediately, whereas expected gains in competitiveness, output, and 
exports often take at least a year or two. The losers of trade reform may 
react violently and rekindle the conflict, especially if they are among the 
very groups who are bound to lose from peace as well. 
In a study on trade policy and domestic political alignments based on the 
standard Stolper-Samuelson theorem, Rogowski (1989: 19-20) concludes 
that changes in exposure to trade profoundly affect internal political 
cleavages between capital, labour and land interests. He adds that 
appropriate and temporary compensations may help avoid a resurgence of 
violence. However, postconflict countries often lack the financial capacity 
to provide assistance to "losers" from trade reforms. The microeconomic 
impact of trade liberalisation should thus be carefully assessed in the 
context of war-to-peace transition. 
11.3.2 Fiscal and Budgetary Policy 
Statistical evidence confirms that during the war, government revenue 
generally falls in absolute terms as the fiscal base narrows and major 
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sources of revenue diminish. But government revenue does not invariably 
decrease as a proportion of GDP. This proportion even rose in a majority 
of cases studied by Stewart et al. (1997), with the notable exception of 
countries where government lost its tax collection capacity (e.g. Somalia, 
Afghanistan, Cambodia). Government expenditure on the other hand tends 
to rise as a proportion of GDP chiefly because of the war effort drain. As a 
consequence, budget deficit increases, as confirmed for all countries for 
which data is available. This may be aggravated by a collapse of public 
and private institutions accompanied by the diversion of skilled labour, 
which is either mobilised for the war or else flees abroad. 
As far as the sectoral allocation of government resources is concerned, 
empirical surveys on war economies show that, as expected, the share of 
military expenditure tends to increase. More surprisingly, data gathered by 
Stewart et al. (1997) reveal that per capita expenditure on health and 
education was either sustained or rose in several countries where 
governments could maintain their capacity to deliver basic services - and 
raise taxes - in spite of the conflict. The share of investment in total public 
expenditure tends to fall in countries at war - and this to a greater extent 
than in other developing countries implementing expenditure-cutting 
measures under stabilisation policies. 
A peace settlement reduces military expenditure ("peace dividend"), but 
increases spending for urgent reconstruction requirements and the 
restoration of health and education services. There is thus a pressing need 
to both raise government revenue and contain budget deficit. FitzGerald 
(1997: 54) argues that as the tax base is limited, governments may 
increasingly resort to indirect taxation (e.g. taxes on petrol and/or 
electricity, import duty on nonessential consumer goods) and user fees for 
public goods and services (e.g. transportation and health services). This 
option must be assessed on a case-by-case basis as it is often politically 
costly for the incumbent government, and may also revive inflation. 
Besides, indirect taxation may lead to a more regressive tax system and 
widen gaps between the rich and poor5. But it often represents the only 
short-term solution as increasing direct tax collection in the short run 
might not be realistic in postconflict countries often accustomed to major 
tax evasion and lacking efficient tax administration. Tax amnesty may help 
As a result of such concern about distribution, trie Guatemalan Peace Accord requires that the 
tax system be "globally progressive", in addition to a 50% increase ot the fiscal revenue/GDP 
coefficient {Minugua, 1996). 
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redress this situation together with efforts to strengthen and modernise 
administrative, auditing, and fiscal control capacities (Segovia, 1996b: 
107-127). 
11.3.3 Savings and Investment 
As a result of falling income during the conflict, domestic savings are 
likely to decrease in absolute terms. The cross-country survey by Stewart 
et al. (1997) indicates that the gross domestic savings ratio also falls, in 
most cases. This decline may result from the necessity to maintain 
consumption levels in spite of reduced incomes, but may be balanced by a 
shortage of consumer goods leading to de facto forced savings, or else 
inflation in consumer good prices. FitzGerald (1997: 52) notes that the 
evolution of the ratio of savings to GDP may be ambiguous: uncertainty 
about life span might reduce incentive to save for higher immediate 
consumption, but on the other hand higher uncertainty linked with war 
conditions may increase precautionary savings. 
Gupta (1990: 180-182) remarks that a reduction in savings generally will 
not result in an increase of consumption that would allow for an upward 
multiplier to take the economy to a higher level of prosperity under normal 
conditions. For uncertainty linked with political instability impairs many of 
the automatic, self-correcting and equilibrating market mechanisms. 
General lack of faith in economic prospects and institutions may lead to 
substantial "hoarding": individuals can either "store their money under the 
proverbial mattress (thereby withdraw money from the natural flow of 
economic activity), or they can send their money illegally (as few countries 
allow a free remittance of money abroad) to a safer haven, such as a Swiss 
bank, or to a politically stable nation." (Gupta: 1990:181). Another option 
is to buy precious metals such as gold or silver. Consumption and savings 
tend then to decrease while the price of precious metals might increase. 
Conventional wisdom would indicate that private investment falls as 
conflict breeds distrust and uncertainty. The ensuing higher risk and 
greater transaction costs discourage foreign and domestic investors. 
Political instability is likely to further cause an increase in interest rates 
which in turn reduces investment incentives. This upward trend in interest 
rates is due to the fact that hoarding lowers the amount of money available 
for lending. In addition, the higher level of uncertainty itself raises interest 
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rates. FitzGerald (1997: 50-51) adds that contrary to natural disaster, war 
not only damages the existing capital stock of firms, but also reduces 
desired stock level or investment plans. For expectations regarding 
profitability, domestic demand and export opportunities worsen as a result 
of prohibitive risks. The cross-country survey mentioned earlier clearly 
confirms that the absolute level of investment falls significantly in most 
cases. However, the negative impact of war on the ratio of investment to 
GDP appears less severe. 
Because of the climate of instability, private agents may resort to other 
investment choices than fixed capital formation. In a study focusing on 
African civil wars, Collier and Gunning (1995: 233-237) underline that 
uncertainty leads to a portfolio shift from fixed to financial or liquid assets 
as real fixed assets become vulnerable to war damage. Some groups are 
thus likely to accumulate unusually high savings. As for portfolio 
decisions, there is a high premium on liquidity during the war. Probably 
the safest financial asset with the highest return is a foreign interest-
bearing claim (e.g. bond or bank deposit), but access to transactions may 
be inconvenient as deposits and withdrawals must be conducted externally. 
This is not the case of transactions in foreign and domestic currency or 
with domestic interest-bearing assets. Available evidence for some African 
war-torn countries (e.g. Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda) indicates that 
portfolio choices of private agents result in an increase in liquidity in a 
range of foreign and domestic financial assets, depending on the penalty 
for holding domestic financial assets (i.e. inflation level, currency stability, 
availability of reliable financial services, etc.) as well as on the difficulty 
of conducting financial transactions abroad. 
Gupta (1990: 194) remarks that, provided business and consumer 
confidence returns after hostilities, the saving and hoarding accumulated 
during the conflict may find their way back into the nation's income 
stream, as experienced by the Western World after World War II 
(analogous to the real balance or Pigou effect). But in the case of 
contemporary postconflict countries, macro-level instability added to the 
high level of criminality and political insecurity often discourages the 
acquisition of visible assets and perpetuates the premium on liquidity that 
emerged during the war. Potential investors tend to keep their assets in 
liquid forms despite the transition from war to peace. They usually adopt a 
wait-and-see attitude before switching from liquidity to domestic fixed 
investment (Collier and Gunning, 1995: 236), or they may be more 
tempted to acquire the consumption goods that they could not buy during 
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the conflict (FitzGerald, 1997). Alternatively, they may prefer to invest 
abroad or to keep foreign currency denominated financial assets, often in 
cash. Thus, private investment may not increase sufficiently to restore 
growth and employment due to uncertainty about future profits as well as 
about asset and land ownership, as discussed below. 
To the extent that private agents do nonetheless switch from liquid to fixed 
assets, there are strong incentives to invest in quick-yielding, mobile assets 
such as transport equipment and light machinery as such investments can 
be easily redeployed elsewhere in case of renewed crisis. Consequently, 
economic agents are reluctant to invest money where it would be most 
needed, i.e. in fixed, productive assets such as agricultural infrastructure. 
The reluctance of investors to do so at the end of a protracted conflict is 
primarily responsible for the lack of supply response that orthodox 
economic reforms are expected to spur. Crosby (1990: 22) therefore argues 
that a major priority is to restore local investor confidence, which requires 
that a whole range of conditions be quickly met. Among them, Crosby 
mentions political and macroeconomic stability, the restoration of the rule 
of law, access to credit at reasonable rates, low or predictable levels of 
inflation, a convertible currency, a clear regulatory framework and access 
to market information and efficient trade-related services. 
Private investment in agricultural production remains low in the aftermath 
of a protracted conflict, as it is often perceived as being too risky. Yet 
investment in agriculture production should be treated as a priority since 
increased food production reduces the dependency on foreign aid that 
developed during the conflict and helps restore market entitlements. 
Agriculture often represents the dominant export activity and is a major 
source of foreign exchange and government revenue. Agricultural 
development can further facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants and 
civilian returnees in rural areas (WSP, 1997a: 8). Under normal 
circumstances, the agricultural sector is meant to benefit from conventional 
economic reforms aimed at removing anti-agricultural bias and promoting 
nontraditional agricultural exports. But FitzGerald (1997: 60) underlines 
that in the case of war-torn countries, farm price deregulation does not 
necessarily increase peasant output unless (i) credit and transport 
conditions are improved; (ii) the question of land ownership is 
appropriately settled; and (iii) farmers can spend their harvest earnings on 
producer goods such as fertilisers or agricultural machinery. 
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The state may have an essential role in providing the right incentives as 
public investment in the agricultural sector can help attract private 
investors (crowding-in effect). Collier and Gunning (1995: 239) suggest 
that a possible strategy for the government is to make the necessary 
investment in nontradable capital and lease it to private entrepreneurs on 
short, but renewable, tenure, or else to subsidise the act of commitment of 
private investors in irreversible agricultural assets. But while the former 
option makes private agents vulnerable to the government that becomes 
landlord, the latter might lead to corruption rather than judiciously 
"backing winners" through subsidies. 
11.4 ECONOMIC MODELS OF CONTEMPORARY WARS 
The emergence of more rigorous studies was made possible by the 
availability of new and more systematic data on war, in particular the data 
set of Singer and Small (1994) on civil wars between 1816 and 1992. This 
data set allows for the combination of standard economic data (e.g. Penn 
World Tables, World Bank statistics) with a standard source on civil wars. 
The latter are defined along specific criteria. They comprise all internal 
conflicts that resulted in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year, 
combatants and civilians included. To distinguish genuine war situations 
from massacres, pogroms and purges, Singer and Small specify that the 
weaker forces must cause to the stronger ones at least 5% of the number of 
fatalities they incur. The government must further be a party to the conflict. 
The Singer and Small data set gives the dates of the starting and ending of 
all civil wars since 1816 by month. Because socioeconomic data (e.g. 
income per capita) are not available for all war-torn countries prior to 
1960, empirical studies focus on the last three decades. 
H.4.1 Econometric Analysis of War Causes 
A broad consensus prevails among scholars that postconflict 
reconstruction cannot succeed unless the root causes of war are correctly 
understood and eliminated, at least in part. Effective research on war 
causes has also been singled out as a prerequisite for the selection of early 
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warning signals and the design of successful conflict prevention policies. 
This has led a few economists to investigate with different models whether 
civil wars have economic causes, and how these interact with other 
variables. In what follows, we briefly describe the methodology and main 
findings of such pioneering work (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Auvinen and 
Nafziger, 1999). 
Drawing on previous work by Grossman (1995) and Azam (1995), the 
models used are based on utility theory in that people rebel only if the 
expected benefits outweigh the costs of rebellion. Pooled cross-country 
time-series regression techniques are applied to a sample of developing 
countries which did or did not experience a civil war over the past 30 
years. Several econometric methods have been applied to test the 
robustness of the findings, including ordinary least squares (OLS), 
generalized least squares (GLS), two-staged least squares (2SLS), tobit and 
probit models. 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) investigated for the first time into the 
economic causes of civil war. In their model, the benefits of rebellion are 
an increasing function of p(T)-T and P, where p is the probability of rebel 
victory, which diminishes in the per capita taxable base of the economy, T. 
P stands for the size of the population and is meant to capture the desire 
for secession. Turning to the costs of rebellion, the probability of war 
diminishes in both the expected duration of war (D) and the income per 
capita of the population (Y). Rebels further face co-ordination costs which 
can be assimilated to transaction costs. Formally, the authors set out the 
rebel decision on whether to embark on civil war as hanging on the rebel 
utility function which they specify as: 
Ï p(T).G(T,P)dt_>nm + Qdt 
L a+')' io a+r)' 
where Uw is the rebel utility to engage in a civil war, G = gain conditional 
upon victory, C = coordination costs, and r = the discount rate. For a 
complete development of the model, see Collier and Hoeffler (1998: 565-
567). 
To summarise, the probability of civil war is a function of the gains from 
rebellion, made up of the probability of a rebel's victory and the expected 
gains from it (taxable base), and the cost of rebellion measured in terms of 
opportunity costs (income rebels have to forego) and co-ordination costs. 
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Four proxies are determined for these variables: per capita income for the 
opportunity cost, share of primary exports in GDP for natural resource 
endowment (i.e. taxable base), population size and ethno-linguistic 
fractionalisation for co-ordination costs. The dependent variables are the 
occurrence and duration of civil war. The authors use probit and tobit 
regressions to investigate whether the explanatory variables are powerful 
in predicting civil wars, using a sample of 98 countries - of which 27 
experienced civil wars - over the period 1965-92. The results show that 
income per capita is a significant and strong determinant of the two 
endogenous variables because of higher opportunity costs at higher income 
levels. The effect of natural resource endowment is nonmonotonic in that 
the risk of war increases at low levels and decreases at high levels. The 
authors interpret this as follows: at relatively low levels, increased natural 
resources constitute an attraction for the rebels as this bears the promise of 
a higher taxable base of the economy. At high levels, natural resources 
enhance the financial capacity of the state which translates into improved 
ability for the ruling elite to stay in power. The findings confirm that a 
large population increases the attraction of secession, although one could 
argue that the larger the population, the higher the probability of that 
country having a civil war to the extent that the main criterion applied by 
Singer and Small (1994) is to witness more than 1,000 casualties in a given 
year. Endogeneity problems should also be considered, for instance with 
regard to national income. 
Auvinen and Nafziger (1999) conducted another study on the sources of 
so-called "complex humanitarian emergencies" (CHE)3. The authors posit 
that stagnation and decline of income, high inequality, a large share of 
military expenditures in GNP, falling real aid, a tradition of violent 
conflict, and low IMF credits as a percentage of GNP all contribute to the 
emergence of CHEs, i.e. are all positively correlated with complex 
humanitarian emergencies. While some of these assumptions simply derive 
from common sense, others are grounded on previous work. With cross-
country statistical information for over 70 countries in the 1980s, Nafziger 
(1996) supported four initial hypotheses for the economic causes of 
humanitarian disasters: 
Following Vayrynen (1996), the authors define complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs) as 
human-made crises in which large numbers of people die and suffer from war, physical violence, 
or displacement. CHEs are usually accompanied by widespread disease and hunger. 
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1. Stagnation and protracted decline in incomes (real GDP per capita), 
caused by international economic shocks and deterioration, and/or a 
failure of agricultural development. One should further add among 
potential causes of stagnation leading to humanitarian crises bad 
economic policy and predatory practices by the state. 
2. Unequal and immiserising growth, resulting from various factors such 
as exogenous market driven trends, government policies, regional and 
ethnic economic competition, or regional conflict and lack of 
economic integration. In addition, growing regional inequality and 
limited regional economic integration, often found in economic 
enclaves, can exacerbate ethnic and regional competition and conflict. 
Lack of regional economic integration not only increases the 
transaction costs of inter-regional trade flows, investment, and 
migrants, but also reduces the extent to which major social forces in 
the regions have a vested interest in remaining politically integrated 
with other regions (see also Schiff and Winters, 1997). 
3. Rapid population growth during substantial environmental 
degradation. Of particular importance is the access to land (land 
tenure, land reform and redistribution, and access to water for 
drinking and irrigation). Population growth, insecure land tenure and 
environmental degradation can lead to conflict by reducing economic 
performance or necessitating the sharing of scarce resources. 
4. Large and abrupt shifts in income and wealth distribution during 
adjustment and liberalisation programmes. Structural adjustment 
programmes redistribute the timing and extent of costs and benefits 
among economic actors. Most expenditure-reducing policies and 
some expenditure-switching policies tend to impose immediate 
welfare costs, while benefits emerge only after one or two years. This 
shapes the costs and benefits of adjustment to classes, regions, and 
communities and their perceived grievances. 
Auvinen and Nafziger (1999) include in their definition of CHEs a 
measure of the number of refugees by origin adjusted for the source 
country's population. Thus, in addition to the "Correlates of War" database 
of Singer and Small (1994), the basic data is drawn from the World 
Refugee Survey of the US Committee for Refugees from 1980 to 1996. In 
operalising the dependent variable (CHEs), the author further constructed a 
composite indicator that includes malnutrition and disease. As for the 
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explanatory variables, annual real GDP growth and GNP per capita are 
indicators of short-term changes and levels of income, respectively. Food 
and agricultural development is measured by the annual growth of food 
production per capita while changes and levels of per capital official 
development assistance (ODA) and terms of trade indicate sudden external 
shocks and long-term developments in a country's international economic 
position. The usual Gini index of income concentration measures income 
inequality. The use of IMF credit as a percentage of GNP provides an 
indicator of the extent of the IMF's intervention in a country. Finally, the 
tradition of violent conflict is measured by the number of deaths from 
domestic violence between 1963 and 1977. 
The CHE function can thus be written as follows: 
CHE=J[GDPGRO; GlNI; GNPCAP; IMFGNP; CPIDIFF; MILCENT; DEATRAD, 
FOODGRO; ODAPOP80; ODAPOGRO; POLRI, TOT80, TOTCHANG) 
where GDPGi?0=gross domestic product (average annual growth, %); 
Gjm=Gini Index; GAfPCAP=gross national product per capita; 
IMFGNP=ViSe of IMF credit as a percentage of GNP; CPZD/FF=consumer 
price index, annual change; M/LCßVT^'Military centrality": annual 
military expenditures as a percentage of GNP; DEATRAD="death 
tradition": number of deaths from political violence; F00DGÄ0=annual 
growth of food production per capita; ODAP0PS0=official development 
assistance per capita; 0DAP0GÄO=official development assistance per 
capital growth; P0L/Î7=summary index of political rights grievances, i.e. 
demands for greater political rights other than autonomy; 7OT80=terms of 
trade index; and TOTCHANG=tttms of trade index, annual change (see 
Nafziger and Auvinen, 1997: 74-75). 
Auvinen and Nafziger test the hypothesised sources of conflict mentioned 
above with a data set drawn from 124 developing countries for the period 
1980-1995, using pooled cross-national time-series regression techniques. 
Simple correlation analysis indicates a direct and significant association (at 
the 1% level) of the dependent variable with inflation, conflict tradition 
and military expenditure while the association is inverse with food 
production growth, GDP growth and GNP per capita. ODA and the terms 
of trade are however not associated with the dependent variable. The 
robustness of the finding is tested with the following models in addition to 
the basic OLS: 2SLS each time two-way causality is suspected between the 
predictors and the dependent variable, GLS with the Prais-Winsten 
transformation because of autocorrelated disturbances within the cross-
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sectional units, tobit and probit models. As the assumption of constant 
coefficients is unrealistic in a pool containing as much as 124 different 
types of cross-sectional units, the authors further specified fixed-effects 
and random-effects regression models6. Different lag structures were also 
applied to increase the validity of the findings. Most of the hypotheses are 
supported by the results of OLS linear regression analysis. However, some 
unexpected results are worth mentioning: 
• Inflation appears to be a source of CHEs even if real economic growth 
adjusts for inflation and the distributional aspects of inflation were 
expected to be captured in income inequality. One possible explanation 
resides in the relative invariability of the data on income distribution 
because of infrequent surveys resulting in no change in the Gini 
coefficient of many countries between 1980 and 1995. Yearly inflation 
figures may thus capture the destabilising effect of income distribution 
shifts as inflation redistributes income from low-income workers and 
those on fixed income to high-income groups, at least in the early stages. 
Economists such as Alesina and Drazen have provided an interesting 
political perspective on inflation. These authors explain why there is a 
surge in inflation when stabilisation measures are delayed as different 
social groups compete to avoid bearing the cost of reform (Alesina and 
Drazen, 1989). 
• The lack of data also partly explains that changes in the terms of trade 
are not associated with the dependent variable. GDP growth may capture 
some of the variations between terms of trade and CHEs. 
After correcting for first-order autocorrelation, IMF funding is no longer 
associated with complex emergencies. The authors argue that it may reflect 
IMF's rejection of countries plagued by wars and humanitarian 
catastrophe. We would argue that this rather reflects the fact that a 
government fighting a war to survive is inclined to give absolute priority to 
political considerations and the war effort. As a result, it generally misses 
the stringent fiscal and monetary targets set under IMF programmes, which 
As Auvinen and Nafziger (1999:277-278) specify, "the fixed effects or least squares dummy 
variable model captures variation unique to cross sections in an intercept that varies from one 
cross section to another. In contrast to the fixed-effects model, the random effects or error 
component model assumes that the magnitude and the direction of the relationships among the 
cross sections are random but captured and specified in the error term explicitly. As in the OLS 
model, a single intercept is again postulated, but the differential intercepts are merged within the 
error term." 
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in turn leads to the withdrawal of the Fund's support. This causal 
relationship clearly appears when estimating the two-staged least squares 
model to correct for the potential simultaneous equations bias. A two-way 
causal relationship also appears between GDP growth and CHEs although 
the relationship is stronger from GDP growth to emergencies than vice 
versa when applying different lag structures on the OLS and GLS models. 
The same applies to the relationship between inflation and CHEs whereby 
humanitarian emergencies may give rise to inflation rather than vice-versa. 
There is also a two-way relationship between CHEs and military 
expenditures as the latter tend to rise during conflicts but are also 
conducive to coups d'état and violent conflict. 
The obvious problem of simultaneity between the political and economic 
variables in cross-section data calls for particular efforts to discover 
important causal relationships. The robustness of the results presented 
above raises some questions since the reduced form model by Auvinen and 
Nafziger (1999) comprises a high number of explanatory variables. This 
tends to dilute the results, which is not the case for the structural form 
model presented by Collier and Hoeffier (1998). Running sensitivity tests 
by varying the set of additional explanatory variables would increase the 
confidence that the result's significance does not depend on the particular 
specifications chosen. 
This being said, the findings of Auvinen and Nafziger (1999) do not 
fundamentally contradict with the conclusions of Collier and Hoeffier 
(1998). Yet, they provide empirical evidence that other exogenous 
variables not considered by the latter are also powerful explanatory factors 
of civil wars. Highlighting successful explanatory variables for the 
emergence of civil war obviously rely on the initial assumptions and 
objectives of the researchers. This calls for further research to identify 
empirical regularities in the relationship between economic policy, growth 
and conflicts. The updated data set of Small and Singer (1994) provides a 
basis to harmonise the countries and periods under examination to allow 
for direct cross-country comparisons. 
Research conducted so far makes it clear that a single factor can rarely be 
identified as the sole root cause of conflict. It should be reminded that 
economic variables only provide a limited and partial picture of the 
rationale for war, even though they may still represent an important factor 
contributing to the violent outburst of a conflict. Social scientists have 
stressed that sources of conflict are many and various, and that 
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understanding their subtle interactions requires a broad, multidisciplinary 
perspective7. We would like to stress here the conclusions of Stavenhagen 
(1996) drawn from a wide-ranging study on ethnic conflict and the nation-
state: economic factors do play a crucial role in the generation of ethnic 
conflicts. Yet these factors must be combined with tribal, religious or 
ethnic enmities that are often invented by the contending parties to justify 
or legitimise violence (see also Alesina et al., 1997). "When regional and 
social disparities in the distribution of economic resources also reflect 
differences between identified ethnic groups, then conflict over social and 
economic issues readily turns into ethnic conflict" (p. 294). Psychological 
theories of collective violence, and the theory of relative deprivation in 
particular (e.g. Gurr, 1970) are useful contributions to address the 
interactions between economic and noneconomic explanatory variables of 
conflict. Easterly and Levine (1997) bring further insights on the influence 
of ethnic division on economic growth. The two economists argue that 
Africa's high ethnic fragmentation explains a significant part of the 
characteristics associated with low economic growth, such as political 
instability, high government deficits and insufficient infrastructure. 
U.4.2 Econometric Analysis of War Consequences 
As illustrated in sections II.2 and 111.3 above, the economic consequences 
of civil war have been initially studied through statistical surveys which 
focus both on the macro level (national accounts, sectoral output) and on 
the micro level (distributional impact between and within households). 
Attempts to model the effects of armed conflicts were nonexistent until 
very recently. In a pioneering work, Collier (1999) develops a model of the 
economic effects of civil war and economic growth in the postwar period. 
No previous author had quantified the growth effects of civil wars and 
their aftermath, although several economists had examined the relationship 
between political violence in general and growth. 
Since the mid-1980s, there has indeed been a renewed interest in political 
sources of economic growth and a boom in empirical research in the form 
of cross-country growth analysis. Political variables have been tested in 
See for instance Van de Goor et al. (1996:1-28) who assess different root causes of war such 
as historical circumstances, nationalism and ethnicity, religion, state formation and state 
collapse, competition over resources, démocratisation, institutional weakness and armament. 
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growth regressions, and a very heterogeneous set of variables has been 
suggested to measure economically relevant differences in the political 
system of countries. These studies typically regress the average growth rate 
for a cross section of countries on selected political variables while 
checking for other determinants of economic growth identified in the 
empirical literature on economic growth. At the methodological level, 
there are two major methodological problems related to cross-section 
regression surveys (Brunetti, 1997). First, there is a problem of 
"simultaneity" as the usual ordinary least square (OLS) regressions used in 
most empirical studies do not reveal the direction of causation. Authors 
generally assume that the political process determines the growth rate, but 
some theoretical arguments indicate that the direction of causation could 
be the other way round. The second problem relates to the robustness of 
the econometric results to variations in the specification of the growth 
equation. This problem is particularly acute in empirical research on 
growth as the latter has been hypothesised to be related to a high number 
of variables. It has been suggested that empirical analyses should therefore 
provide formal sensitivity tests of the explanatory variable under 
consideration by modifying the set of additional right-hand variables. This 
would provide more confidence that the significance of the result does not 
depend on the initial specifications. 
Psychological perception of inequalities appears to offer better explanatory 
variables of political variables than strict quantitative indicators, as 
revealed in a systematic overview of the literature on political variables 
used in cross-country growth analysis (Brunetti, 1997). This author 
reviews empirical links between economic growth and five categories of 
relevant political variables, namely democracy, government stability, 
political violence, policy volatility, and subjective perception of politics. 
Brunetti concludes that measures of democracy are least successful as 
explanatory variables in cross-country growth regressions, whereas 
measures of policy volatility and subjective perception of politics are most 
successful. The best criteria do not reflect any objective measure of 
political stability but are based on the subjective perception of the agents 
that make the growth-relevant decisions. This kind of "subjective" or 
"psychological" variables seem to exert a significant impact on economic 
growth, but have just begun to be taken into account in cross-country 
studies. 
Coming back to the economic consequences of civil war per se, Knight et 
al. (1996) quantify peace dividend in an empirical study on 79 countries. In 
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their panel regression of the ratio of investment to GDP, warfare is found 
to have a strongly negative effect. When controlling for physical and 
human capital, together with military spending and trade policy, war loses 
significance in the growth regression. This means that civil wars reduce 
growth mainly by depleting the domestic capital stock in its various forms. 
Knight et al. further find that increased military expenditure has significant 
negative growth effects. Consequently, the single source of the peace 
dividend in their study resides in the reduction in military expenditure 
following the successful settlement of a conflict. De Melo et al. (1996) 
investigate the effect of civil wars in the transition economies of eastern 
Europe on the average growth rate over the period 1989-1994. The dummy 
variable "regional tension" in the growth regression is found to be highly 
significant and reduces the annual average growth rate by 9% over the 
whole period. The above dummy includes persistent internal conflicts or 
conflict-related blockades. 
Building on these previous findings, Collier (1999) explicitly quantifies 
the effects of civil war on growth both during the war and during the first 
five postwar years. The author combines the data set of Small and Singer 
(1994) with the Penn World Tables and obtains a sample of 92 countries of 
which 19 had civil wars over the period 1960-1989. Collier distinguishes 
five central economic effects of war: (i) destruction (of physical capital, 
human capital, resources, infrastructure, etc.); (ii) disruption (insecurity, 
breakdown of social order) which reduces the efficiency of public 
expenditure; (iii) diversion (e.g. of public expenditure from output-
enhancing to military activities; see Knight et. al. above); (iv) dissaving to 
the extent that income losses are regarded as temporary; and (v) portfolio 
substitution whereby private agents gradually shift their assets out of the 
country (including financial, physical and human assets). The central 
argument of Collier is that the portfolio substitution effect may be felt long 
after the end of hostilities8. Following this assumption, the restoration of 
peace does not necessarily produce a dividend. Downward adjustment of 
the capital stock during the war is a slow process. In the aftermath of a 
war, the desired capital stock is lower than had there been no war, although 
higher than that desired during the war. In the case of a brief war, the 
desired postconflict capital stock may be still below the prevailing stock 
capital at the end of the war. In this case, the decline in the stock of capital 
This assumption is not negligible if one considers that around 40% of the total wealth owned by 
Africans is held in foreign assets. 
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will continue because of continued capital substitution, yielding a war 
"overhang" effect instead of a peace dividend. The explanation is found in 
the greater risk of renewed war perceived by economic agents - which is a 
rational expectation according to the findings of Collier and Hoeffler 
presented above - as Well as in the higher burden of military expenditure 
that prevails in the direct aftermath of a short conflict. The author insists 
on the fact that the exodus of factor endowments is a gradual process and 
varies according to the types of capital: liquid assets are obviously highly 
responsive (endogenous) to war while the supplies of buildings, land and 
unskilled labour are less responsive (exogenous). There is thus a critical 
duration of civil Wars, below which growth is lower in the postwar period 
than in the counterfactual case (no war in the first place) and above which 
there is a peace dividend. 
Collier characterises prewar aggregate output in the simple Cobb-Douglas 
form where N denotes endogenous factor endowment and X those which 
are exogenous: 
O = a- X'1N''" 
As Collier specifies (1999: 170), "the rate of return on the endogenous 
factor will be its marginal product minus its rate of depreciation, d. An 
initial equilibrium is assumed in which the rate of return equals the return, 
r, obtainable on foreign assets, so that 
(X-b)N-b-aXb-d^r 
Civil war reduces the rate of return on the domestic asset relative to that on 
the foreign asset. Both the disruption and diversion effects reduce factor 
productivity while destruction can be interpreted as an increase in the rate 
of depreciation. Civil war adds uncertainty with respect to the return on 
domestic assets, which creates a premium upon holding assets in liquid 
form, which can be easily transferred and held abroad. 
Collier uses OLS and tests the results against fixed and random effects 
models. Civil war is introduced into the regression with three variables to 
capture the effects both during the war and in the first five years of 
subsequent peace: months of warfare, number of potential recovery months 
and a third variable which is a combination of the first two. The findings 
confirm the initial assumptions. The output indicates that the growth rate is 
reduced annually by 2.2% during civil war. During the five years following 
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a conflict which only lasted one year, the growth rate would be 2.1% lower 
than had the war not happened. By contrast, the postwar growth rate is 
enhanced by 5.9% annually after a 15-year war. The OLS model is not 
rejected when tested against the fixed and random effects models. 
Collier also addresses the effects of civil war on the composition of GDP 
as sectors may differ both with respect to the disruption and the diversion 
effects depending on their intensities in endogenous and exogenous 
factors. But since data is particularly weak for civil war economies, these 
compositional effects cannot be tested with a set of comparable cross-
country data set. Instead of multicountry panels, Collier analyses data on a 
single country, Uganda, and reports the evolution of GDP composition 
from 1971 to 1994. The findings thus fall well short of a rigorous test, but 
nonetheless tend to reinforce the initial assumptions made by Collier. 
Activities with any of the following characteristics tend to contract during 
the war: activities which are either capital or transaction-intensive, and 
those which supply either capital or transactions. These include 
construction, transport, distribution, finance and capital-intensive 
manufacturing, whose share in GDP contracted from 42.5% to 28.7%. The 
inverse holds for low transaction, low asset intensity activities captured by 
arable subsistence agriculture: its share in GDP rose from 20.5% to 36% at 
the end of the war in 1986, decreasing to 32.1% in 1994. This means that 
the war-invulnerable activity nearly doubled as a share of GDP during the 
war whereas it would have been expected to contract, had there been no 
war. As one could expect, peace reverses the compositional changes 
caused by prolonged civil war. 
Some of the findings above may appear somehow trivial in that they 
simply confirm what common sense dictates: a country impoverished by 
decades of civil wars tends to have an enhanced postwar growth (or 
recovery) rate by mere virtue of its extreme poverty. Collier's study 
nonetheless provide solid evidence of key issues that had been overlooked 
in the past, such as the gradual process of capital loss that accrues from 
higher risk, increased uncertainty and disrupted social capital. This results 
in increased transaction costs, the substitution of portfolios abroad and 
dissaving. Another conclusion is that these factors may extend for years 
into the postconflict period. Based on these findings, we would argue that 
the restoration of social capital, interpersonal trust and confidence among 
economic agents should be given absolute priority in the formulation of 
reconstruction strategies. Otherwise, the adverse effect of portfolio 
substitution on domestic growth in the aftermath of a conflict, if left 
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unchecked, might jeopardise the fragile peace-building process. A crucial 
challenge lies in finding a convincing approach to account for social 
capital in economic analysis, and to generate it through public policy 
(Fukuyama, 2001). 
11.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The literature review confirms that the distributional impact of economic 
reform plays a critical role in the firm restoration of peace. Yet this 
dimension has often been overlooked in economic policy advice to war-
torn countries. The distributional impact of economic policy options 
should be systematically assessed to help identify potential winners and 
losers from peace and economic reforms, and design alternative policies or 
compensatory measures as appropriate. The following chapter builds on 
that suggestion and examines the potential contribution of the social 
accounting framework in the case of Guatemala. 
The literature review also highlights that interactions between the 
economic and political spheres may often shape the success of failure of a 
peace-building process. Research should thus help • improve our 
understanding of these politico-economic interactions. In chapters four to 
seven, we present a politico-economic framework which focuses on the 
behaviour of - and interactions between - the main actors involved in 
economic reforms and peace-building. 
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III. DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Unequal income and asset distribution has been recognised as an important 
source of violent conflict (see chapter II). Poverty and high inequality may 
often constitute necessary preconditions for the (re)emergence of conflict, 
but are generally not sufficient to translate into political violence unless 
combined with some form of group identity that can be mobilised for 
collective action. Distributional issues are also crucial in the postwar 
period as reconstruction and peace-building often entail substantial shifts 
in the distribution of wealth and power. Experts have increasingly called 
upon the international community to put distributional concerns at the 
heart of rebuilding strategies. A correct understanding of distributional 
impact is essential to economic reforms. Indeed, structural adjustment may 
have major destabilising effects as the living conditions of the poor and of 
politically vocal groups rapidly deteriorate, and longer-term costs and 
benefits of reforms are redistributed among different economic sectors and 
classes. Thus, reforms should not be considered only in their narrow 
economic aspects, but must be analysed from a political-economy point of 
view, as forcefully argued by Boyce and Pastor (1997). 
The social accounting framework has been developed - and extensively 
used - for income distribution analysis. It offers a coherent framework in 
which to reconcile sparse economic data on war-torn economies. It further 
makes it possible to focus on distributional issues. This chapter starts with 
a short presentation of the social accounting matrix (SAM) framework. We 
then construct a social accounting matrix for Guatemala whose base year is 
1986 (beginning of the peace process). The SAM thus captures the 
Guatemalan economy at the beginning of the peace process, which lasted 
over ten years. As detailed in chapter VI, Guatemala has been torn apart by 
more than thirty years of political violence, and it is estimated that over 
100,000 people died in the civil war. 
Based on the SAM, we analyse the structure of the Guatemalan economy 
in terms of sectoral contribution to total supply and demand, and secondary 
distribution of value added from production factors to household groups. 
We then specify endogenous and exogenous accounts and calculate 
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multipliers which capture the transfer, open-loop and close-loop effects 
resulting from an exogenous injection. With this multiplier model, we run 
simulations of various exogenous shocks in the tax accounts and assess 
their distributional impact. This is because tax reform has been singled out 
as the major economic policy challenge in post-conflict Guatemala. The 
first simulations focus on an increase in government spending while the 
following three deal with changes between and among direct and indirect 
taxes, changes which are initially budget-neutral. Finally, we discuss the 
contributions and limitations of the SAM framework. 
111.1 A SOCIAL ACCOUNTING FRAMEWORK 
The study by Pyatt and Thorbecke published in 1976 under the title 
Planning Techniques for a Better Future is generally considered as the 
first comprehensive description of the social accounting matrix framework. 
SAM arose from a growing dissatisfaction with the existing practice of 
national accounting with its exclusive emphasis on measuring economic 
growth (Keuning and de Ruijter, 1988). A SAM-can be defined as a 
numerical representation of the circular flow of income within the 
economy with emphasis on distributive aspects. Transactions in a 
particular year appear in a matrix format, showing receipts on the rows and 
outlays in the columns. Social accounting matrices (SAMs) have been 
extensively used for income distribution analysis (e.g. Defourny and 
Thorbecke, 1984; Pyatt and Round, 1985; Alarcon and Immink, 1993; De 
Janvry and Sadoulet, 1995). 
The SAM is a simple and efficient framework in which to organise 
economic data in a consistent and comprehensive way. The system is 
consistent in that for every income there should be a corresponding outlay; 
and comprehensive in the sense that both the receiver and the sender of 
every transaction is identified. The SAM is an extension of the matrix of 
inter-industry flows, or the "input-output" table in which the payments or 
expenditures are listed in columns and the receipts in rows (for a 
presentation of the SAM framework, see King, 1981; de Janvry and 
Sadoulet, 1995). The inclusion of different types of households in SAMs 
distinguishes the approach from standard close-loop Leontief systems and 
makes it possible to bring the distribution of income into the picture. 
Including factor and household accounts implies an extension of the 
structure of accounting balances as set out by Quesnay (1758) and the 
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previous close-loop multiplier formulations which have been developed 
within his accounting framework (see also Stone, 1978). As underlined by 
Pyatt and Round (1979), the distinguishing feature is that value added in 
different production activities is paid directly to households of various 
types in Quesnay's Tableau as opposed to being routed to them via a set of 
factor accounts in the SAM framework. 
SAMs make it possible to maintain accounting consistency between the 
patterns of production, the institutional and household distributions of 
income, and the patterns of consumption. Statistical data from different 
sources and information from diverse household and production surveys 
can be reorganised in a systematic manner within the SAM framework. 
The data can be cross-checked for consistency and reconciled under the 
logic of double-entry bookkeeping. The SAM hence offers an adequate 
accounting system to reconcile the dispersed and incomplete economic 
data that is typically found for war-torn, low-income economies (see 
chapter I). 
The are generally six basic types of accounts in the SAM: production 
activities, commodity, factors (labour and capital), the current accounts of 
the domestic institutions (i.e. households, firms and government), the 
capital account and the rest of the world. Production can be defined in 
terms of a set of production activities classified according to criteria such 
as type of commodity, level of technology, and prevailing form of 
organisation. Schematically, the system functions as follows: the 
production activities generate a flow of value added which accrues to the 
various factors of production which, in turn, can be broken down 
according to labour skills, types of capital, and land classification. The 
resulting factorial income distribution provides the major source of income 
for the institutions. Then transfers are added. Finally, institutions spend 
their incomes on a variety of commodities and services which are supplied 
by production activities, thus completing the feedback system or "loop". 
This reveals the situation prevailing at one point in time, which usually 
corresponds to a fiscal year. In other words, a SAM shows how sectoral 
value added accrues to production factors and their institutional owners, 
how these income - corrected for net current transfers - are spent, and how 
expenditures on commodities lead to sectoral production and value added. 
The leakages from this cycle, e.g. in the form of payments abroad or 
savings, are also shown. Capital finance may then be linked to savings, 
presenting a glimpse of the dynamics in an economy (King, 1981, Arida 
and Taylor, 1988; Keuning and de Ruijter, 1988). 
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Depending on the aim of a study, the various accounts can be specified at 
different levels of aggregation. The SAM may further cover different 
economic entities (nation, region, community, village). The convention of 
double-entry bookkeeping guarantees that there is no leakage or injection 
into the system, as every flow must go from one account to another. 
Extension of the input-output model to a SAM framework is performed by 
partitioning the accounts into endogenous and exogenous accounts and 
assuming that the column coefficients of the endogenous accounts are all 
constant. Endogenous accounts are those for which changes in the level of 
expenditures directly follow any change in income, while exogenous 
accounts are those for which expenditures are set independently of income. 
Exogenous accounts often encompass the government, capital and/or rest-
of-the-world accounts, justifying the choice on the basis of macroeconomic 
theory coupled with the objective of the study. 
The SAM can be converted into linear models by assuming constant 
distribution and expenditure coefficients, in addition to the standard 
Leontief constant production coefficients. As mentioned above, one major 
use of multiplier models in the SAM framework has been to explore issues 
of income distribution. The linear multipliers provide a way to do 
comparative analysis of the impact of exogenous changes in various 
coefficients, or shifts in the size and composition of final demand for 
sectoral production and employment. This enables the computation of 
direct as well as indirect effects of an exogenous shock. Indeed, the close-
loop character of the SAM formulation implies that the incomes of 
production activities, factors and institutions are all derived from injections 
into the economy via a multiplier process, as elaborated further below. 
The SAM framework suffers from severe limitations that reduce its 
applicability as a model because of several stringent underlying 
assumptions: no substitution effect, no resource constraint, no room for 
price effects, constant coefficients, etc. (see section 111.5). Nonetheless, the 
SAM framework makes it possible to simulate shifts in taxes, exports, 
investment, demand for public services and in transfers to value added or 
households, as empirically demonstrated below in the case of a 
Guatemalan SAM. The multiplier model provides information on the 
impact of such changes on labour and capital remuneration, income of the 
various household categories as defined in the SAM, government 
revenues, savings and imports. In the application that follows, the SAM-
based model helps predict and understand the reactions of various 
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socioeconomic groups to economic policy reform options. It thus 
contributes to politically informed decisions. 
111.2 SAM AS A MULTIPLIER MODEL 
The SAM can be used as a basis for simple modelling9. More specifically, 
the effects of exogenous injections on the economic system as a whole can 
be explored by multiplier analysis, which requires partitioning the SAM 
into endogenous and exogenous accounts. The assumptions of SAM-based 
models are similar to those of traditional input-output models, i.e. fixed, 
linear coefficients (hence stable average propensities to spend); constant 
expenditure shares; constant expenditure income elasticity; complementary 
factor inputs; and excess capacity throughout the economy. Thus, the 
applicability of SAM-based models remains limited to situations 
characteristic of the Keynesian environment of a fix-price model, with 
excess production capacity and absence of substitution. Yet the SAM 
approach presents several advantages over the traditional input-output 
analysis: 
• In the input-output model the exogenous part is the final demand 
vector, whereas there are several options regarding the choice between 
endogenous and exogenous accounts in the case of a SAM embracing 
the whole circular flows diagram. We recall that endogenous accounts 
are those for which changes in the level of expenditure directly follow 
any change in income, while exogenous accounts are those for which 
we assume that the expenditures are set independently of income. 
• It is important to stress a major difference between SAM-based and 
Leontief models. Multipliers in the former encompass the effects of an 
increase in income on production, which is not the case with the 
Leontief model. SAM multipliers are thus larger than the corresponding 
input-output ones, for value added and incomes generate demand 
linkages in the SAM framework while only intermediate demand serves 
as a multiplier in the input-output analysis, value added being a leakage 
(see equations 9 and 10 below). 
The reader who is familiar with SAM-based models and the decomposition of accounting 
multipliers can skip this section and move straight to section 111.3 which deals with the 
Guatemalan case study. 
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• A major flaw of the input-output framework is that the agricultural 
sector has very low production multipliers as it captures only the 
production backward and forward linkages. The low production 
linkages of the primary sector served as an argument in favour of an 
industry-led development pattern in the 1960s and 1970s. The use of 
the SAM framework provided new arguments for a development 
strategy based on agriculture (see de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1995): by 
considering the linkage effects created by agriculture on labour and 
household incomes, the SAM multipliers show that the primary sector 
does not fare any worse than the industrial sector. 
The multipliers can be interpreted as the effect of an injection of one unit 
in the exogenous account(s) on the endogenous accounts. Standard 
practice is to pick, for the exogenous accounts, one or more among the 
government, capital, and rest-of-the-world accounts. If a single account is 
taken as exogenous, the fact that the endogenous accounts must all balance 
at a new equilibrium guarantees that the exogenous account will also 
balance, since the SAM as a whole must balance. If two or more accounts 
are set exogenously, then only their sum must balance. Each choice of 
which accounts are endogenous defines a different macro "closure" to the 
SAM model. The endogenous accounts should at least comprise the three 
following categories or modules: productive activities, factors of 
production and institutions. The range of shocks that can be studied with a 
SAM model then depends on the choice of the exogenous accounts. With 
an exogenous government account, changes in demand for administrative 
services and in transfers to value added or households can be simulated. 
With an exogenous capital account, shocks are mainly changes in 
investment, and with an exogenous rest-of-the-world account, changes in 
exports. In all cases, the multiplier model gives the impact on the structure 
of production and on factor and institution incomes. It also provides 
information on the leaks on exogenous accounts (e.g. government 
revenues, savings, and imports). 
Following the presentation and notation suggested by Defourny and 
Thorbecke (1984), table III.l shows a partition of a SAM involving three 
endogenous accounts. 
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Table 111.1 : Simplified partitioned SAM 
Receipts 
Endo-
genous 
accounts 
Exog. 
Expenditures 
Endogenous accounts 
Factors 
Households 
Production 
activities 
Sum of other 
accounts 
Totals 
Factors 
0 
T2, 
0 
l'i 
y'i 
Households 
0 
T22 
Ta2 
I2 
y's 
Production 
activities 
T,3 
0 
T33 
Ia 
y's 
Exog. 
Sum of other 
accounts 
X, 
Xl 
X3 
t 
y< 
Totals 
V1 
V2 
V3 
yx 
The matrix T33 corresponds to the input-output transactions matrix. Tu 
allocates the value added generated by the various production activities 
into income accruing to the factors of production. The matrix T2; maps the 
factorial income distribution into the household income distribution, and 
matrix 3T22 refers to the income transfers within and among household 
groups. Finally, matrix Tj2 captures the expenditure pattern of the various 
institutions for the different commodities which they consume. 
In table III.2 below, the totals for incomes received by endogenous 
accounts are given by the column vector y„, which consists of two parts 
arising from (i) expenditures by the endogenous accounts recorded as Tm 
and summed up as column vector n; and (ii) injections referring to 
expenditures by the exogenous accounts Tm, and summed up as x. 
1 
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Table 111.2: Partitioning of a SAM 
Receipts 
Endogenous 
Exogenous 
Totals 
Expenditures 
Endogenous 
Inn 
Leakages 
Tm 
Sum 
n 
I 
Yn 
Exogenous 
Injections 
Tm 
Residualbalances 
lux 
Sum 
X 
t 
y'' 
Totals 
Yn 
Y* 
We can write for the incomes received by the endogenous accounts 
yn=n+x (1) 
and analogously for the exogenous accounts 
yx=l+t - (2) 
The elements of the endogenous transaction matrix Tnn can be expressed as 
ratios of their column sums, that is as average expenditure propensities, 
* nn — Anyn, (V 
Hence, the column OfAn show expenditures as proportions of total income 
(y'„ in table III.2) while Tnn provides the absolute amount. In equation (3), 
Jn is a diagonal matrix whose elements are yh i=l,...,n. Along the same 
lines, 
T1n=Ajn (4) 
When introducing the matrices An and Ah we can express n and 1 as 
n=A„y„ (5) 
I=Ajn (6) 
Combining equations (1 ) and (5), we obtain the multiplier matrix Ma, 
yn=Anyn +X=(I-AJ1X= Max (7) 
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By multiplying injections (x) by the multiplier matrix Ma, equation (7) 
yields the vector of endogenous incomes (yn). In other words, we obtain 
the income levels of factors (yi), households (3¾) and production activities 
(y3) which are endogenously determined as functions of the exogenous 
injection Qc). Ma is also called "the accounting multiplier matrix". It is 
important to stress that a major limitation of the accounting multiplier 
matrix is that it implies unitary income elasticities, meaning that the 
prevailing average expenditure propensities are assumed to apply to any 
incremental injection. 
111.2.1 Decomposition of SAM Multipliers 
Pyatt and Round (1979) have shown that, based on the partition of the 
endogenous section of the SAM into three categories or modules of 
endogenous accounts (activities, factors and institutions), the matrix of 
multipliers can be decomposed into four components. These are the initial 
injection, transfer effects, open-loop and close-loop effects. A shock, or 
injection, is given by a change in elements of the exogenous accounts. The 
model solves for the equilibrium level of all the endogenous accounts. The 
coefficients in the rows of the exogenous accounts provide the leakages 
which can be, for instance, the induced demand for imports, the induced 
government revenues, and the induced savings. 
A comparison of tables III. 1 and III.2 shows that Tm is partitioned. The 
corresponding partition of the matrix of average expenditure propensities 
is as follows: 
0
 A32 A3. 
(8) 
We then combine equations (7) and (8) and solve for the production 
activities vector, and obtain 
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ys=A33y3 +( A32y2+x3) - (1-A33)'1 (A32y2+x3). (9) 
In contrast, the open Leontief model can be expressed as follows: 
y3=(I-A33ff (10) 
as A33 is the input-output coefficient matrix and / the exogenous final 
demand. Equation (9) includes in the elements of final demand of the 
Leontief model the effects of income distribution (y2) on household 
consumption through A32 which reflects the consumption pattern of each 
household group. This formulation contains more information and a higher 
degree of endogeneity than in equation (10) since it captures the effects of 
income distribution on consumption (Defourny and Thorbecke, 1984). 
SAM-based models may follow the same logic as the Leontief one, they 
nonetheless have the advantage of providing essential information on the 
distributional impact of economic measures. They may thus help in the 
design of policy reforms that are politically better informed. 
Following the original multiplicative decomposition by Pyatt and Round 
(1979), we can obtain a more elaborate and general expression from the 
accounting model presented above, which is a decomposition of equation 
(7) above. For any matrix A"n of the same size than An and such that 
(1-A0J1 exists, we can write 
yn=Anyn +X=(An- A°n) y„ + A°n yn + x 
=(1-A°n y1 (An-A0Jyn +(I-A°n fx 
= A*yn+(I-A°nfx. (U) 
Multiplying throughout by A* and substituting for A*yn on the right-hand 
side of equation (U) gives 
yn= A*2yn +(r+A*) (l-A°n fx (12) 
Similarly, multiplying both sides of (12) by A *2 and substituting for A *2 y„ 
in this last expression - provided that (I-A*3)'1 exists - gives 
yn=A*3yn +(1+A*+ A*2) (I- A°n fx 
= (1- A*3)'1 +f/+A*+A*2)(/-A°n/ix (13) 
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For the purpose of multiplier decomposition, Pyatt and Round posit that 
o o o 
A\ 
0
 ° A, 
(14) 
and A * as defined in equation ( 11 ) can be expressed as 
A*.. 
A*
 13 
o 
A*32 ° 
(15) 
where A*l3= A13 , A*21 = (I- A22 )'1 A21 and A*32 = (I- A33 f A32. The 
authors further derive a general expression of the equation (13) on the 
grounds that, mathematically speaking, An could be partitioned in as many 
sets of accounts as one may wish: 
y„= (I- A * y +(1+A *+ A*2+... +A 4*-1') (I- A°„ )'x. (16) 
Yet the conceptual framework of economics dictates three partitions of An 
which correspond to factors, endogenous institutions and production 
activities. This also reflects the three steps in the sequence of substitutions 
that correspond to one full cycle in the circular flow of income within the 
economy. Using the notation of table III. 1, Defourny and Thorbecke 
(1984) depict this income flow as follows: 
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Figure UM : Circular flow of income within the economy 
Production 
activities 
T33 
T13 
Institutions 
(incl. HH 
income 
distribution) 
T22 
V 
Factors 
(factorial 
income 
distribution 
An injection in the production activities will first generate a flow of 
income to the factors of production, and then this income will be 
distributed to the institutions. The third step is that the income flow goes 
back to the original account in which the injection has taken place, i.e. 
production activities. The first and second steps are captured by the open-
loop multipliers, while the third step refers to the close-loop multipliers. 
This representation implies that k-S in equation (16). Considering 
equation (7), the multiplier matrix Ma can be expressed, in its 
multiplicative form, as the product of three matrices: 
Ma=M3M2M1 (17) 
With M3=(I- A^y'x, M2=(I+A*+ A*2), and M1 =(1- A\ f. M3 
represents the full circular effects of an income injection going back to its 
point of origin in a series of repeated cycles (own indirect or extra-group 
effects). The total effects once the income has come back to the original 
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account where the injection took place are referred to as "close-loop effects". 
M2 shows the cross-effects of the multiplier process and corresponds to 
open-loop effects (injections into one part of the system have repercussions 
on other parts). As is the case with input-output multipliers, Mi captures 
the direct or intra-group effects such as the transfers of goods between 
activities or the distribution of corporate profits to households. On the 
contrary, Af2 and Mj capture the consequences of the circular flow of 
income within the economy. 
Defourny and Thorbecke (1984) provide another version of this 
decomposition process which they called the additive form : 
Ma=I+T+0+C (18) 
This additive form is related to the multiplicative decomposition presented 
earlier in the following way: 
I The initial injection (identity multiplier effects); 
T=( Mi -I) The net contribution of the transfer multiplier effects; 
0=( M2 -I) Mi The net contribution of the open-loop or cross multiplier 
effects; 
C=( M3 -I) M2 Mi The net contribution of the circular close-loop effects. 
Following this additive decomposition method, equation (18) means that 
the matrix of accounting multipliers Ma is equivalent to the sum of the 
identity matrix (unitary injection in each endogenous account), the transfer 
matrix, the open-loop and close-loop matrices. The multiplier 
decomposition method presented by Defourny and Thorbecke (1984) 
distinguishes each element of the SAM multiplier effects into direct, total 
and global influences. 
The standard Leontief model is primarily concerned with the transfer 
multipliers and captures the direct or intra-group effects in production 
activities. SAM-based models add the open-loop and dimensions in the 
multiplier analysis, based on the logic of the circular flow of income within 
the economy. In the simulations below, we therefore outline the combined 
effects of open-loop and close-loop multipliers in order to single out the 
specific contribution of the social accounting framework in distributional 
analysis. The most interesting conclusion that one can draw from SAM-
based models is not only to assess the impact of a policy shift on different 
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socioeconomic categories, but also the political risk associated with it. 
This can be done by combining distributional analysis with information on 
the power structure within the society to evaluate the political feasibility of 
policy economic reform. 
111.3 A SAM FOR GUATEMALA 
The Guatemalan SAM presented in this section is based on an accounting 
table by Cruz and Serra (1989) which is reproduced in annexe ULI. The 
authors reorganised the 1986 Guatemalan national accounts in a 
rectangular table along the same lines as that of a SAM. First, they 
aggregated the 45 production sectors appearing in the latest input-output 
table (base year 1971) into a seven sector table: traditional agricultural 
exports, nontraditional agricultural export, subsistence agriculture, 
manufacturing, oil and lubricants, services and commerce. The annexe 
III.l further provides detailed explanation on the notation used in - and 
content of - the accounting table of Cruz and Serra. 
Some of the coefficients were updated to account for structural changes 
between 1971 and 1986: 
• As the intermediate demand for goods produced by the backward 
agricultural sector which resulted from the input-output table was 
inconsistent with the 1986 national account data, Cruz and Serra added 
363.6 millions Quetzales (national currency, hereafter referred to as qtz) 
corresponding to com and fodder. This additional intermediate demand 
was allocated to the three rural sectors and manufacturing. 
• The 1971 input-output matrix provided value added figures for each 
productive sector, divided into wages and other value added. Cruz and 
Serra multiplied each wage category by the corresponding real wage 
change rate between 1971 and 1986, based on World Bank data. 
• Although the 1971 input-output matrix had an intermediate import 
demand coefficient for each sector, Cruz and Sera considered instead 
the 1986 international trade statistics, and allocated intermediate goods 
to the seven productive sectors using the input-output table. 
The authors then used the data from the 1986-87 household expenditure 
survey to derive the household accounts. They aggregated consumption of 
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goods and services into the seven categories corresponding to the 
productive sectors defined above. The expenditure survey considered 
different income groups and geographical zones. Based on this, Cruz and 
Serra distinguished between rural workers, industry workers, service 
workers and capitalists, assimilating each category to an income group and 
to the rural or urban geographical zone (see below). The other accounts 
have been constructed by drawing all relevant data from the national 
accounts, the balance of payments and other statistics provided by the 
Banco de Guatemala (central bank). 
The table by Cruz and Serra (1989) presents the national accounts in a 
double-entry accounting format, but departs from a SAM in several 
respects: the table is not square, there are no institution accounts as such -
the household and firm accounts being implicitly merged into the 
production factor accounts - and the row totals do not equal the column 
sums, just to mention a few departures from a standard SAM. The 
accounting table by Cruz and Serra cannot be used to compute linear 
multipliers required to assess the distributional impact of exogenous 
shocks. We therefore correct, adjust and reorganise all the data in a 
consistent SAM framework. To this end, we classify the Guatemalan 
accounts along a standard SAM structure, as depicted in annexe III.2. We 
create institution accounts which are essential to trace how factorial 
incomes are distributed among household groups and other institutions 
(firms, government). We also distinguish between current accounts and 
capital accounts, the later being further split between the government 
capital account, private capital and the rest-of-the-world account. 
In order to construct a consistent social accounting matrix for Guatemala 
based on the structure outlined in annexe III.2, we have to correct, adjust 
and rearrange all the accounts. We use both data from the the Banco de 
Guatemala (central bank) and a series of balance sheets provided by Cruz 
and Serra (1989): government income and expenditure - including data on 
tariff revenue, tariff payment by sector and consumption taxes by sector; 
balance of payments; financial relations with the rest of the world; central 
bank operations; and balance sheets for households, firms and the financial 
sector. The main adjustments and corrections are presented in annexe III.3. 
The paucity and weakness of data on income distribution pose severe 
limitations for distributional analysis. The extreme concentration of wealth 
and income in Guatemala is a highly sensitive political issue, and it is not 
surprising that the authorities did not make any effort - and even resisted 
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attempts - to conduct and publicise the outcome of detailed income and 
expenditure surveys. The only relevant information available to Cruz and 
Serra at the country level was the 1986-7 household survey published by 
the Guatemalan National Institute of Statistics (INE). The survey only 
provides information on size income distribution, but does not give any 
indication as to functional income distribution nor to income by activity 
categories. Households are simply classified by income classes and deciles. 
Since then, the only data which has been collected is another expenditure 
survey carried out in 1989 along the same lines as in 1986-7. As a result, 
the data available does not allow to map factor income into household 
income based on professional categories (e.g. independent labour, petty 
traders). 
Because of the lack of data, we had to mechanically associate each factor 
account with a household group whose expenditure pattern corresponds to 
that of households with a given annual income, according to information 
provided by the 1986-7 expenditure survey. We associated the rural low-
income household group with the "rural labour" factor and, following Cruz 
and Serra, further assimilated their expenditure structure to that of 
households with an annual income of qtz 1,200. In the same way, the urban 
low-income group is assimilated to urban labour in the manufacturing 
sector with a consumption pattern of households whose annual income 
ranges between qtz 1,201 and 2,400. The urban middle-income group is 
associated with labour in the service sector (expenditure structure of 
households with an annual income between qtz 2,401 and 4,800), and the 
high-income group is assimilated to capital (qtz 7,201 - 12,000). 
Departing from the table of Cruz and Serra, we then relocate consumption 
outlays from the factor accounts to the household accounts. We eventually 
obtain the accounting table in annexe III.4, which is fully consistent in 
terms of double-entry bookkeeping. It provides interesting information on 
direct and indirect taxes, which we wish to keep in the final SAM for the 
purpose of simulating various fiscal policy options. To get a square matrix, 
we add four column-accounts that correspond to direct and indirect taxes. 
Row-wise, customs tariffs on consumption and capital goods are merged in 
a single "customs tariff account. We further sum up the private and public 
capital accounts in a consolidated capital account. The result is a fully 
consistent social accounting matrix for Guatemala that is reproduced in 
annexe III.5, which further provides a detailed description of what comes 
under each account. To avoid confusion, we use the same notation as Cruz 
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and Serra (see annexe III. 1 : PA for production activities, FP for factors of 
production, HH for households, etc.). 
III.3.1 Structure of the Guatemalan Economy 
Social accounting matrices provide a lot of information about the 
economy. In this section, we analyse various features of the Guatemalan 
economy following the logic of the circular interdependence embedded in 
the SAM. We start from the productive process, followed by the primary 
and secondary distribution of income and consumption or demand back to 
the productive activities. 
We first analyse the sectoral structure of domestic production and value 
added. We extract the outlays of the production activities from the SAM to 
assess the contribution of each activity or sector in terms of imports, 
intermediate inputs, value added at factor cost, net indirect taxes and total 
supply. As shown in table III.3 below, the primary sector accounts for 29.5 
per cent of value added while the share of manufacturing lies under 15 per 
cent. The import structure reflects the productive specialisation of the 
Guatemalan economy. Roughly two thirds of the imports are goods which 
either are manufactured goods or enter into manufacturing activities as 
intermediate products. 
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Table 111.3: Contribution of each sector to total supply, 
in % share 
1-PA-Traditional agr 
sec 
2-PA-Hybrid agr sec 
3-PA-Backward agr 
sec 
4-PA-manuf 1 
5-PA-manuf2 
5-PA-fuels 
7-PA-services 
3-PA-commerce 
Total 
imports 
2.6 
0.9 
7.7 
61.1 
1.5 
14.7 
11.5 
0.0 
100.0 
intermediate inputs 
5.7 
2.7 
2.2 
53.3 
1.3 
0.7 
20.0 
14.1 
100.0 
Value added 
15.9 
9.5 
4.1 
14.5 
0.3 
0.1 
31.7 
23.8 
100.0 
Net indirect taxes 
17.6 
1.1 
1.5 
8.5 
0.1 
0.6 
20.5 
50.2 
100.0 
Total supply 
13.4 
5.7 
3.9 
29.1 
0.7 
1.3 
25.5 
20.5 
100.0 
N.b.: PA stands for production activities. See annexe III.5-contfor a definition of each sector. 
The information provided by the SAM is fully consistent with our findings 
in chapter VI, which focuses on the Guatemalan economy: Table V.3 in 
particular reports the breakdown of GDP by type of economic activity, but 
this time based on the literature and statistical data available on the 
Guatemalan economy. Consistent with this information, the insight drawn 
from the SAM in the table above confirms that Guatemala has an important 
agricultural sector which largely relies on the abundance of low-cost 
indigenous labour in agriculture. The primary sector still accounts for 
about a quarter of GDP and for more than two thirds of merchandise export 
earnings, coffee ranking first. Besides a modern sector producing 
traditional agricultural export goods - mainly coffee, sugar, bananas, 
cotton, beef and cardamom - the bulk of agricultural labour is in the 
backward subsistence sector which produces staple food crops for 
domestic consumption: basic grains, potatoes and legumes. A more recent 
hybrid sector emerged in the 1980s and produces "nontraditional" 
agricultural exports such as fruits, vegetables, timber, rubber and 
ornamental plants. 
There are wide differences in the shares of each of the productive activities 
in terms of intermediate inputs and net indirect taxes. These differences 
can be better appreciated by looking at the share of the various cost 
components in total supply, as shown below in table III.4. This is 
especially interesting with regard to multiplier models and for our 
subsequent assessment of demand injections into different production 
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activities. Those activities with a higher share of value added to total cost 
are likely to have a higher degree of endogeneity - or smaller leakage -
with respect to the circular flows diagram. This is the case of the 
agricultural sector with a share of value added to total supply comprised 
between 57 per cent and 81 per cent. 
Table 111.4: Composition of total supply 
- % share of major supply component for each sector 
1 -PA-Traditional agr sec 
2-PA-Hybrid agr sec 
3-PA-Backward agr sec 
i-PA-manuf 1 
5-PA-manuf 2 
8-PA-fuels 
7-PA-servîces 
3-PA-commerce 
total 
Imports 
2.0 
1.3 
18.8 
16.6 
17.1 
79.6 
4.0 
O.C 
8.6 
Intermediate inputs 
17.8 
16.3 
21.9 
S8.S 
60.5 
15.5 
28.0 
24.7 
35.2 
Value added 
70.0 
81.2 
56.6 
22.7 
21.7 
2.4 
62.6 
58.8 
49.6 
Net indirect taxes 
10.2 
1.2 
2.8 
1.8 
0.8 
2.6 
5.4 
16.5 
6.6 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
1OO.0 
100.0 
100.0 
The value added share in total supply is around 60 per cent for commerce 
and services. This means that such activities are likely to generate higher 
incomes which are then distributed to institutions and transformed into 
demand within the system. On the contrary, imports and taxes represent 
leakages in the multiplier model. Overall, import is a slightly more 
important source of leakage than tax (8.6% against 6.6%). As expected, 
import shares in total supply are negligible for the two agricultural export 
sectors and commerce, while they are substantial for staple crops 
(backward agr. sector) and manufacture (e.g. import of capital goods), and 
much higher for fuels as Guatemala is far from oil self-sufficiency. Not 
surprisingly, indirect taxation is above 10 per cent of supply in the 
commerce sector as a result of consumption taxes. This is also the case of 
the traditional agricultural export sector as a result of heavy export duties 
which were still applied in 1986. In general, the share of intermediate 
inputs varies according to the degree of backward vertical integration 
within and outside the same sector. The degree of integration is usually 
higher for the manufacturing sector, as the table above confirms for 
Guatemala. 
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Turning to the analysis of the receipts of the production activities, the 
various sectors exhibit very different shares in the demand components, as 
table 1II.5 illustrates. The table clearly reflects the overwhelming weight of 
a few traditional agricultural export products (primarily coffee and banana) 
which account for more than 50 per cent of total exports. Nontraditional 
agricultural exports were on the rise, but still represented less than 10 per 
cent in 1986. The manufacturing sector represents about one fourth of total 
exports. Table III.5 shows that, as described in annexe III.5-cont, the 
sector "PA-manufacture 2" only refers to industrial goods which are 
wholly exported (see also description of the Guatemalan economy in 
chapter V). 
Table 111.5: Contribution of each sector to total demand, 
in % share 
1 -PA-Traditional agr sec 
2-PA-Hybrid agr sec 
3-PA-Backward agr sec 
4-PA-manuf 1 
5-PA-manuf2 
B-PA-fuels 
7-PA-services 
B-PA-commerce 
Total 
Metmedîate output 
6.3 
8.5 
6.6 
32.5 
0.0 
2.5 
27.5 
16.0 
100.0 
Final consumption 
8.4 
4.2 
3.7 
27.6 
0.0 
0.6 
25.8 
29.8 
100.0 
Investment 
2.9 
4.£ 
1.1 
40.6 
0.5 
0.1 
46.5 
3.8 
100.0 
Exports 
56.2 
7.1 
0.0 
18.7 
5.6 
2.3 
10.1 
0.0 
100.0 
Tota! 
12.6 
5.7 
3.7 
29.5 
0.7 
1.2 
27.0 
19.5 
100.0 
Investment is concentrated in the manufacturing and service sectors. This 
is not surprising, all the more so as the service sector comprises 
construction. Commerce ranks first in contributing to final consumption, 
followed by manufacture and services. 
Table III.6 turns to the primary income distribution from production 
activities to factors of production. The wide differences largely stem from 
the technology used in a given sector (labour type and labour versus 
capital) and from the overall socioeconomic settings. The contribution of 
each sector to value added at factor cost is reproduced here pro memoria. 
Land is considered as a specific type of capital, and is thus included in 
table III.6 under FP-capital. 
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Table 111.6: Composition of value added (at factor cost) 
between production factors, and sector shares of value 
added 
l-PA-Traditional agr 
sec 
2-PA-Hybrid agr sec 
3-PA-Baokward agr 
sec 
«-PA-manuf 1 
5-PA-manuf 2 
3-PA-fuels 
7-PA-services 
3-PA-commerce 
Total 
FP-rural 
W O * 
37.0 
16.5 
40.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
8.6 
FP-urban 
work 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
26.7 
29.8 
59.3 
0.0 
0.0 
5.5 
FP-serv. 
work 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
29.4 
31.1 
15.8 
FP-capiial 
63.0 
83.5 
60.0 
73.3 
70.2 
40.7 
70.6 
68.9 
70.1 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Value added 
% of lota! 
15.9 
9.5 
4.1 
14.5 
0.3 
0.1 
31.7 
23.8 
100.0 
In a SAM framework, it is interesting to assess to what degree the value 
added generated in a given sector is distributed to labour or to capital (and 
land). This is because capital income is subject to much more leakage 
given its higher propensity to save and its higher taxation burden. This 
type of leakage is often reflected in SAM models to the extent that savings 
are classified as an exogenous account. Yet, savings and investment may 
also be considered as endogenous in models that are oriented toward long-
term analysis. 
In all sectors but fuels, the capital factor takes the biggest income share 
from value added. This indirectly results from the balance of power within 
Guatemalan society: low wages and a high concentration of wealth and 
assets in the hands of a few. It is especially striking that in all three 
agricultural sectors, the majority of value added goes to the capital factor 
while a small share is allocated to rural labour. It is in the hybrid 
agricultural export sector that the share of value added accruing to capital 
is the highest (88.5%), which may be due to the fact that this sector 
requires higher capital investment than backward agriculture. 
Finally, table III.7 presents the distribution of value added by factors of 
production to household groups. This table highlights a major weakness in 
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our SAM which results from the fact that we had to create household 
categories based on the accounting table by Cruz and Serra (1989). In the 
absence of relevant data from household income surveys which would 
provide information on how factor income is distributed among different 
household groups, the only solution was to directly associate each 
household group with one of the four factors of production, as described 
earlier. Table 111.7 thus strongly overstates the fact that high-income 
households receive their income primarily (here exclusively) from capital, 
middle-income households from labour in the services sector, and urban 
low-income households from urban labour. One may assume that given the 
extreme land and capital concentration that characterises the country, 
labour income is rather negligible in the case of powerful land and capital 
owners. This tends to legitimate our basic assumption, but should ideally 
be cross-checked with relevant data that may be available for neighbouring 
countries (e.g. El Salvador, Honduras). 
Table 111.7: Secondary income distribution of value 
added by factors of production to household groups 
Rural low inc. HH 
Urban low inc.HH 
Jrban middle 
no.HH 
High income HH 
Total 
FP-ruralwork 
80.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
10.1 
FP-urbanwork 
0.0 
100.0 
0.0 
0.0 
6.5 
FP-sew. work 
0.0 
0.0 
98.8 
0.0 
24.2 
FP-capiîal 
19.5 
0.0 
0.2 
100.0 
59.2 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Total 
income 
12.6 
6.5 
24.3 
56.7 
100.0 
Urban middle-income households receive 0.2 per cent of their income from 
net interests (deposits). Rural low-income households however, receive 
some 19.5 per cent of their income from capital. This may actually reflect 
revenues from small farm holdings, i.e. income from the land factor, which 
is included in capital. 
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111.3.2 Multiplier Decomposition 
We follow the additive method by Defourny and Thorbecke to calculate 
the different multipliers for our Guatemalan SAM10. The outputs are 
presented in annexe II1.6, listed under numbers 1 to 11: 
• Table 1 provides the income shares or average propensities, which are 
then broken down into the matrix of average propensities of the 
endogenous accounts An (table 2) and the average propensities of the 
exogenous accounts At (table 3). 
• IYiMe 4 is the aggregate multiplier matrix Ma and table 5 is the leakage 
multiplier matrix. 
• Table 6 shows the direct effects or intra-group matrix Mj, table 7 the 
own indirect effects or extra-group matrix M2, and table 8 the cross-
effects matrix M?. 
• Table 9 refers to the transfer multiplier effects T that capture the direct 
effects resulting from interactions within each category of accounts 
(e.g. transfers among institutions). 
• Table 10 is the open-loop multiplier effects matrix O that captures the 
interactions among and between the three endogenous categories of 
accounts (e.g. from factor income on household revenues). 
• Finally, table 11 represents the multiplier effects matrix C that captures 
the full circular effects of an income injection going through the system 
back to its point of origin (e.g. from activities, to factors, to institutions, 
and then back to activities in the form of consumption demand). 
These matrices being calculated, we can now run simulations to assess the 
main options facing the Guatemalan government with regard to economic 
policy reform required by the peace accords, chiefly in the area of taxation, 
fiscal policy and government expenditures. 
10
 We calculate all the multiplier effect matrices with the help of the econometric software 
package EViews except the matrix of average propensities (calculated with Excel). 
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111.4 SIMULATIONS 
The SAM-based multiplier model allows us to simulate various types of 
exogenous shocks. This is done by pre-multiplying the vector of initial 
transfers by the matrix M of accounting multipliers - or by the matrices O, 
T and C for the open-loop, transfer and close-loop effects respectively. We 
can write this in equation form: 
Ay=MaAx (17) 
whereby each policy shift to be analysed is characterised by a vector of 
initial shock Ax and its resulting impact Ay. 
We run four simulations relating to fiscal and tax policy shifts and assess 
how they affect income distribution at the household level in Guatemala. 
Our first simulation below focuses on an increase in government spending 
while the following three simulations all deal with changes in taxation. We 
choose to focus on these issues in the case of Guatemala because tax 
reform is the major economic challenge on the post-conflict agenda (see 
chapter V for a discussion). The tax revenue to GDP ratio in Guatemala is 
the lowest in Latin America, and taxation of personal income and wealth is 
extremely weak. The international financial institutions and a whole series 
of economic studies have long called for a major reform of the tax system 
and an end to endemic fiscal evasion. Fiscal policy is thus one of the major 
challenges of post-war Guatemala: compliance with the commitments 
made by the government in the 1996 peace accords requires ending the 
vicious circle of fiscal fraud and distrust between tax payers and the state. 
In addition, peace requires a substantial increase in government 
expenditure, as discussed in chapter V, mainly to assist the most 
vulnerable and decrease extreme inequalities between socioeconomic 
groups. To this end, one of the peace accords (Agreement on Land and 
Socioeconomic issues) sets as a target an increase of 50 per cent in the 
total tax to GDP ratio in order to pay for peace-related expenses, while 
stipulating that the tax reform should be "globally progressive". 
We have chosen to treat the government and tax accounts as exogenous to 
the extent that they correspond to policy instruments. The first simulation 
traces the impact of an increase of qtz 100 million in government 
expenditure, which roughly corresponds to an overall increase of 6 per cent 
in public spending. In the injection vector, these qtz 100m have been 
apportioned to each account proportionally to the initial structure of 
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government spending as reflected in the SAM. The second, third and 
fourth simulations relate to changes in taxation, which raises specific 
issues: first, tax shifts must be pictured as positive and negative income 
injections. As an example, an increase in corporate tax is injected into the 
system as a negative income in the firm account. Second, the income 
injections could come from any exogenous account and would have the 
same effects on the endogenous accounts, if not specified properly. We 
address this issue by specifying the injection vector so that it reflects in 
fixed proportion the existing tax structure. The injection vector is thus 
determined by the tax structure in the SAM (Keuning and Thorbecke, 
1992). Third, we have to bear in mind that treating tax as an exogenous 
account is a simplification since shifts in taxation interact at the same time 
with the whole set of circular interdependence characteristic of any 
economic system. In the real economy, they are feedbacks on the tax 
accounts due to initial changes and the ensuing leaks from the circular 
flow of income within the economy. All three simulations are designed to 
be initially budget-neutral: the injection vector is the difference between 
positive and negative injections of equal amounts across two or more 
exogenous tax accounts. But because of the leak in the government 
account, this does not mean that the final output is neutral for the budget. 
More specifically, the second simulation captures a shift of qtz 100m in tax 
revenue from the import duty to value added tax (VAT) accounts. This is 
intended to reflect the main fiscal policy trends between 1986 (base year of 
the SAM) and 1996: during that period, the value added tax rate was 
eventually raised from 7 per cent to 10 per cent while average customs 
duties decreased under the combined effects of accession to the 
GATT/WTO and the revival of the Central American Common Market 
(see presentation in chapter V). Both customs and value added taxes apply 
to production activities but their distribution across the various sectors 
differs. We assume that the increase of qtz 100m in value added tax and 
the decrease of qtz 100m in import duties are proportional to their 
respective initial tax burden. This means that if a given sector pays twice 
as much customs tax as anodier, the decrease in duties will also be twice as 
much. The injection vector is, for each of the two exogenous accounts, the 
sum of the ensuing increase in value added tax and decrease in customs 
duties, i.e. the net result of a positive and a negative injection. Overall, the 
sum of the injections is zero (budget neutrality). 
The third simulation refers to an increase of qtz 100m in direct taxes and a 
decrease of qtz 100m in "other indirect taxes". The augmentation focuses 
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mainly on personal and corporate taxes while the reduction of other 
indirect taxes primarily captures a sharp decrease in export duties and 
specific consumption tax. As in the second and fourth simulations, tax 
shifts translate into positive and negative income injections. The fourth 
simulation is a combination of the latter two: customs duties and other 
indirect taxes are reduced by qtz 100m each, which is compensated by an 
increase of equal amounts in direct taxation and value added tax. This is an 
attempt to simulate what would be the distributional impact of measures 
advocated by the international financial institutions, i.e. trade liberalisation 
coupled with an increase in value added tax and/or direct taxation. 
The simulation outputs are presented in tables III.8 to III. 11 while table 
III. 12 focuses on the overall distributional impact of the four simulations 
on household groups and firms. The following tables report, for each 
scenario and in million Quetzales, the identity, transfer, open-loop, close-
loop, and total accounting multiplier effects. Identity multiplier effects are 
obviously equal to the injection vectors. We add the open-loop and close-
loop effects in a single column to highlight the specific multiplier effects 
of income flows across modules (or account categories). The accounting 
multiplier or total effects have been calculated with the Leontief inverse 
matrix of linear multipliers. As expected, the accounting multiplier effects 
are equivalent to the sum of the identity, transfer, open-loop and close-loop 
effects. Leaks in the exogenous accounts are also reported for each 
simulation, together with the total leaks in tax revenue for simulations two, 
three and four. 
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Table 111.8: Simulation 1 - Increase of qtz 100m in 
government expenditure 
Endo-
genous 
accounts 
Traditional 
agrsec 
-lybrid agr 
sec 
Backward 
agrsec 
vianuf 1 
Manul 2 
=uels 
Services 
Commerce 
Rural work 
Urban work 
Service 
work 
Capital 
LHH-rural 
LHH-Urban 
MHH-urban 
HH-lncome 
Firms 
Total 
til 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
12.51 
0.00 
0.00 
1.12 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
48.01 
0.00 
0.00 
5.92 
5.65 
0.00 
14.30 
87 
Transfer 
multiplier 
effects 
1.90 
5.47 
2.26 
2.91 
0.00 
2.87 
1.78 
1.82 
0.00 
O.OO 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
19 
Opets-
teop 
multiplier 
effects 
6.41 
8.97 
11.50 
8.58 
0.00 
7.08 
9.83 
12.67 
3.54 
15.96 
3.01 
6.63 
2.84 
13.36 
48.46 
5.32 
4.57 
168 
Close-
loop 
multiplier 
effects 
14.08 
20.78 
25.19 
21.53 
0.00 
21.11 
23.09 
31.06 
23.72 
28.23 
27.45 
31.20 
24.5£ 
26.51 
27.82 
32.50 
27.91 
406 
Close tooo* 
open-loop 
effects 
20.49 
29.75 
36.69 
30.11 
0 
28.19 
32.92 
43.73 
27.26 
44.19 
30.46 
37.83 
27.37 
39.87 
76.28 
37.82 
32.48 
574 
Accounting 
Multiplier or 
total elects 
22.39 
35.21 
38.95 
45.53 
0.00 
31.05 
35.83 
45.54 
27.26 
44.18 
78.47 
37.82 
27.37 
45.78 
81.93 
37.82 
46.78 
681 
Leakages 
Exogenous 
accounts 
Customs tariffs 
Value added 
tax 
Other indirect 
taxes 
Direct taxes 
Government 
Capital account 
ROW current 
ROW capital 
Leaks 
43.97 
45.21 
35.68 
41.01 
3.34 
37.12 
34.50 
O.OO 
As expected, an increase in government expenditure is clearly 
expansionary and benefits all sectors and institutions. However, the fact 
that the identity multiplier effects are below 100 means that there is a leak 
of qtz 13m out of the initial injection of qtz 100m, which primarily 
corresponds to an increase in imports and thus does not enter into the 
endogenous economic cycle. As highlighted in bold above, the main 
beneficiaries are medium-income households which profit from increased 
labour income in the services sector, mainly via the open-loop multiplier 
effects. This can be explained by the fact that the latter household category 
comprises civil servants who benefit from the increase in government 
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à 
current expenditure, as reflected in the injection vector. The induced 
demand translates into significant increased activity in the commerce 
sector and higher income for the "urban work" production factor. 
Table 111.9: Simulation 2 - increase of qtz 100m in value-
added tax and decrease of qtz 100m in customs duties 
Endogenous 
accounts 
Traditional 
agr 
sec 
Hybrid agr 
sec 
Backward 
agrsec 
Manuf 1 
V!anuf2 
Fuels 
Services 
Commerce 
Rural work 
Urban work 
Service work 
Capital 
LHH-rural 
LHH-Urban 
MHH-urban 
HH-lncome 
Firms 
rotai 
Identity 
multipliées 
effects 
1.62 
-0.05 
1.39 
35.27 
0.00 
-0.11 
8.16 
-46.27 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
o.oo 
0.00 
0.00 
Transfer 
multipl iers 
effects 
5.24 
15.12 
6.70 
7.29 
" 0 . 0 0 
7.28 
0.82 
3.43 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
O.OO 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
46 
Open-
loop 
multiplier 
effects 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
o.oo 
8.29 
40.86 
-9.43 
5.48 
7.23 
36.87 
-9.15 
5.48 
4.70 
90 
Close-
loop 
multîp. 
efteots 
4.41 
6.51 
8.06 
6.91 
O.OC 
6.59 
6.90 
9.7S 
5.37 
6.74 
6.19 
7.12 
5.33 
6.08 
6.02 
7.1 Î 
6.11 
105 
Slose-IoOB* 
open-loop 
multiplier 
effects 
4.41 
6.51 
8.05 
6.91 
0 
6.59 
6.9 
9.79 
13.66 
47.6 
-3.24 
12.6 
12.56 
42.95 
-3.13 
12.e 
10.81 
195 
Accounting 
multiplier or 
total effects 
11.27 
21.58 
16.14 
49.46 
0.00 
13.76 
15.87 
-33.04 
13.67 
47.60 
-3.24 
12.59 
12.56 
42.95 
-3.12 
12.5E 
10.82 
241 
Leakages 
Exogenous 
accounts 
Customs tariffs 
Value added tax 
Other indirect 
taxes 
Direct taxes 
Government 
Capital account 
ROW current 
ROW capital 
Tax revenue 
Leaks 
3.35 
-31.06 
1.89 
11.96 
1.03 
9.89 
20.80 
0.00 
•13.86 
As the table above shows, the overall impact of the injection is clearly 
expansionary, although the initial tax change is budget-neutral. This can be 
explained by a global income shift in favour of sectors and institutions 
with relatively lower leakages toward exogenous accounts. The table 
highlights that the redistribution of the indirect tax burden among sectors 
implies lower income in the commercial sector. This is largely 
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compensated by increased income in manufacturing activities, as shown in 
the identity multiplier effects. This primarily benefits urban labour and 
thus low-income urban households through cross multiplier effects. The 
overall social impact is rather positive to the extent that low-income 
households - in both urban and rural areas - end up better off. Politically 
speaking, the tax shift should not provoke outright opposition as high-
income households benefit too while middle-income ones do not 
significantly lose. 
Table 111.10: Simulation 3 - increase of qtz 100m in direct 
taxes and decrease of qtz 100m in "other indirect 
taxes" 
Endogenous 
Traditional 
ag rsec 
Hybrid agr 
sec 
Backward agr 
sec 
Manuf 1 
Manuf 2 
Fuels 
Services 
Dommerce 
Rural work 
Urban work 
Service work 
Capital 
LHH-rural 
^HH-Urban 
MHH-urban 
HH-lncome 
Firms 
Total 
ItI 
27.97 
1.28 
0.4£ 
7.11 
0.15 
0.69 
31.43 
30.90 
0.00 
0.00 
o.oo 
0.00 
o.oo 
o.oo 
o.oo 
-64.42 
-35.58 
0 
III 
1.61 
5.12 
7.47 
5.57 
O.OO 
16.03 
6.96 
4.97 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
O.OO 
O.OO 
o.oo 
-4.31 
43 
Open-
loop 
multiplier 
effects 
-13.02 
-19.86 
-18.65, 
-20.32 
0.00 
-24.10 
-23.85 
-29.84 
7.22 
-7.46 
8.45 
5.02 
21.68 
11.24 
27.81 
27.20 
23.36 
25 
Close-
loop 
multip. 
effects 
5.39 
7.97 
10.05 
8.32 
o.oc 
8.05 
8.92 
12.00 
6.61 
8.12 
7.79 
8.84 
-8.76 
-10.65 
-12.01 
-13.34 
-11.46 
35 
Close+ 
open-loop 
effects 
-7.63 
-11.89 
-8.6 
-12 
0 
-16.05 
-14.93 
-17.84 
13.83 
0.66 
16.24 
13.86 
12.92 
0.59 
15.8 
13.86 
11.9 
60 
Account ing 
multiplier or 
total ef fects 
21.96 
-5.49 
-0.6E 
0.67 
0.1E 
0.66 
23.47 
18.03 
13.83 
0.66 
16.24 
13.86 
12.92 
0.59 
15.80 
-50.57 
-27.98 
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l e a k a g e s 
Exogenous 
ace. 
Customs tariffs 
Value added 
tax 
Other indirect 
taxes 
Direct taxes 
Government 
Capital account 
ROW current 
R O W capital 
Tax revenue 
Leaks 
11.41 
17.25 
19.07 
-42.53 
0.43 
-16.10 
-4.31 
O.OO 
5.2 
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Again, the overall effect under this third scenario is expansionary, but to a 
lesser extent than in the former simulation. For obvious reasons, higher 
direct taxes translate directly into lower net income for firms and high-
income households (see injection vector). The traditional agricultural 
export sector benefits from a decrease in export duties, which reflects 
positively on rural low-income households through the loop effects. The 
services and commerce sectors both profit from a diminution in excise and 
other consumption tax, which has a positive impact on medium-income 
households via cross multiplier or open-loop effects. But in the case of 
high-income households, the latter effects are not sufficient to offset the 
negative impact of die initial tax shift. The ensuing income deterioration 
may spur major discontent among the Guatemalan economic elite, and may 
thus not be politically viable. 
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Table 111.11: Simulation 4 - combination of simulations 2 
and 3 
Endogenous 
Traditional 
ag rsec 
Hybrid agr 
sec 
Backward agr 
sec 
Manuf 1 
Manuf 2 
Fuels 
Services 
Commerce 
Rural work 
urban work 
Service work 
Capital 
LHH-rural 
LHH-Urban 
MHH-urban 
HH-lncome 
Firms 
Total 
IfI 
29.59 
1.23 
1.87 
42.37 
0.15 
0.58 
39.59 
-15.37 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
O.OO 
o.oo 
-64.42 
-35.58 
0 
Transfer 
multiplier 
effects 
6.85 
20.25 
14.17 
12.85 
0.00 
23.31 
7.78 
8.40 
0.00 
0.00 
O.OO 
0.00 
O.OO 
O.OO 
O.OO 
0.00 
-4.31 
89 
Open-
loop 
multiplier 
effects 
-13.02 
-19.86 
-18.65 
-20.32 
0.00 
-24.10 
-23.85 
-29.84 
15.51 
33.40 
-0.98 
10.4S 
28.91 
48.11 
18.66 
32.68 
28.07 
65 
Close-
loop 
multip. 
effects 
9.81 
14.48 
18.10 
15.22 
0.00 
14.64 
15.82 
21.78 
11.99 
14.86 
13.98 
15.96 
-3.43 
-4.57 
-5.98 
-6.23 
-5.35 
141 
Close loop 
»• open-foop 
effects 
-3.21 
-5.38 
-0.55 
-5.1 
0 
-9.46 
-8.03 
-8.06 
27.5 
48.26 
13 
26.45 
25.48 
43.54 
12.68 
26.45 
22.72 
206 
Accounting 
multiplier or 
tofal effects 
33.22 
16.09 
15.49 
50.13 
0.15 
14.42 
39.34 
-15.02 
27.50 
48.26 
13.00 
26.45 
25.48 
43.54 
12.68 
-37.97 
-17.17 
295 
Leakages 
Exogenous 
aoc. 
Customs tariffs 
Value added 
tax 
Other indirect 
taxes 
Direct taxes 
Government 
Capital account 
ROW current 
ROW capital 
Tax revenue 
ieaks 
14.76 
-13.8C 
20.96 
-30.57 
1.46 
-6.21 
16.49 
0.00 
•8.65 
As in the two former scenarios, the impact of the various tax changes in 
simulation 4 is expansionary. Income increases for all sectors but 
commerce, which is not surprising as this fourth simulation comprises an 
increase in value added tax. As in the third simulation above, the 
combination of tax shifts in the fourth simulation results in increased 
income for all institutions but high-income households and firms. This is 
because of the impact of higher corporate and personal income tax in the 
injection vector that cannot be compensated to a sufficient degree by the 
positive open-loop effects. 
As a direct result of the initial injection, the positive transfer multiplier 
effects are clearly felt in the fuel, manufacturing and hybrid agricultural 
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sectors, and then through loop effects on rural and urban work as well as 
on capital factor income. The overall social impact is clearly progressive: 
low- and middle-income groups end up in a better situation while the 
richer segment of the society and the corporate sector have to pay more. 
But this is also why this policy option is a dangerous bet for the 
government: the latter may not be able to stay in power in the face of 
fundamental opposition from the most powerful group within the society. 
We can eventually turn to the distributional impact of the four simulations 
and assess in particular how progressive or regressive the tax change 
proposals are. Table III. 13 Teports the relative change in income following 
shifts in government spending and taxation for each household category 
and firms. 
Table 111.12: Variation in the income of institutions 
(percentage of total income) 
Simulation 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Increase 
Gvt expenditure 
Value added tax 
(VAT) 
Direct tax (DT) 
VAT and DT 
Decrease 
Customs duties 
(CD) 
Other indirect 
tax (IT) 
CD and IT 
LHH-
roral 
1.47 
0.67 
0.69 
1.37 
LHH-
Oroan 
4.60 
4.31 
0.06 
4.37 
MHH-
ur&an 
2.37 
-0.09 
0.46 
0.37 
HH-
ineome 
0.48 
0.16 
-0.64 
-0.48 
Oi-Brms 
2.81 
0.65 
-1.68 
-1.03 
Total 
11.73 
5.71 
-1.11 
4.59 
As highlighted earlier, SAM-based models may provide critical 
information for the design of policy reforms that are politically informed if 
combined with some understanding of the political dynamics in a given 
country. Table III. 12 shows that the expansionary nature of the various 
policy interventions makes the results positive for institutions in a majority 
of cases. But looking at the four scenarios one after the other, it is 
particularly interesting to underscore the following: 
• An increase in government expenditures (simulation 1) benefits low-
income urban households in a greater proportion than other institution 
categories. This implies that these households profit from improved 
public services and government transfers to a greater extent than other 
groups. Low-income households in rural areas do not enjoy the same 
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access to government services, and do not benefit as much as urban 
households. The income increase is proportionally lower for high-
income households, but in this case as a result of the higher absolute 
level of their initial income. 
• Among the scenarios implying tax changes, the second simulation, 
which refers to higher value added tax and lower customs duties, fares 
best in terms of overall institutional income increase (5.7%). Thanks to 
cheaper prices on imports, firms and high-income households enjoy 
higher income, even if they pay higher value added tax. The only 
category which may lose slightly from the shift in taxation is medium-
income households. Yet this scenario does not seem likely to cause 
much political turmoil to the extent that it does not entail any dramatic 
income deterioration for a specific group. This may partly explain why 
this policy mix has been adopted by the Guatemalan government over 
the past years (see chapter V). 
• An increase in direct taxation coupled with a reduction of indirect taxes 
(simulation 3) is the only scenario that has a negative impact on the 
overall income of institutions (-1.1%). There seems thus to be good 
reason not to favour this option over other tax-neutral changes, even if 
the outcome is clearly progressive in terms of equity and income 
redistribution to the poor. 
• The outcome of the fourth simulation implies a partial transfer from 
firms and high-income households to poorer groups. This combination 
of tax changes would clearly represent a progressive reform as it would 
contribute to reducing inequality. This option also seems politically 
favourable in that low-income urban households - a vocal group able to 
mobilise quickly and to pose a serious threat to the government -
benefit from an income increase of 4.37 per cent. This would be good 
news for the international financial institutions to the extent that the 
simulation encompasses some of the measures recommended by them. 
Yet the members of the powerful oligarchy would clearly rank among 
the losers: the income of the richest category would decrease by 0.48 
per cent and firms would lose by 1.68 per cent. This may explain why it 
has not been possible to introduce such measures successfully in 
Guatemala despite repeated attempts over the past fifteen years. 
The analysis of the distributional impact of several changes in taxation 
helps explain why some measures have never been introduced successfully 
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while others passed through. The successive governments managed to 
gradually reduce customs tariffs and increase the value added tax rate 
without facing outright opposition from a powerful coalition. But all 
attempts to introduce a more progressive system, be it by introducing a 
new direct tax or by increasing revenues from existing ones, have failed. 
The output of simulations 3 and 4 explain why the ruling oligarchy and the 
economic elite have systematically opposed it as they, quite rightly, feel 
bound to lose11. On the other hand, the government has been unable and/or 
unwilling to muster sufficient popular support in favour of such reforms 
advocated by the international community. 
The results presented above cannot be regarded as the strict quantitative 
outputs of the simulated measures, because of severe limitations embedded 
in SAM-based models which we discuss in the next section. The results 
rather provide an indication of general trends. The interpretation of results 
requires great caution. The model's multipliers are based on the original 
tax structure and do not incorporate the effects of changes in the tax 
structure associated with the injection. Besides, the institution categories 
as defined in our Guatemalan SAM cannot serve as a basis for a detailed 
analysis of income distribution at the household level. Because of the lack 
of data on the factorial income at the household level, we had to associate 
each factor of production with one household category in a somewhat 
mechanical manner. 
111.5 LIMITATIONS OF SAM-BASED MODELS 
The multipliers computed from a SAM tend to overstate the adjustment to 
exogenous shocks for several reasons. First, the SAM framework does not 
allow for substitution effects in production, consumption, and international 
trade. Second, there are no resource constraints on the adjustment. Third, 
the linear model derived from the SAM has no room for price effects and 
assumes that marginal and average coefficients are the same (fix-price 
models). As in the input-output framework, supply is infinitely elastic at 
the cost price and output is demand-determined. Assumptions about fixed 
coefficients and cost prices limit the applicability of all linear input-output 
This is in line with the conclusion drawn by Rodrik (1994): research based on his political cost-
benefit ratio (PCBR) confirms and illustrates the substantial distributional impact of trade policy 
reform (see section 11.3.1). 
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and SAM-based models, static and dynamic. Under this logic, all firms that 
are aggregated under a given production activity should have the same 
production function with a unique technology and a similar distribution of 
factor income. This means that when defining production activities for the 
agricultural sector for instance, categories should be tailored along 
production systems, not commodity aggregates12. 
As for input-output tables, SAMs remain fundamentally applicable in 
contexts which are characteristic of fix-price models with excess 
production capacity and absence of substitution (Robinson, 1989). 
Consequently, it cannot serve to study shocks that involve important 
structural changes with major price adjustments such as real exchange rate 
movements, wage repression, or terms-of-trade effects, which are 
characteristic of major adjustments occurring in developing countries 
undergoing structural reforms (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1995). SAM-based 
models are thus inherently limited in their ability to reflect the workings of 
a multi-market economy in which price adjustments play an important role 
and in which there are important substitution possibilities in both 
production and demand. What the SAM does however correctly portray is 
the interdependence between production and the primary and secondary 
distributions of income (Robinson, 1989). The only way to include 
structural changes and shifts in relative prices would be to elaborate on the 
information provided by a SAM in the framework of Computable General 
Equilibrium models (CGE). 
In our Guatemalan case study, we have analysed tax policy in the 
framework of constant prices. Shifts have been dealt with as positive or 
negative income injections. In reality, an increase or reduction in a tax 
which directly relates to economic activity (e.g. VAT) is likely to bring 
about changes in prices. The solution would be to build a SAM-based CGE 
model which would combine the advantages of the SAM in terms of data 
with the inclusion of changes in relative prices. Provided the closure 
mechanisms and elasticity parameters in the different sectors are correctly 
identified, the tax shifting effects would then be properly determined by 
the model, instead of the ad hoc assumptions required for the simulations 
above. Yet our model may still be adequate for predicting the reactions of 
socioeconomic groups to different policy options. These are best explained 
under the assumption of limited rationality whereby each group is likely to 
12
 This is the case in our Guatemalan SAM, as shown in chapter V. 
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react on the basis of its anticipated gains or losses from economic reform. 
These anticipations are most likely to be generated without taking into 
account the impact of structural changes within the economy following 
fluctuations in relative prices. 
The paucity of reliable data on war-torn economies remains a major 
impediment to detailed SAM-based analysis. But the possibility of 
building a social accounting matrix at the sub-national level opens the door 
for distributional studies at the municipal or village level, to the extent that 
it is easier to conduct a representative household survey at the micro level. 
III.5.1 Contribution to the Analysis of War-torn Economies 
In concluding a brief review on recent literature on war-torn economies 
(chapter II), we have highlighted several key issues which deserve 
increased attention in economic analysis. The first one - distributional 
analysis - has been the focus of this chapter. SAM-based modelling proves 
helpful in reconciling scarce and inconsistent data from different sources 
into a coherent framework and in assessing the distributional impact of 
several economic policy options. This is particularly important in the case 
of war-torn societies as politics often takes precedence over economic 
efficiency, at least in the short run. Yet the simulation outputs resulting 
from a SAM-based model do not say much per se about the political 
feasibility of economic reforms. The analysts have to deduct from the 
simulation results which household' or institution category would gain or 
lose from a given policy change, and then make assumptions about the 
likely reactions that can be expected at the political level from these 
institutions. 
Assumptions behind the potential impact of poverty and extreme inequality 
also derive from psychological theories on collective violence. The relative 
deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970) contends that invidious discrepancies in 
economic, social, and political values are the most important determinants 
of conflict. Large gaps between people's socioeconomic expectations and 
what they actually receive, and the perceived grievance or frustration 
resulting from such discrepancy, is a major cause for political mobilisation 
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and conflict13. This theory has particular implications for postconflict 
rebuilding. Internal conflict offers huge profit opportunities to a small 
minority while living conditions dramatically deteriorate for the vast 
majority. War therefore tends to increase income concentration and to 
widen the gap between rich and poor. Much is then at stake during the 
reconstruction phase: 
• If aspirations and rising expectations are well in excess of 
achievements, the resulting frustration is a potentially strong 
destabilising factor. In the aftermath of a protracted conflict, losers have 
high expectations of rapid improvements once the peace is settled. If 
these expectations do not materialise, frustration breeds discontent and 
rekindles tensions. 
• Winners (e.g. illegal traders, some government officials, operators on 
parallel markets) have benefited from quasi-rents generated by chronic 
macroeconomic disequilibria and supply shortages. These new 
economic elites emerging during the conflict are likely to exert a major 
influence on the postwar economy, but tend at the same time to 
perpetuate illegal activities and continue their racketeering behaviour. 
A basic question is whether it is sound to allow this kind of "investor" 
to play such a dominant role in the postconflict economy and, if not, 
how to curb their influence or bring them back into a formal/legal 
economy. Liberalisation measures tend to eliminate the rents from 
which powerful groups benefited during the war and who are thus 
likely to oppose such reforms and resist attempts to integrate into the 
formal economy. 
• Other people such as elements of the old central army, warlords, 
demobilised soldiers, and politically disenfranchised forces are 
potentially destabilising groups in the postconflict period. They are 
likely to resort to violence if they fear they may "lose" from the peace 
deal, all the more so as they often have access to - or still possess -
arms and ammunitions (Adekanye, 1997). 
13
 Other authors have suggested that studying the origins of expectations can help to understand 
the rationale for conflict: norms, social comparison processes, ideologies, etc. (Lichbach, 1989). 
Adelman and Robinson (1989) showed that opportunities for "exit" through international or rural-
urban migration made greater inequality more tolerable, and that the same holds true if the 
richest groups refrain from ostentatious display of wealth differentials. 
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It is further interesting to add that the relation between social tensions and 
inequality may work in two ways, as highlighted by Sachs (1989) in the 
case of Latin American countries: high income inequality contributes to 
bad policy choices and weak economic performance via intense political 
pressures for macroeconomic policies to raise the incomes of lower income 
groups ("populist" policies). There is thus a vicious circle where unequal 
income and asset distribution fuel inequality via the whole process leading 
to economic policy design and implementation. In the same vein, Persson 
and Tabellini (1994) provide empirical evidence in a major survey of the 
literature on endogenous growth and endogenous policy that high 
concentration of land ownership tends to be associated with higher sectoral 
tax rates on the capital intensive sector, and thus lower growth rate. This 
conclusion is based on the following assumption: the small group of 
individuals (land owners in the above example) that disproportionately 
benefits from a policy that is unfavourable in terms of aggregate outputs 
(higher taxes on capital intensive sectors) is likely to be more organised 
and more successful in lobbying than the rest of the population. This 
phenomenon is relevant for many postwar countries in Latin America, 
including Guatemala. 
In the following chapters, we explore how to better include the political 
dimension in economic analysis, over and above strict distributional 
analysis. The next chapter specifically deals with the political economy of 
peace-building and presents a framework to tackle the complex and crucial 
interactions between the political and economic spheres. 
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Annexe HM : Copy of the original accounting table by 
Cruz and Serra 
Guatemala-1986 (Parti) 
Productive sector Intermediate 
Accotona 
1 Pa-Traditional aqr x sec 
2 PA-Hvbrid aar s e c 
3 PA-Backward aar sec 
4 PA-»anuf 1 
5* PA-Mnuf 2 
6 PA-ïuels 
7 PA-services 
8 PA-OOMoerce 
a Total domestic inracs 
9 H-Backward aar sec 
IO H-Pron CÄCM 
11 «-manufacturing 
12 K-From CSCM 
13 M-fuels 
14 H-services 
b Total inoorts 
c" CtOSB value 
d value added a t swrJtet p r i c e 
(c-b-a) 
15 FP-waoes rural workers 
16 PP-vaaes urban workers' 
17 FF-waa«* s erv i ce workers' 
e Total salaries 
Q Gross cavitai oavoents j'd-ë) 
23 G-total taxes (excl corp. tax) 
24 G-o/w t o t a l t a r i f f s 
25 G-o/w t a r i f f s on cap i t poods 
18 FP-aez capital payments Ig-
23+25J 
19 Fp-Interest pavnents 
20 FP-Deoreeiation 
21 FP-Coroorate Tax 
ft Cashflow I18-19~21i 
22 FP-Reinvestnens 
i Dividends /sua 26 t o 20} 
26 K-rural workers div 
27 K - c a o i t a l i s t s div 
28 K-covems>ent § div 
29 K-foreicners div 
30 Trannfers d iv 
3 Total disposable 'Income 
(k+31) 
31 Savino« 
k Consuantion fa+bl 
K)TAL • 
1 
PA-tr.aq 
5 . 5 
23 .7 
152,7 
122.7 
0 . 0 
5 . 1 
11.9 
36 .0 
357 .6 
3 . 6 
1 . 2 
35.8 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o.o 40.6 
3068.6 
2670.4 
941.4 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
941.4 
1729.0 
205.7 
2 . 2 
0 . 6 
1523.5 
37.2 
81.3 
77 .3 
1409.4 
39.1 
0 . 0 
1392.5 
0 . 0 
54.5 
- 3 8 . 7 
3069 
2 
PA-hvb. 
0 . 0 
1 . 2 
SB.9 
12.7 
0 . 0 
2 . 0 
34.1 
20 .4 
169.3 
1 . 2 
0 . 4 
11 .7 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
13.3 
1296.S 
1113.3 
207.2 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
207.2 
906.7 
12.4 
0 . 9 
0 . 4 
• 894.7 
50.2 
47.B 
0 . 7 
843.» 
52.2 
844.0 
0 . 0 
896.2 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
-52 .2 
3 
PA-back 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
98.9 
0 . 4 
0 . 0 
5 . 9 
21.5 
11.8 
138.5 
ID.S 
3 . 6 
104.7 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
118.8 
8B3.9 
626.6 
251.8 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2Sl. 8 
374.8 
17.5 
5 . 6 
0 . 7 
3S8.0 
0 
19.1 
0 
3S8.0 
19 .1 
33ß.ß 
336.8 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
B84 
4 
PA-atanuf 
382.2 
490.8 
63.9 
1287.0 
0 . 0 
34.2 
599.9 
481.8 
3335.fl 
86.2 
29.7 
825.» 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
542.8 
6681.4 
2399.8 
0 . 0 
859.4 
0 . 0 
859.4 
1540.4 
99.7 
48.0 
12.2 
1452.9 
130.5 
669.2 
36.7 
1205.7 
639.7 
784.4 
0 . 0 
761.3 
0 . 0 
158.8 
-135.7 
6681 
5 
PA-manuf 
9 . 3 
11.9 
1 . 6 
31.3 
0 . 0 
0 . 8 
14.6 
11.7 
81.2 
2 . 1 
0 . 7 
20 .1 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
22.9 
158.0 
53.9 
0 . 0 
20.9 
0 . 0 
20.9 
33.0 
1 . 1 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
3 1 . 5 
2.G 
14.4 
0 
29.1 
14.5 
14.7 
0 . 0 
14.0 
0 . 0 
3 . 6 
- 2 . 9 
1 5 8 
6 
PA-fuels 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
28.4 
0 . 0 
0 . 3 
15.2 
0 . 0 
43.9 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
225.9 
0 . 0 
225.9 
303.5 
33.7 
0 . 0 
17.9 
0 . 0 
27 .5 
25 .8 
7 . 3 
0 . 6 
0 . 0 
B. 5 
1 . 8 
0 
0 
6 . 7 
1 . 9 
6.7 
0 . 0 
1 . 9 
0 . 0 
6 . 7 
- 1 . 9 
3 0 4 
7 
PA-s erv i 
0 . 0 
5 . 9 
0 . 0 
429.1 
0 . 0 
104.4 
441.6 
274.3 
1255.5 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
145.4 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
32.2 
177.6 
5843.7 
4410.6 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1511.7 
2521.7 
2898.9 
239.8 
11 .1 
6 . 3 
2655.4 
-141 
673.2 
1 . 9 
2804.5 
479.6 
2471.6 
0 . 0 
2509.0 
109.4 
8 . 0 
- 1 4 6 . 8 
SS44 
8 I denana 
PA-comercft 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
127. S 
0 . 0 
6 . 6 
582.1 
166.1 
882.3 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
O-. 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
4688.9 
3806.6 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1055.6 
2055.6 
2751.0 
588.4 
67.7 
0 . 0 
2262 .6 
60.7 
55.5 
1 . 8 
2200.2 
72 ,5 
2090.6 
Ö.0 
2153.7 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
- 6 3 . 1 
4689 
397.0 
533.5 
426.0 
2039.1 
0.0 
159.3 
1721.1 
1002.1 
6268.1 
103.6 
35.6 
1143.6 
O.O 
225.9 
32.2 
1540.9 
22924. S 
1511S.5 
1400.4 
898.2 
2567.3 
4865.9 
10249.6 
1171.9 
136.1 
20.2 
9097.9 
142.2 
1560.S 
HO. 4 
8837.3 
1319.2 
7959.1 
338.8 
7728.6 
109.4 
223.6 
-441.3 
22925 
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Annexe UM: Copy of the original accounting table by 
Cruz and Serra 
Guatemala-1986 (Part 2) 
P r i v a t e 
JtOCOOMTS 
1 P a - T r a d i t i o n a l a a r X s e c 
2 F A - H v b r i d a a r sec 
3 P A - B a c k w a r ä a a r s e c 
4 P A - a a n u f 1 
5 PA-manuf 2 
6 P A - f u e l * 
7 P A - s e r v i c e s 
8 P A - c c — e r e » 
a Totti domestic i n o u t s 
9 M - B a c k w a r d » o r s e c 
1 0 M - r r c w CAC» 
1 1 x - a a n u f a c t u r i n g 
12 M - F r o * CACU 
1 3 H - f i i r t * 
14 H - s a r v i . c * g 
b S t o c a l i * 8 » r t s 
c Gross value 
d V a i u « a d d e d a t m a r * « t p r i e « 
f e - i - a J 
15 F P - w a o u r i t r a i w o r k e r s 
1 6 F P - w a o e « u r b a n w o r k e r » 
1 ? P P - w a o a s s e r v i c e w o r k e r s 
e T o t a l « a l a r i « « 
a Gross cavitai vavmenks f d - « ) 
2 3 O - t o t a l t a x « « < « x c l C o r p t a x ) 
2 4 ' 6 - o / w t o t a l t a r i f f s 
2 5 G - o / w t a r i f f s o n c a o i t g o o d » 
18 FP-oet capite! payments Ig-
23*251 
19 P P - I n t e r a s t o a v n e n t * 
2 0 P P - D C D r c c i a t i o n 
21 F F - C o r o o r a t * « a x 
b Cashflow 118-19-21} 
22 P P - R * i n v e s t s t a n s 
i Dividends !mm 26 to 30} 
2 6 K - r u r a l w o r k e r s d i v 
2 7 K - c a c i t a l i a U d i v 
2 8 K - o o v e m M u t t d i v 
2 9 K - f o r « i o n « r * d i v 
3D T r a n s f e r s d i v 
j T o t a l disposable income 
(k+3Xl 
3 1 S a v i n o « 
k C o n s W D t i o n <a+b) 
TOTAL 
1 5 
p p - r u r a l 
1 2 7 . 0 
S S . 2 
1 4 0 . 8 
6 1 7 . 7 
0 . 0 
4 . 9 
2 6 4 . 0 
5 8 0 . 4 
2 7 9 3 . 0 
2 . 5 
0 . 0 
3 7 . 3 
3 0 . 4 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
70.2 
1 4 0 0 . 4 
0 . 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 3 8 . 8 
- 1 2 3 . 9 
1863.2 
0 . 0 
1 8 6 3 . 2 
3 2 6 4 
1 6 
P P - u r b a n . 
9 4 . 1 
4 4 . 2 
3 3 . 5 
2 6 1 . 7 
0 . 0 
3 . 4 
2 1 2 . 6 
2 7 5 . 5 
9 2 5 . 0 
0 . 6 
0 . 0 
1 5 . f i 
1 2 . 9 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
29.3 
8 9 8 . 2 
0 . 0 
0 
4 . 3 
0 
D 
0 
0 
- 9 2 . 9 
99S. 3 
4 1 . 0 
9 5 4 . 3 
1 8 5 3 
c o n s u m p t i o n T o t a l I n v e s t m e n t 
1 7 
F P - s e r w 
3 0 7 . 4 
1 4 9 . 8 
1 2 7 . 1 
8 5 1 . 6 
0 . 0 
U . 8 
8 9 2 . 9 
9 5 2 . 2 
3292.. B 
2 . 2 
0 . 0 
5 1 . 6 
4 1 . 7 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
9 5 . 5 
3 3 5 6 . 1 
O.O 
0 
7 . 1 
Q 
B 
0 
0 
- 9 2 . 9 
3456.1 
6 7 . 8 
3 3 8 8 . 3 
, „6744 
3 8 
P P - c a p i t a 
5 0 7 . 0 
2 6 8 . 4 
1 5 1 . 5 
1 6 9 1 . 1 
0 . 0 
5 8 . 3 
1 8 2 1 . 0 
1 8 7 8 . 2 
6 3 7 5 . 5 
2 . 7 
0 . 0 
1 0 1 . 7 
8 3 . 6 
0 . 0 
7 7 * 4 
265.4 
0 , 0 
2 1 4 , 4 
0 
1 2 5 . 5 
0 
0 
7 7 2 8 . 5 
0 
0 . 0 
7639,7 
9 9 8 . 8 
6 6 4 0 . 9 
6 6 4 1 
consw. 
ï o t a l 
1 0 3 5 . 5 
5 2 0 . f i 
4 5 2 . 9 
3422.1 
0.0 
78.4 
3190.5 
3686.3 
12386.3 
8.0 
0.0 
206.4 
168.6 
0.0 
77.4 
460.4 
5 6 5 4 . 8 
214.4 
136.9 
8 0 6 7 . 3 
-309.7 
13954.3 
1107.6 
12846.7 
1 8 5 0 2 
CAP 
K - o r / i n v 
4 B . 6 
4 1 . 3 
1 5 . 2 
4 8 5 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
4 6 2 . 5 
0 . 0 
1 0 5 2 . 6 
4 0 1 . 8 
4 0 2 . S 
0 . 0 
D 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 4 5 4 
TAL 
P P - D U / i n 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 6 6 . 3 
0 . 0 
2 6 6 . 3 
1 7 . 2 
2 7 . 2 
0 . 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 8 4 
GVT 
F P - a o V / s j i 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 0 5 . 5 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 8 . 4 
0 . 0 
223.9 
1 0 9 . 6 
1 0 9 . 6 
7 8 8 . 8 
7 8 8 . 8 
0 
4 3 8 . 9 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 6 9 . 7 
2 1 2 2 
ROH 
E - e x t s m a 
1 5 8 7 . 8 
2 0 1 . 4 
0 . 0 
5 2 9 . 4 
1 5 8 . 0 
6 5 . 8 
2 8 5 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 8 2 7 . 4 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 
4 4 4 . 2 
0 
0 
o 
0 
1 8 1 . 3 
2 8 2 7 
Gtross value 
3068.9 
1296.8 
884.1 
6681.1 
15B.0 
303.5 
5 8 4 3 . 8 
4688.4 
22924.6 
111.6 
35.6 
1769.0 
168.6 
225.9 
219.2 
2529.9 
22924.5 
15115. S 
1400.4 
898.2 
33S6.1 
11309.5 
10249.6 
1386.3 
136.1 
20.2 
9097. S 
1162.2 
1560.5 
118.4 
16904.6 
1319.2 
7959.1 
338.8 
7728.6 
109.4 
223.6 
0.0 
13954.3 
2 1 0 7 . 6 
12846.7 
47014 
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Annexe 111.1.2: Explanation regarding the table by Cruz 
and Serra 
N.b.: Accounts in italics are totals or sub-totals of other accounts. Small 
letters and account numbers are used to indicate how each of these 
accounts is calculated. 
ACRONYMS 
PA: 
FP: 
M: 
G: 
K: 
E: 
Production activities 
Factor of production 
Imports 
Government 
Capital 
Exports 
CACM: Central American Common Market (Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) 
Corp. tax: Corporate tax 
Div: Dividends 
ROW: Rest of the world 
C: Consumption 
Int. demand: Intermediate demand 
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Annexe 111.3: Adjustment and corrections to construct 
the Guatemalan SAM 
The main operations in building our SAM are the following: 
Some of the accounts in the accounting tables by Cruz and Serra are 
reorganised and corrected as follows: 
Value added at market prices - wages = gross capital receipts 
(or operating surplus at market cost); 
all taxes = operating surplus or value added at factor cost; 
depreciation = net operating surplus at factor cost; 
reinvested utilities or nondistributed profits = distributed profits or 
dividends. 
Depreciation is then reported under the private capital account in the SAM. 
The private capital account is taken as a residual. We add to the amount of 
investment allocated to each and every sector in order to balance rows with 
columns based on the usual assumption that private investment is poorly 
recorded and often underestimated. 
81 
We reproduce below the most relevant balance sheets provided by Cruz 
and Serra, which we use to cross-check the information provided on the 
accounting table (annexe 111,1) and correct the data where necessary. For a 
complete presentation of the balance sheets and national accounts, the 
reader is referred to the tables 20 to 32 in Cruz and Serra (1989). 
Government - Current Account (million qtz, 1986) 
Revenues 
Tax revenue 
Central government 
Value added 
imports tariffs 
Export 
Excise (consumption 
tax) 
Stamp tax + others 
Personal income 
Property 
Vehicle 
Corporate tax 
Rest of government 
Households 
Enterprises 
Non tax revenue 
Central government 
Net transfers public 
enterprise 
Petroieum 
compensation fund 
Rents 
Others 
Rest of government 
Grants 
TotaP 
Deficit 
Origin of payment 
t 
* 
5
 Productive sector , 
i
 Productive sector \ 
' Productive sector 
f Commerce sector ! 
1 
j Service + commerce 
Households 
Households 
Households 
\ Productive sector 
[ ~ - -
fc
 Households 
1
 Service + commerce 
I 
Ì " ! 
_: _. _t 
I Public enterprise i 
} _ ! t ; 
I Services ' 
I Services l 
a Households i 
i External Sector [ 
j 
, 
1,327.8 
1,114 2 
3083 
136.1 
245.5 
1388 
883 
612 
16.4 
ID I 
1185 
21SS 
100 0 
1138 
3082 
272 S 
28.S 
133.3 
311 
79 2 
36.7 
57.4 
1,694,4 
S4.D 
Expenditures 
Current expenditure 
Consumption (goods + 
services) 
Government consumption 
Services 
Goods 
Rest of govt consumption 
Services 
Goods 
Wages + salanes 
Central government 
Rest of government 
Interest 
Central government interest 
External debt 
Internal debt 
Rest of Central govt 
interest 
Net private transfers 
Capital expenditure 
Fixed capita) formation 
Non-financial public enterprise 
Financial intermediaries 
Total - — — 
1,5192 
3335 
2781 
895 
ISSS 
55.4 
402 
15.2 
788.8 
624.8 
164.0 
2 » 1 
207.9 
27.7 
180.3 
&2 
185.8 
239.2 
1835 
44.8 
10.9 
1,758.4 
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Guatemala : Balance of payments 1986 
(million Quetaales) 
! CURRENT ACCOUNT -118.0 
J Trade balance 
! Net factor receipts 
j Official interest 
j Government 
E Public enterprise 
(
 Bank of Guatemala 
I Public banks 
I Other 
Ì Private interest 
j Dividends Nondlstr Ut 
i Other 
I Non factonal services 
] Transport+insurances 
1
 Other services 
Tounsm 
Net private transfers 
CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
i - — 
t Private capitals 
j Foreign investment 
Î Other private capitals 
j Government 
Grants 
Foreign financing 
Public enterpnses 
Net capitals to Bank of Guatemala 
Short term 
Medium- and long-term 
405 0 ; 
-507 9 j 
-4004 i 
-59 8 ; 
i 
-887 . 
" -121 6 I 
-94 ' 
1210 
-98 
-27 7' 
-889 -
-I39T 
-215 2 
425 j 
336 • 
123 9 ! 
I 
I 
266.3 j 
i 
. i 
140 5 Ì 
165 8 
-25 3 j 
1991 ' 
574 j 
1417 ! 
— i 
20 5 ' 
-7 5 
- ^ J 
-13 7 
I-
Arrears of Bank of Guatemala 
: FMI 
j Other banks 
lOveraii deficit 
j i 
foveratt  
i Net deficit of FMI 
! Memo 
\ Total arrears (Interests) 
I Cortina 
S Public sBctor 
-123 2 
1294 ! 
TÔ97 j 
23 4 Ì 
1483 i 
386 j 
831 ' 
I 
441 ' 
330 
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General Government (Million Qtz, 1986) 
Taxes 
Non tax income 
From households 
From enterprises 
Utilities public enterprise 
Transfers from abroad 
Overall deficit 
External new net 
indebtedness 
Loans from fin. 
intermediaries 
Loans Guatemala Bank 
Change in floating debt 
Other loans 
Bonds 
Households 
Financial intermediaries 
Public entities 
Bank of Guatemala 
Sources 
1,325.0 
280.2 
36.7 
243.5 
28.9 
57.4 
99.1 
141.7 
203.9 
(170.6) 
146.9 
(26.2) 
(196.7) 
28.0 
172.9 
0.0 
(397.6) 
1,790.5 
Uses 
788.8 
333.5 
243.2 
59.8 
183.5 
241.5 
185.8 
55.7 
183.5 
1,790.5 
Wages+ salaries 
Goods + services 
Interest payments 
External public debt 
Internai public debt 
Transfers productive sector 
Households 
Public enterprises (Capital) 
Fixed capital formation 
Central Bank (Million Qtz, 1986) 
New external net 
indebtedness 
Money supply (currency) 
Change in bank reserves 
interest government debt 
Interest financial system 
Sources 
(117.1) 
106.4 
167.3 
90.9 
25.9 
273.4 
Uses 
312.4 
(568.2) 
(61.2) 
0.8 
148.3 
441.3 
273.4 
Interest external debt 
New credit to government 
Credit public enterprises 
Credit financial system 
Change international reserves 
Unclassified assets 
84 
Households (Million Qtz, 1986) 
Wages + salaries from 
enterprises 
Government wages + salaries 
Transfers 
From abroad 
From government 
Interest from bonds 
Net interest from deposits 
Dividends from enterprises 
Consumer credit 
Sources 
4842.8 
788.8 
309.7 
123.9 
185.8 
4.3 
132.6 
8,414.5 
S.4 
14,502.0 
Uses 
12,846.7 
673,1 
748.7 
94.2 
111.4 
28.0 
14,502.1 
Private consumption 
Taxes to families 
New deposits 
Change money supply (currency) 
Securities capital + reserves 
Central Government bonds 
Enterprises (Million Qtz, 1986) 
GDP Non government sector 
New external indebtedness 
New banks indebtedness 
New Bank of Guatemala 
indebt. 
Securities capital + reserve 
Capital transfers from 
government 
Foreign investment 
Unclassified assets 
Sources 
15,049.1 
(4.8) 
238.1 
(61.2) 
111.4 
55.7 
165.8 
441.3 
15,995.3 
Uses 
4,842.8 
424.4 
369.3 
0.0 
55.1 
657.0 
27.7 
8.,414.5 
28.9 
1,453.0 
146.9 
15,995.2 
Wages + salaries to household 
Total interest payments 
To banking system 
To Bank of Guatemala 
To external creditors 
Taxes to enterprises 
Utilities external investment 
Dividends to households 
Utilities Public enterprises 
Private investment 
Change in floating debt 
85 
Banking system (Million Qte, 1986) 
Change in deposits 
New external indebtedness 
interest debt private sector 
interest debt public sector 
Credit from Bank of 
Guatemala 
S o u r c e s 
748.7 
23.4 
369.3 
S8.3 
0.8 
1,230.5 
U s e s 
19.2 
25.9 
132.6 
167.3 
247.5 
9.4 
238.1 
350.6 
12.2 
275.2 
1,230.5 
Interest external debt 
Interest Bank of Guatemala debt 
Interest payments from deposits 
Change in banking reserves 
Net loans to private sector 
Consumer credit 
Corporate credit 
Net loans to public sector 
Change cash in vault 
Taxes 
Based on the above, we correct data for households as follows: net 
interests from deposits are split between high income households (HHH) 
which receive 125.5 million Quetzales (qtz) (+7728.5=7854) and middle-
income urban households (MHH) which get qtz 7.1m. 
Government transfers are divided between MHH and low-income urban 
households (LUHH) which receive an additional qtz 4.3m in interests 
(+92.9=97.2). Transfers from abroad correspond to capital and labour 
income from abroad. The qtz 123.9m accruing to low-income rural HH 
(LRHH) primarily register remittances sent from relatives working abroad. 
We add an account "other institutions" which comprises productive 
entities. The qtz 111.4m receipts by other institutions correspond to equity 
shares acquired by HHH. 
The government gets qtz 214.4m from HHH as direct taxes, and qtz 57.4m 
as grants and credits from abroad. Net transfers from public enterprises 
amount to qtz 28.9m, rents to qtz 31.1m and other nontax revenues to qtz 
79.2m (=qtz 109.4m). The government deficit is qtz 99.1m (reported in the 
SAM as negative savings). 
As for the rest-of-the-world account - which includes capital transfer from 
abroad and current deficit in the balance of payments - the figures are 
corrected based on the balance sheets as follows: capital payment abroad 
86 
actually amounts to qtz 233.4m which corresponds to 
qtz 223.6m + qtz 4.3m and 5.5m as interest payments by the government. 
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Annexe 111.5.1 : Description of the SAM Accounts 
Numbering corresponds to account numbers in the SAM (annexe III.5) 
1. Traditional agricultural exports: coffee, cotton, banana, sugar cane, 
meat. 
2. Nontraditional agricultural exports: tomato, other agricultural 
production, forestry and fishing. 
3. Subsistence agriculture: corn, beans and wheat. 
4. Manufacturing 1: mining, food processing, industry, handicraft. 
5. Manufacturing 2: industrial goods that are wholly exported, such as 
textiles in export processing zones. 
6. Oil and lubricants 
7. Services: covers all services including construction, energy, 
communications, transport, 
banking and insurances (financial services), tourism and other private 
services. 
8. Commerce: commercial activities. 
9. Rural labour 
10. Urban labour 
11. Service labour 
12. Capital (includes dividends, interests and nondistributed profits from 
land and capital). 
13. Low-income rural households: rural households earning up to qtz 
1,200, associated with rural labour. 
14. Low-income urban households: urban households earning between 
qtz 1,201 and 2,400, associated with urban (industry) workers. 
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15. Medium-income urban households: urban households earning 
between qtz 2,400 and 2,401 and 4,800, associated with labour in the 
services sector. 
16. High-income households: households earning more than qtz 4,800, 
associated with capital. 
17. Other institutions: firms. 
18. Customs tariffs: only on imported goods. 
19. Value added tax. 
20. Other indirect taxes: comprises export tariffs and excise tax. 
21. Direct taxes: includes income tax, property tax, corporate tax and tax 
on vehicles. 
22. Government: includes nontax revenue such as net transfers from 
public enterprises, petroleum compensation fund by the private sector, 
rents and other. 
23. Consolidated capital account: column-wise includes capital formation 
(public and private investment), and row-wise depreciation 
allowances, savings of institutions and net capital transfers from 
abroad. 
24. Rest-of-the-world (ROW) current account: this includes export, 
respectively imports; factor income from (resp. to) abroad, current 
transfer of institutions to (respectively from) abroad. 
25. Rest-of-the-world (ROW) capital account: includes capital transfer 
from abroad and current deficit in the balance of payments. 
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IV. A POLITICO-ECONOMIC 
FRAMEWORK FOR 
WAR-TORN COUNTRIES 
In this chapter, we first present an analytical framework that enables us to 
capture the crucial interactions between economic policy and peace-
building. We then specify how the main actors behave within this politico-
economic framework. On the basis of a simple model of politico-economic 
interactions, we elaborate on microeconomic considerations that help 
understand the behaviour of the government, the social groups and the 
external actors with regard to the requirements of postconflict 
reconstruction. 
The politico-economic framework developed here originates in the 
pioneering work of Frey and Eichenberger (1992 and 1994) on the political 
economy of stabilization in developing countries. It is based on a wider 
perspective than that of the traditional economic approach in that it builds 
on both Modern Political Economy and New Institutional Economics. The 
conceptual framework makes it possible to account for the complex 
challenges related to economic reform in politically volatile settings. It 
addresses the specific institutional arrangements and politico-economic 
relations prevailing in today's war-torn countries, i.e. primarily in low-
income economies. 
We have opted to elaborate on the contributions of Frey and Eichenberger 
because the political economy approach brings an essential dimension into 
the economic analysis of conflict-ridden countries. Traditional economic 
theory assumes that private "egoistic" entrepreneurs are driven by profit, 
while "benevolent" policy makers seek maximum public welfare. The 
"political economy" approach departs from this basic assumption and 
analyses the demand and supply sides of economic policy, i.e. how 
individual preferences are defined, aggregated and channelled into political 
demands and how policy-maker preferences take shape accordingly. It also 
focuses on the government's demand and supply of political support. 
Political economy analysis thus adds an essential dimension to research on 
postconflict rebuilding by placing postwar economic reforms in their 
political contexts. Under this approach, economic policy is viewed as the 
outcome of interactions among politicians, bureaucrats, interest groups and 
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external actors within a set of institutional constraints. The new political 
economy literature views economic policy itself as a process in which 
distributional considerations and political competition play a crucial role. 
The endogenous political process then constitutes an important 
determinant of economic policy. 
The will and capacity of government to implement and manage economic 
reforms may be a requirement for success but those qualities alone do not 
suffice, especially in the aftermath of a conflict. For powerful domestic 
actors are often in a position to block reforms if they refuse to co-operate. 
Standard economic reforms often affect negatively well-organised 
economic sectors (e.g. public administration) while the potential 
beneficiaries are politically, less vocal (e.g. agricultural and informal 
sectors). Those who stand to lose from the reforms readily oppose them 
while winners often do not know who they are before obtaining the 
induced benefits and thus do not mobilise in support of the reforms (see for 
instance Krueger, 1993). During the transition from war to peace, this is 
further complicated by the fact that groups affected by the reforms often 
simultaneously lose from the peace deal, as the end of hostilities means the 
disappearance of quasi-rents generated by the conflict. These combined 
factors can put the whole peace-building process in danger if not carefully 
dealt with by an appropriate sequencing of reforms and/or compensatory 
measures. 
In what follows, we elaborate on a politico-economic framework which 
basically consists of two groups of variables: measures and events. 
Economic and political measures are related to policy instruments, while 
economic and political events result from - and shape - policy decisions. 
There are three actor groups or decision-making entities: the government, 
the social groups and the external actors. The whole system is driven by 
relative prices: the attitude of social groups towards the government is 
determined by a cost-benefit evaluation and depends on the relative cost of 
support or opposition, which in turn hangs on the institutional framework. 
The same applies to the decision of the government to reward or sanction a 
given group, as we will elaborate below. The framework focuses on the 
interactions between the economy, the polity and the major players at 
stake, be they domestic actors (government, interest groups, etc.) or 
foreign actors (donors, creditors, aid agencies, foreign investors, etc.). The 
framework thus integrates a political dimension into economic analysis and 
vice-versa. 
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Following Frey and Eichenberger (1992), we illustrate the fundamental 
politico-economic interactions prevailing in developing countries as 
suggested in figure IV. 1. The system can be briefly summarised as follows: 
resources generated by the economy flow to social groups who react 
accordingly and influence the polity, in particular the survival probability 
of the government. Political instability in turn affects the economy. The 
political elite seeks to manipulate the economy with the objective first to 
remain in power, and second to improve its own welfare. Foreign actors 
primarily intervene by providing economic and political support with 
conditions attached to it (conditionality). The government reacts to 
economic and political signals and takes decisions accordingly. These in 
turn affect the economy and the political situation. 
Figure IV.1 : Politico-economic relations 
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The remainder of this section explores the basic relationships between 
actors, policy decisions and politico-economic events in war-torn settings 
in general. 
IV.1 THE ACTORS 
IV.1.1 The Government 
The government is understood to encompass the politicians in power 
including the presidency, ministers, the ruling party or parties, the security 
forces and top government executives to the extent that they are political 
appointees. The primary objective of a government under attack is to retain 
enough support to stay in power. Note that the motivations for retaining 
power may be purely egoistic but also ideological, political, religious, 
ethnic, etc. The second objective of political elites is to increase personal 
income, wealth and prestige, all the more that the risk of being suddenly 
ousted out of office increases with political instability (Bulow and Rogoff, 
1990). We assume that the government uses political and economic 
instruments to maximise its utility1: Economic policy can be classified as 
either restrictive or expansionary, which corresponds to unpopular and 
popular measures respectively. Political instruments fall under two broad 
categories, i.e. repression and liberalisation. The government's probability 
of remaining in power is a function of its domestic popularity and of the 
way it is perceived by external actors. As summarised by Dessus, Lafay 
and Morrisson (1997: 100-101): "The expression of domestic 
unpopularity... is a positive function of stabilisation measures, and a 
negative function of political repression. Unpopularity abroad is a negative 
function of stabilisation measures, and a positive function of political 
repression. The former induces a positive reaction from the donors if the 
country engages in plans to reduce external imbalances, while the latter 
can trigger a negative reaction on the part of the international community, 
which in turn weakens the government's domestic position." 
The reader is referred to chapter V for a detailed analysis of the mioroeconomic foundations 
behind the government's demand for political support and the groups' supply of support in 
conflictual settings. 
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For the government, there is a clear trade-off between economic reforms 
that are unpopular in the short run and expansionary economic measures 
that increase short-term support but may impact negatively on the overall 
economic conditions in the longer run. When implementing restrictive 
economic measures, the government tends to repress troubles in order to 
remain in power. Yet, the government might cancel the reforms if popular 
discontent cannot be kept under control any longer with political 
instruments such as repression. The final decision depends on the overall 
costs of repression, be they economic (additional means for the army and 
the police), or political (increased government dependence on its security 
forces). The dilemma is particularly acute in the direct aftermath of a 
conflict: the government is under mounting pressure for economic reform 
to put the economy back on track and secure access to foreign funds for 
reconstruction. At the same time, the room for violent repression is 
drastically reduced by the peace arrangements, often under tight 
monitoring from the international community. Thus, restrictive economic 
measures easily trigger civil unrest, while effective postconflict rebuilding 
requires first and foremost the restoration of political stability. 
IV.1.2 The Social Groups 
Economic agents are taken to behave rationally, but have imperfect 
information and limited power of anticipation, or at best adaptive 
anticipation capacity. The analytical framework consequently focuses on 
whether a given economic or political measure is sensed by key 
socioeconomic groups to affect their short-term interests in a positive or 
negative manner. Groups express opposition to governmental measures 
through upheavals, strikes, demonstrations and the like. In this 
dissertation, we limit our analysis to the most relevant groups in conflict-
ridden societies to the extent that they play a substantial role in the 
politico-economic interactions taking place during the peace-building 
process. 
Among organised groups, the military, paramilitary and police forces are 
key players whose active support is essential to both suppress opposition 
and maintain the government in power. The public administration also has 
much clout in that it is in a position to systematically block the 
implementation of government policies, to go on strikes and stage large 
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demonstrations in urban centres. Key executive branches may have a 
disproportionate political weight such as the fiscal and customs authorities 
in charge of collecting government revenue or essential service providers 
in the areas of health, energy and transportation. The private sector is often 
highly organised and disposes of powerful means to advance the interests 
of its members. In our analytical framework, the private sector may react to 
public policy decisions or political events by placing its capital abroad, 
emigrating, moving into the informal economy and escaping its fiscal 
obligations. It is important to note that the private sector plays an 
ambiguous role: it can be a driving force for peace as well as for conflict. 
Entrepreneurs may be instrumental in pushing for the restoration of the 
rule of law and of security as a prerequisite to restarting business. At the 
same time, they may also perpetuate a climate of insecurity and impunity to 
carry on criminal activities or preserve rents and quasi-rents generated 
during the conflict. 
Non-organised groups may also exert great influence over politics because 
of their considerable size. It is worth distinguishing, among the poor and 
middle classes, between the urban and the rural population. The former 
may express discontent through riots, strikes and demonstrations. The 
mobilisation costs are higher in rural areas where people sometimes have 
no option other than joining the armed insurrection, seek refuge in another 
region of the country, or flee abroad. 
TV.1.3 The External Actors 
Foreign actors intervene in a war-torn economy through humanitarian aid, 
rehabilitation, traditional financial and technical assistance, trade measures 
ranging from active import promotion to embargo, foreign direct 
investment, etc. Political interventions may take various forms, e.g. 
providing support to the opposition or to the government, pressing for 
peace, brokering or hosting peace talks, etc. External assistance is usually 
conditioned by a set of targets to be met by the recipient country. 
Economic conditionality lies in the realm of the international financial 
institutions (IFIs) and the IMF in particular. Structural adjustment 
packages encompass measures such as a reduction of the budget or 
balance-of-payment deficits, privatisation of state-owned enterprises and 
trade liberalisation. Political conditions are rather set by powerful bilateral 
partners and may involve clarification and prosecution of human rights 
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violations, démocratisation, downsizing of the security forces, reduction of 
military expenditures, etc. 
Access to foreign finance is usually contingent upon prior agreement with 
the IMF. Schematically, the IMF provides funds only once an agreement 
has been reached with the recipient government (primarily the central bank 
and the finance ministry)2. Conditions imposed by the IMF typically 
include politically sensitive measures such as salary cuts in the public 
sector, price increases in basic foodstuffs as a result of subsidy cuts, or 
restrictive monetary/credit policy. In recent years, the IFIs have come to 
recognise the need for a specific approach for their operations in conflict 
and post-war situations. In addition to traditional economic conditionality, 
they have begun to look more and more at peace-related issues and have 
openly set political conditions in a few cases (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
For a discussion on the IFIs and peace-related conditionality see Boyce 
and Pastor, 1998). 
1V.1.4 The Economy 
Economic agents are taken to behave rationally and have limited power of 
anticipation. In studying politico-economic interactions, we shall focus on 
the potential trade-off between economic reform and peace-building3. The 
literature on the political economy of structural adjustment shows that 
orthodox economic reforms tend to hit the interests of public employees 
and strongly unionised workers in import-substituting sectors, while those 
supposed to benefit in the medium term are the rural population and 
successful exporters. The problem is that those who stand to win have 
often less political clout than those who stand to lose. In addition, potential 
winners generally ignore whether and how much they will gain from 
reform, while losers readily organise to defend their interests. During the 
a
 The positive theory of international organisations helps understand how the IFIs actually 
behave and why. Lafay and Lecaillon (1993) have shown how much the behaviour of these 
organisations depends on the governments and interest groups of member countries, and on 
the staff of the international bureaucracy itself. They also highlighted that the volume of loans 
offered follows closely the cyclical fluctuation in the creditors' economies. Not surprisingly, 
mandates and operational principles do not tell the whole story. 
3
 Based on the politico-economic framework presented above, we will develop a 
macroeconometric model in chapter Vl in which we shall follow usual specifications for the 
economy. 
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transition from war to peace, structural adjustment tends to affect the very 
groups that stand to lose from the peace deal to the extent that both the end 
of hostilities and economic reforms imply improved market efficiency and 
the suppression of rents (Boyce, 1996; Keen, 1998). Stabilisation measures 
may thus add to the incentives to oppose the peace process and restart 
hostilities. 
IV.2 MICROECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
The framework outlined above differs from traditional economic 
approaches by integrating the political dimension. It also differs from the 
standard politico-economic models in public choice in that it accounts for 
the specific institutional settings of low-income countries at war, in 
particular with regard to the autocratic nature of political regimes and the 
violent means through which discontent is channelled. In this sense, it 
offers a promising avenue to study political and economic relations in 
conflict settings. 
Our ultimate objective is to construct a macroeconometric model with a 
view to testing the relations between economic reform and the peace-
building process. This will be done in the context of a country case study 
on Guatemala (chapter VI). Before turning to the model, it is important to 
specify how the main actors behave within our politico-economic 
framework outlined above, i.e. examine the behaviour of the government, 
social groups and external actors. We first present a positive model of 
government behaviour developed by Frey and Eichenberger (1992) and 
analyse the demand and supply functions of political support. We assess 
how this model applies in the case of war-torn countries in general as well 
as in the particular Guatemalan context, based on our previous analysis of 
war-torn economies (chapter II). Following Haggard, Lafay and Morrisson 
(1995), we introduce intertemporality into the model together with political 
variables such as civil unrest and repression, with a view to highlighting 
the gap between the optimal policy mix from a government's standpoint 
and the economic optimum advocated by the international financial 
institutions. Finally, we turn to the external actors and assess different 
types of interventions by the international community through their 
politico-economic impact during the fragile transition from war to peace. 
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IV.2.1 The Political Support Function 
Following Frey and Eichenberger (1992), we model the interactions 
between the government and the social groups in a demand-supply 
framework wherein the government demands the support that the 
population supplies. 
The Government's Demand for Support 
Frey and Eichenberger assume that the government aims at maximising its 
utility function (Ug) which depends on two variables: own consumption 
(C) and probability of survival (PS). Consumption expenditures of the 
politicians in power are understood in a broad sense: they encompass not 
only egoistic expenses to improve their material wellbeing and social 
prestige, but also expenditures motivated on ideological, ethnic or political 
grounds. The government's probability of survival (PS) is a direct function 
of the support it gets from the population (S). Under normal circumstances, 
support could be gauged by a popularity index through regular polls and 
elections, to the extent that the latter are "free and fair". In the midst of a 
civil war, such an index is obviously not available. The intensity of 
government support could then be traced through the behaviour of distinct 
groups vis-à-vis the government and the rebels, ranging from outright 
opposition to active support. 
The government is confronted with a basic trade-off: increasing C reduces 
PS as it diminishes the resources available to muster support from the 
population. The government utility function can be written as follows: 
Ug = U(CPS), with < % > 0 and < % 5 > 0, (1) 
The government of a country at war has limited resources to muster 
support. This is particularly true for a government such as the Guatemalan 
one which is constrained by the very limited amount of resources available 
to pursue its goals (financial constraint). During the conflict, a government 
also faces political constraints related to the risk of being toppled, 
sometimes with dramatic consequences for the politicians in power (e.g. 
being jailed or killed). The government is thirdly limited by technical 
constraints given its weak bureaucratic ability and its low capacity to 
m 
address the high expectations of its constituents after the war (peace 
dividends). Following Frey and Eichenberger (1992: 24), we represent the 
government's utility function given the resource constraint and the trade-
off between support and consumption as illustrated in figure IV.2. 
Figure IV.2: The government's utility 
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As the resources available are not completely fungible between 
expenditures for own consumption and increased popular support, there are 
diminishing marginal returns and the resource constraint is concave with 
respect to the origin. The optimal trade-off between support and 
consumption is located in (O). The demand for support curve is then 
obtained by identifying the optimal demand for support under varying 
prices of support in terms of the amount of own consumption the 
government must give up (figure IV.3). 
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Figure IV.3: Government's demand for support function 
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The government's demand for support function depends on a set of 
political and institutional factors. Based on a review of the literature on 
conflict and the economy (chapter II) and on insights from our Guatemalan 
country case study (see next chapter), the main variables determining the 
support demand function in contemporary conflict-ridden, low-income 
countries are discussed hereafter: 
• The perceived cost of losing power is positively associated with the 
support demand. During a conflict, this cost is generally high: the people 
in power may fear to be killed or jailed if the opposition seizes power. 
The political elite might be deprived of its assets and belongings and 
lose its dominating position following a major shift in the ethnic and 
social balance of power. The ultimate survival strategy may be to seek 
asylum abroad. A government seriously threatened by an armed 
insurgency is thus inclined to give greater priority to retaining support of 
crucial groups - the military and security forces ranking first - and is 
consequently ready to pay a higher price for support. The demand curve 
tends to shift outwards as a result (Ds"). 
• Démocratisation associated peace processes reduce the cost of losing 
power for the politicians in power, shifting the demand curve inwards 
(towards Ds'). In Guatemala, for instance, this cost can be regarded as 
relatively low at present. For if the government is sanctioned through 
elections or is even toppled by a coup, the balance of power between the 
various social groups is unlikely to be fundamentally challenged, 
including the oligarchy's dominating position. 
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• Governments generally lack resources and have a low fiscal capacity in 
the direct aftermath of a protracted civil war. Guatemala is no exception: 
it has the lowest fiscal revenue/GDP ratio in Latin America. This tight 
resource constraint tends to shift the demand curve to the left (towards 
Ds'). The influx of external assistance for reconstruction may alleviate 
the situation to a certain extent. In this context, the reconstruction 
package pledged by the international community in the Guatemalan case 
(USD 1.9 billion) has enhanced the capacity of the government to 
muster support. 
• State institutions have often been debilitated during the conflict and 
suffer from a lack of popular legitimacy4. In our Guatemalan example, 
the security forces and the judicial system have been seriously 
discredited by years of indiscriminate repression and widespread 
impunity for corruption, crimes and human rights violations. To regain 
popular support, one of the priorities is to restore some credibility in 
public institutions. This is all the more necessary that the peace deal has 
seriously limited the scope for violent repression of the opposition. The 
demand curve consequently shifts to the right (towards D"). 
The Groups' Supply of Support 
The politico-economic theory of democracy assumes that individuals 
compare the utility they derive from the government in power with the 
alternatives and vote accordingly (e.g. Oslon, 1990). This concept can be 
adapted to the type of authoritarian regimes prevailing in contemporary 
war-torn countries, mutatis mutandis: instead of inflicting electoral 
sanctions, some groups express opposition through violent means (armed 
insurrection, coups, upheavals and the like). Others may voice then-
discontent through demonstrations, strikes, protest marches, etc. 
With Frey and Eichenberger (1992), we start from the simplifying 
assumption that the population and the various interest groups derive 
utility (Up) from the general economic conditions, the special privileges 
granted to them by the government and the absence of negative sanctions 
(repression). The government can thus influence Up with three sets of 
4
 This is obviously not the case when a popular movement seizes power after winning a national 
liberation struggle (e.g. Eritrea). 
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instruments, i.e. general economic policy (E) to improve the overall 
economic conditions (Y), positive sanctions in the form of bribes or 
economic measures directed at specific individuals or groups to muster 
political support (P), and repression (R) which can be regarded as a 
negative sanction (e.g. additional means for the military intelligence 
services). E may for instance include public investment in basic 
infrastructure, in health and education services, etc. The immediate impact 
on popular support may be negative, but is expected to turn positive after 
some delay. P encompasses bribes and privileges granted to specific 
groups and may take the form of tax exemption, rents, subsidising basic 
foodstuff prices or the steel industry, protecting a given sector from 
external competition, preferential access to jobs in the public sector, etc. P 
enhances support instantaneously, but reduces the surplus available to the 
government for discretionary consumption (CJ since bribing supporters is 
costly. The utility function is written as follows: 
Up=U (F, P, R) (2) 
where Y and P are positively associated with the groups' utility, contrary to 
repression (R) which is negatively correlated. 
Figure IV .4 suggested by Frey and Eichenberger (1992: 26) depicts the 
resource allocation dilemma facing the authorities: the politicians in power 
have to muster a sufficient amount of support from the population and the 
various interest groups to remain in power. As the resources at their 
disposal are limited, they are forced to allocate them as efficiently as 
possible between E, P and R. The government's possibility curve ABC 
depicts this allocation trade-off in the case where all available resources 
are spent exclusively on mustering support. This could be the case of a 
risk-averse government which feels dangerously threatened by the 
opposition. The possibility curve is concave with respect to the origin, 
reflecting that the productivity of resources affected to E and P is positive, 
but subject to diminishing marginal returns. 
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Figure IV.4: Government's decision on resource 
allocation 
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Opting for a policy mix set in B, the government gets S* support which 
maximises its probability of survival given the resources at its disposal. A 
government that either feels less threatened or is less risk-averse will 
choose a trade-off point inside the ABC curve, such as E for instance. This 
government receives less support but enjoys the surplus that was not spent 
on mustering support for its own consumption. On the opposite side, a 
government which has not sufficient resources to muster what it considers 
as being the minimal level of support required to stay in power may seek 
access to foreign finance. If it is granted a loan, it can spend GHI and 
succeeds in raising support to the level 5' '. 
In other words, Frey and Eichenberger (1994: 27) illustrate in figure IV.4 
the function that associates the values of a variety of government resource 
allocations with different support levels. They conclude that "the 
derivative of this function can be interpreted as the support supply function 
or the marginal cost of support function which will presumably be upward-
sloping"5. The Ss curve represents the support provided by the population 
and the various groups when comparing the utility they get from the 
present government with the alternatives. When combined with the 
demand curve, it determines the equilibrium support, as shown in figure 
IV.5 below. 
In iheir paper on the political feasibility of stabilisation programmes in developing countries, 
Frey and Eichenberger (1994) introduce the concepts of appropriability and attributability as tools 
to examine the institutional conditions that determine the support supply and demand functions. 
Appropriability refers to how far the government can appropriate resources, and attributability 
focuses on the extent to which economic benefits are attributed by the beneficiaries to 
government policies, thus increasing support. 
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Figure IV.5: Government's equilibrium support 
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The main determinants of the government's supply of support function in 
the case of war-torn countries are the following: 
• In a New Institutional Economics perspective, transaction costs increase 
with the conflict as a result of the weakening of institutions, the 
deterioration of social capital and the high level of political and 
economic insecurity. More protection provided by the authorities results 
in more support, provided the price of support remains equal. In other 
words, increased security services shifts the support function 
downwards (for instance towards Ss") to the extent that investors, and 
capital owners in general, are willing to pay a higher price to get 
effective protection from the government (e.g. improved private 
property protection, contract enforcement). The contrary holds in the 
case of state collapse (e.g. Liberia and Sierra Leone at certain stages), 
where the government is unable to provide effective protection. 
• Expression of support to the government or the opposition costs more in 
the midst of a civil war than would be the case in a democratic and 
peaceful context: voting is definitely less costly - or risky - than taking 
Price of 
support 
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sides in an armed conflict. This shifts the supply curve upwards in war-
torn countries (could correspond to Ss'), at least as long as the 
government has not been debilitated to the point that the threat of 
repression has disappeared. Some African conflicts have weakened the 
state apparatus to such an extent that governments have lost the ability 
to reward and sanction their constituents (Zartman, 1995; UNCTAD, 
1997). In such contexts, withdrawing popular support hardly bears any 
cost. 
• In a majority of countries at war, the state is highly centralised. This 
maintains the supply curve upward as people are willing to pay a high 
price for support, given the virtual monopoly of the central government 
over negative and positive sanctions. In recent years, peace processes 
have involved decentralisation and power-sharing arrangements, as is 
the case in Guatemala. The devolution of power from the centre to the 
periphery tends to shift the supply function to the left as it reduces the 
leverage of the central government, and hence the incentives for support. 
• Low-income economies devastated by a civil war have to (redintegrate 
the global economy. This usually comprises inter alia the adoption of 
economic reforms inspired by the IFIs, including market deregulation 
and trade liberalisation. This reduces the resources and instruments 
available to the government to reward supporters, as illustrated by trade 
liberalisation and economic reform in Guatemala: the tariff cuts and 
nontariff barrier removal agreed under the CACM and the WTO have 
limited the government's capacity to protect specific sectors and firms 
against external competition while stabilisation efforts have led to 
subsidy cuts in sensitive areas (basic foodstuffs, public transportation, 
etc.). The adoption of liberal policies tends to shift the support supply 
function to the left to the extent that the private sector and other 
important social groups become aware of the reduced capacity of the 
state to offer significant privileges. 
We have seen that specific factors related to conflicts and peace-building 
shift the supply curve in different directions. The aggregate impact that 
eventually determines the ensuing equilibrium support varies from case to 
case. To sum up, policy decisions made by the government are dictated by 
the relative price of support. The latter depends on the particular 
politicoinstitutional factors prevailing in each context, which determine the 
government's possibility set and support curves. 
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IV.3 ECONOMIC VERSUS POLITICAL OPTIMUM 
Morrisson, Lafay and Dessus (1993), and then Haggard, Lafay and 
Morrisson (1995), expand on the above model in a synthesis of a research 
programme conducted under the OECD Development Centre on the 
political feasibility of adjustment in developing countries. In this synthesis 
(hereafter referred to as the OECD Study), the authors introduce 
intertemporality into the model developed by Frey and Eichenberger 
(1992). They show how the optimal combination of economic and political 
measures (E and P) for the politicians in power diverges from the optimum 
defined from a strict economic point of view, which corresponds to the 
optimum advocated by the IFIs. 
IV.3.1 The OECD Model (1993 & 1995) 
In a simplified way, Morrisson, Lafay and Dessus (1993) assume that 
government consumption (C) depends only on the level of repression (R) 
and writes the consumption function as follows: 
C=c(R), with c '< O (3) 
Repressing opposition carries an economic as well as a political cost. 
Additional resources for repression means an increase in the budget share 
- and power - allocated to the security forces, and raises the risk of a coup 
d'état. Violent governmental repression and human rights violations also 
increase the probability of negative sanctions on the part of the 
international community, which may translate into a reduction of economic 
assistance, the withdrawal of trade preferences, a reduction in military 
support, etc. 
To the extent that the government's survival probability hangs on the 
intensity of support from the population (S) and of the degree of repression 
to suppress opposition, the probability of support function is written as: 
PS=ps(S, R) with 9p%s>0 and 3p%j>0. (4) 
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In the OECD Study, the ensuing overall utility function of the government 
is thus: 
U=U(C(R), ps(S, R)) (5) 
It is assumed that the government operates with bounded rationality. In 
Herbert Simon's terms, it "satisfies" instead of "maximising": once the 
government has determined a minimum acceptable probability of survival 
(mPS), it then seeks to maximise its utility. Supposing that the additional 
utility resulting from a level of PS superior to mPS is negligible, the 
government's objective is: 
Max U[C(R)] on condition that pi (S, R) > mPS, 
where 9 % c > 0 and du/ > 0 (6) 
Following Frey and Eichenberger, the OECD Study posits that the 
government has two broad sets of instruments to muster support (S): 
expenditures of general interest (E) to improve the overall economic 
conditions (Y) and political expenditures to muster support of specific 
groups (P). The government's choice thus follows a two-step process: the 
tax revenue being given, the government first maximises popular support 
through economic and political expenditures. From an economic point of 
view, political expenditures are a pure loss. Second, given its maximised 
level of political support, the government minimises the level of repression 
compatible with its minimal probability of survival (mPS). 
In this chapter, we provide a static representation to illustrate how the 
economic and political optima differ. It is nonetheless useful to briefly 
introduce intertemporality in order to better understand what happens in 
the real world, as we will do in the next chapters focusing on Guatemala. 
Morrisson, Lafay and Dessus (1993) outline a simplified two-period model 
where E increases GDP growth with a lag of one period while P increases 
immediate political support but reduces economic growth in the second 
period6. They write the government's support function in this two-period 
time frame (O=now, l=future) as: 
It is unfortunately not clear how these authors arrive at this formulation. 
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S = S0 + ( ^ 1 + ff))5, With S0 = s0(Y0 -T01P0) 
and S1 =Sl[r1(ï0,P0,E0)-r1,P1l (7) 
where 0 is the political discount rate of the government and Y corresponds 
to GDP. The political dilemma facing the government now appears more 
clearly. Initial support (S0J depends on income (Y0) after deducting taxes 
(T0) and on political expenditures (Po). During the next period, political 
support (S1) depends on future available income which is affected 
positively by E0 and negatively by P0, as well as on taxes (T1) and political 
expenditure (P1) in the second period. 
Haggard, Lafay and Morrisson (1995) then define the political optimum 
from the authorities' standpoint. They adopt the hypothesis that the 
government maximises support under the budgetary equilibrium constraint. 
The latter is described as follows, assuming that the government cannot 
print money nor borrow, public expenditures being thus exclusively 
financed through taxes: 
T0=E0+P0 (8) 
In other words, the political optimum corresponds to the allocation of total 
tax receipts (T) between growth expenditure (E) and political expenditure 
(P) that maximises the government's discounted political support level. 
The objective of this model is to highlight that the economic optimum may 
radically depart from the optimal policy-mix described above that reflects a 
purely political perspective. 
The economic optimum corresponds to the solution that maximises the 
flows of discounted revenues (equation 9 below) under the budget 
equilibrium constraint (equation 8). These flows (Y) can be written in a 
two-period framework as 
Y = Y0 -T0 +(-!--)G'I(r0>P0>£0)Ä0)-r!) (9) 
1+r 
where Y0 is given as exogenous and r is the economic discount rate, which 
has a priori no relation with the political discount rate (a)7 .The economic 
7
 The equation is adapted from Morrisson et al. (1993): T, is subtracted from V,, and we add AO 
in the variables explaining Y, (see figure IV. 7). 
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optimum thus requires the elimination of political expenditure altogether, 
since P0 is negatively correlated with Yx and is a pure waste from an 
economic perspective. The solution is obtained when, again from a purely 
economic standpoint, the marginal cost of taxation equals the marginal 
benefit of economic expenditure. 
What conclusions can we draw from this OECD model with regard to the 
complex interactions between economic reform and peace-building? To 
better capture the politico-economic dilemma of war-torn countries, we 
should compare the optimal policy mix chosen by the government facing 
an armed insurrection with the political optimum in a more stable and 
peaceful situation. Because of the threat posed by the conflict, the people 
in power become more reluctant to sacrifice short-term political support 
for longer-term improvements in the overall economic conditions. The 
political instability accruing from the conflict tends to increase the 
intertemporal political discount rate (see equation 7). For a government 
seriously threatened by violent opposition, the relative importance of 
popular support in the future diminishes, compared to the necessity to 
muster enough immediate support to stay in power while repressing the 
insurgency. On the other hand, the economic utility derived by the 
population from expected improvements in the overall economic 
conditions may also drop to the extent that priority is given to immediate 
survival and wellbeing. This "short-term bias" of a government under 
attack tends to worsen the economic conditions through the combined 
effect of reduced E0 and increased P0 on the discounted income (Y). 
IV.3.2 Graphical Presentation of the Political and Economic 
Optima 
As in the OECD study, our chief objective here is to provide a simple, 
graphical illustration of the political and economic optima associated with 
different patterns of government expenditure and repression. More 
specifically, the aim is to highlight how the heavy political constraint 
typically facing weak governments during the transition from war to peace 
(constraint related to mPS) prevents the system from reaching the 
economic optimum described earlier. To this end, we opt for a static 
representation of the OECD model, abandoning the intertemporal 
dimension. 
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The OECD Study points out that, for a given level of popularity (S), the 
level of repression depends on the level of "aspiration" of the government 
for PS. Repression being a source of disutility, politicians in power will 
seek to secure the minimal level of probability to retain power. In a war-
ridden country, it corresponds to the minimal probability of survival (mPS) 
a government under attack wants to secure (see equation 6 above for the 
government's utility function). This is illustrated in figure IV.6 where the 
government tries to locate itself on the iso-probability curve for survival 
corresponding to mPS. For a given popularity level Sa, the government 
sets repression at Ra in order to secure mPS. The iso-probability curve is 
convex with regard to the origin, reflecting the increasing marginal level of 
repression required to offset a marginal reduction of popularity (S) - and 
vice versa. 
Figure IV.6: Support and repression 
Rb Ra 
Departing from - or rather expanding on - the OECD study, we introduce 
and discuss the impact of political or peace-related conditionality 
exercised by external actors, as in the Guatemalan case (see chapter V). 
The impact of such political conditionality exerted by foreign powers on 
war-torn countries is first represented with regard to repression in figure 
IV.6. When the government is caught under increasing pressure on the part 
of the international community to contain repression (e.g. improve the 
human rights situation) and wants to avoid the risk of international 
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sanctions (e.g. suspension of aid, embargo), it is led to reduce the intensity 
of repression, say from Ra to Rb. Provided the political leaders have no 
means to simultaneously increase their popularity level above Sa, they are 
bound to face a lower level of probability to retain power. This is 
represented by the curve iPS in the figure above, resulting from a lower 
level of repression Rb. This probability of survival constrained by 
international pressures (iPS) may not be sufficient to retain power, and the 
ensuing political instability may actually impair all reconstruction and 
peace-building efforts because of a negative incidence on investment 
The figure IV.7 below shows how the optimal policy mix from the political 
leaders' point of view diverges from the economic optimum. We first look 
at the upper-right graphic in figure IV.7 where we represent iso-taxation 
curves. These curves indicate, for a given level of tax revenue (T), the level 
of support resulting from the distribution of public expenditures between E 
and P, under strict budget equilibrium constraint (see equation 8)8. For a 
tax level Ta for example, the optimal distribution of public expenditure 
that maximises support is obtained at Ea. When linking the higher point of 
each and every iso-taxation curve together (between Ea and F), we can 
determine the optimal level of taxation T as well as the amount of public 
"economic" expenditures that allow for the maximal political support. 
• Let us first consider the political optimum (letters with p subscripts) that 
shows the short-term solution favoured by governments under serious 
threat of being topped by an armed insurrection. Given the optimal level 
of total tax receipt T, the policy mix that will be favoured from a purely 
political perspective is to set the level of economic expenditure at Ep 
and spend Pp (=T-Ep) on political expenditure. The ensuing level of 
popularity is Sp that corresponds to the political optimum. We now turn 
to the upper-left part of figure IV.7 which follows the logic illustrated in 
figure IV.6. Given the popularity level enjoyed by the government (Sp), 
the repression level is set at Rp in order to secure the minimal 
probability of survival mPS. 
• Economic conditionality exercised by the international financial 
institutions pushes the government toward the economic optimum (see 
letters with e subscripts). The economically optimal policy mix is set at 
8
 In this static representation, S=S(Y, P) where P=(T-E). We can consider that the level of 
popular support increases at low level of political expenses (bribes, subventions), up to a point 
where massive bribing spurs resentment from those left aside. 
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Ee where all the government resources are spent exclusively on 
economic expenditure. But popular support is reduced from Sp to Se 
because of the cuts in political expenses. As a result, the probability of 
survival falls down to iPS, that is below what the government regards as 
the minimal level required to stay in power. The political elite reacts by 
intensifying repression from Rp to Re in order to maintain the minimal 
probability of political survival (mPS). 
As it clearly appears, the ideal policy-mix from the government's political 
perspective is far from optimal from a purely economic point of view, 
where the marginal cost of taxation equals the marginal benefit of 
expenditure. 
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Figure IV.7: Government expenditure and repression 
associated with the political and economic optima 
R < Re Rp Ea T a EP Ee (=T) 
Based on the figure above, we now want to illustrate the economic and 
political optima. To this end, we first turn to figure IV.8 below which 
specifies the impact of repression measures R on income. Intensive 
repression may be economically very costly, as confirmed empirically in 
the case of Guatemala (see chapter VI). For high levels of violence 
associated with repression of political opposition tend to affect the 
economy via a negative correlation with investment and consumption. 
There is thus an increasing marginal cost of repression in terms of 
additional economic expenditure (E) necessary to offset the negative 
impact of R on the overall economic conditions. This holds for repressive 
regimes or governments fighting a civil war, but needs to be qualified at 
lower level of repression, as discussed on the basis of figure IV.8. 
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Figure IV.8: The cost of repression 
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Ya, Yb and Yc represent three iso-income curves based on different 
assumptions regarding the marginal cost of repression for a given level of 
taxation. It is plausible that the marginal cost of R may never turn negative 
(Ya and Yb). More realistically, it may be negative at very low level of 
repression if we consider that the total absence of repressive measures 
against opposition discourages investment to the extent that economic 
agents may fear that social unrest may readily transform into widespread 
political instability (Fc). In the NIE jargon, the lack of adequate means for 
the security forces to protect the proper functioning of institutions may 
increase transaction costs when the rule of law cannot be secured (contract 
enforcement, protection of property, etc.). In this case, the marginal cost of 
repression is negative (i.e. marginal benefit) up to Ro, and then turns 
increasingly positive, as illustrated by the iso-income curve Yc. Ro would 
then correspond to an optimal repression level from a purely economic 
standpoint9. 
In the case of conflict-ridden countries like Guatemala, the level of 
government repression is high, by usual standards, as a consequence of the 
conflict. This is why we assume in this dissertation that repression anyway 
lies above Ro in the specific politico-institutional settings of contemporary 
war-torn countries we are interested in. In this regard, the iso-income 
Another scenario is that very low levels of repression may not have any impact on the 
discounted income at all. This Is illustrated by Yb curve which is horizontal up to a certain level of 
repression, Ro. 
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curves shown in figure IV.8 and IV.9 highlight the politico-economic 
challenge in conflict-ridden countries. The shape of these iso-income 
curves reflects the increasing marginal cost of repression in terms of 
additional economic expenditure (E) necessary to offset the negative 
impact of R on the overall economic conditions. The iso-income curves 
further show that the impact of repression on the economy is less 
pronounced at lower income levels, investment variations being smaller. 
IV.4 ECONOMIC REFORM VERSUS PEACE-BUILDING 
In the conflict aftermath - or during the reconstruction phase - major shifts 
in the government policy mix are urgently required. The economic 
imbalance inherited from the war calls for profound economic reforms 
while the consolidation of peace often implies limited room for repression 
combined with political libéralisation/démocratisation and less resources 
and power allocated to the security forces. To examine these complex 
interactions, we introduce the external actors in the model, and focus on 
the impact of economic and political conditions set by the international 
community on the domestic politico-economic variables. 
TV.4.1 Aid, Economic Reform and Political Conditionality 
External actors often exert a decisive influence over the rebuilding process. 
Schematically, they intervene through three basic instruments: external 
assistance (aid), political/peace conditions and economic conditionality. 
We first analyse the implication of the two types of conditionality in the 
framework of our model with the budgetary constraint T=E+P, and then 
introduce foreign aid as a possible way to partly reconcile the 
contradictions between economic and political conditions. 
As mentioned earlier, economic conditionality is primarily exercised by the 
Ms, and the IMF in particular. It is concerned with the introduction of 
stabilisation and structural adjustment measures which aim at improving 
the economy in the medium run through a reduction of P and an increase in 
E. The reforms tend to limit both the amount of resources and the scope of 
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instruments available to muster political support . It is true that standard 
stabilisation measures often encompass a reduction of public expenditures 
to restore budgetary balance. But in Guatemala, the IMF repeatedly 
advocated for a major tax reform to raise public revenues rather than 
cutting public expenditure. Striking a balance between these two opposite 
scenarios, we maintain the overall level of taxation at T after the 
introduction of economic conditionality, as in figures IV .9. 
For the sake of simplicity, the graphic illustration in figure IV.9 captures 
one period only, and the political and economic optima are defined by the 
potential income (Y*) at the end of this period. Potential income (Y*) is 
indirectly influenced by both the level of public economic expenditure and 
repression through the impact of the latter on investment. Hence, Y*=y*(E, 
R). The four iso-income curves represented in the E/R plan correspond to 
different levels of potential income. Economic conditionality typically 
implies a shift in the allocation of government resources in favour of E. 
For the purpose of our presentation, we suppose that it pursues the 
objective of optimal allocation of resources (economic optimum). Under an 
economic rationale, IFI experts tend to expect economic conditionality to 
substantially improve the overall economic situation, from Y*p to Y*e in 
figure IV.9. But by doing so, they would ignore the political constraint 
facing the government. It is now well known that the implementation of 
orthodox reforms may spur political unrest as the social groups bound to 
lose readily organise to oppose them (see e.g. Bates and Krueger, 1993). 
The ensuing instability requires increased repression from the government 
to maintain an acceptable probability of retaining power (mPS), that is for 
the ruling elite to avoid being toppled by increased opposition. In practice, 
repression intensifies to counter the additional opposition to - or lower 
level of popularity enjoyed by - the politicians in power after the 
introduction of the reforms. 
10
 It should be noted the reform may not affect the government's popularity as negatively as 
expected if the blame for eliminating P is shifted to the IMF. This is explained under the same 
logic as the positive impact of foreign aid on government1 s support by the notion of attributability 
elaborated by Frey and Eichenberger (1992). 
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Figure IV.9: Economie and political conditionally 
This is illustrated in the lower-left graphic in figure IV.9. The 
economically optimal solution advocated by the IHs would correspond to 
Y*e. But if repression remains stable at Rp, the probability of political 
survival would drop to iPS, that is below the minimal level mPS. Because 
of this political constraint, the government reacts by increasing repression 
from Rp to Re in order to guarantee what it considers as a minimal survival 
probability irnPS). Consequently, when taking into account the political 
constraint, a switch from the political to the economic optimal policy-mix 
results in a lower increase of potential income than initially foreseen: from 
Y*p to Y*ep instead of Y*e. 
Theoretically, we can imagine an Utopian scenario in which a benevolent 
government would only seek to maximise welfare, without paying 
attention to its own political survival. Such an ideal government would 
reduce repression to Ru (w for Utopian), where the marginal cost of 
repression equals the marginal benefit. The survival probability would 
drop as low as uPS, but potential income would be maximised at Y*u. 
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During the transition from war to peace, political leaders are put under 
strong pressure not only to reform the economy, but also to contain or 
eliminate violent repression altogether. These pressures exerted by the 
international community are referred to aspoliticai or peace conditionality. 
For peace accords often comprise a commitment to reduce the size and 
budgetary resources of the security forces and are often accompanied by 
tighter international monitoring of the human rights situation, which 
reduces the room for violent repression. We represent this in figure IV.9 by 
setting the maximum repression level tolerated by external actors at Rp. 
When combining economic and political conditionality under the 
budgetary constraint described earlier (T=E+P), the probability of political 
survival thus drops below mPS, which may not be sufficient anymore for 
the ruling party or coalition to remain in power. In the direct aftermath of a 
protracted conflict, this may give rise to renewed political instability and 
eruptions of violence, which discourage potential investors and depress 
consumption (see chapter II). If this further derails the peace process, 
rebuilding efforts may be irredeemably impaired, with dire human and 
economic consequences. These contradictions or inconsistencies between 
economic and political conditionality call for increased coherence between 
the diverse responses devised by different ministries and organisations in 
donor countries to help war-torn societies rebuild themselves. 
How do politicians in power react in this framework? Contrary to a 
common assumption among certain economic experts, government leaders 
are not behaving irrationally when they decide to withdraw some or all of 
the economic reforms and keep on "wasting resources" on political 
expenditure. In order to maintain mPS, they may simultaneously decide to 
intensify repression at a level situated between Rp and Re. In both cases, 
they run the risk of negative sanctions on the part of the international 
community for not complying with the economic and/or political 
conditions. In practice, these conditions are attached to the provision of 
specific advantages granted by external actors, be they financial, technical, 
commercial, military, diplomatic or other. The provision of economic and 
financial assistance releases the fiscal constraint by increasing the 
resources available to the government. In this context, the benefit of a 
stand-by agreement with the IMF is not limited to the credit granted to face 
balance-of-payments difficulties. It also enables the government to enjoy 
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better access to external finance as other institutional, bilateral and 
commercial lenders may feel reassured by the said agreement11. 
Foreign aid can help to reconcile the economic and political objectives set 
by external actors to a certain extent. External actors may seek to maintain 
the government's probability of survival during the transition from war to 
peace, which may help secure the minimum level of political stability 
necessary to attract investment, jump-start the economy and consolidate 
the peace process. 
Figure IV.10: Including Foreign aid 
In figure IV. 10, external economic assistance (A) should amount to T+A -
T to enable the government to maintain its probability of survival at mPS 
while at the same time allocating Ea to economic expenditure as required 
by economic conditionality. The resources that the government would still 
allocate to political expenditure in order to muster sufficient support would 
amount to T+A - Ea. In practice however, support does not rely only on the 
amount of foreign aid that is granted but also on the subjective perceptions 
of the recipients: according to the notion of attributability (Frey and 
Eichenberger, 1992), popular support increases to the extent that the target 
groups attribute the induced benefits of foreign aid to the government. 
Thus, direct aid delivery by international organisations to the beneficiaries 
11
 It has been estimated in this respect that one dollar of IMF or World Bank money brings in 
four more (Laidi, 1989). 
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has little or no impact on the level of government support, whereas indirect 
provision through government channels is more likely to release the 
government's resource constraint (from T towards T+A). 
IV.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this chapter, we outline a politico-economic framework and then 
illustrate an interactive model in terms of the demand and supply for 
government support developed by Frey and Eichenberger (1992). We 
elaborate on the contributions brought by Haggard, Lafay and Morrisson 
(1995) to highlight that the politically optimal policy mix from a 
government's standpoint radically differs from the economic optimum 
advocated by the international financial institutions. Intertemporality is 
introduced in a two-period framework to better understand the nature of 
politico-economic interactions between different types of government 
expenditure. We then revert to a static representation of the model and 
integrate civil unrest and government repression. We assess the 
implications of the political conditionality exerted by major foreign 
partners with respect to démocratisation, peace-building and human rights. 
We show how this interacts with the traditional economic conditions set by 
the IFIs and highlight profound inconsistencies between political and 
economic conditionality. We then include the provision of economic 
assistance by the international community and illustrate how it may partly 
reconcile the different responses devised by foreign actors to cope with the 
complex challenges of post-conflict reconstruction. 
As is now well documented, orthodox economic reforms in war-torn 
countries may produce results at odds with initial expectations (e.g. Boyce, 
1996 and FitzGerald, 1997). Positive supply responses following structural 
adjustment are particularly slow and weak in post-conflict countries 
because of considerable structural and institutional bottlenecks. But in the 
absence of rapid improvements in daily life following the misery of a 
protracted conflict, additional opposition to the reforms may originate from 
a wide spectrum of the society disappointed by the absence of "peace 
dividends". Potential winners generally do not know if and how much they 
might gain from the reforms and therefore do not mobilise in support of 
them. On the other hand, those who stand to lose react swiftly to defend 
their interests. This political balance is further aggravated during the 
fragile transition from war to peace: as some rents have been generated by 
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the conflict itself, powerful groups may have additional incentive to 
perpetuate a climate of violence and revive hostilities to preserve the 
advantages that would be suppressed by the reforms. 
Against this background, the international community can contribute to a 
more stable and successful transition from war to peace. Aid can play a 
crucial role in supporting the establishment of safety nets to protect the 
poor, as well as in providing adequate compensation to potentially 
destabilising groups who fear they might lose from the peace deal (e.g. 
demobilised soldiers, merchants in control of the black market). However, 
we argue that economic conditionality must be carefully adapted to the 
specific circumstances prevailing at local and national levels. External 
actors, and the IFIs in particular, should avoid insisting on economically 
optimal solutions that may spur widespread short-term discontent with the 
attendant risk of renewed violence. This may require to postpone important 
reforms while giving explicit priority to the restoration of a minimum level 
of political stability. 
In the following chapter, we analyse the evolution of the Guatemalan 
polity and economy over the past twenty years. We then develop a 
macroeconometric model to assess how economic and political 
conditionality have interacted in this country from the peak of the conflict 
to the successful conclusion of the peace accords. 
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V. A GUATEMALAN CASE STUDY 
The signing of the "Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace" on 29 
December 1996 put a formal end to a long, dirty war that tore Guatemalan 
society apart. Thirty-six years of civil war left an estimated 200,000 
civilians dead - for a total population of 10 million - according to the final 
report of the Commission for Historical Clarification released in February 
1999. This report confirms the dramatic responsibility borne by the state, 
the army and the security forces in the conflict, these being responsible for 
93% of the deaths and disappearances. The war further left thousands 
"disappeared", approximately one million displaced people, around 
100,000 orphans, and many mass graves around the country filled with 
bone fragments12. The conflict began with a Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA)-backed military coup in 1954, ousting elected leftist President 
Jacobo Arbenz, and was declared a "civil war" by 1961. Among the 
various reasons behind this dramatic conflict, four major root causes have 
often been underlined: (i) the appalling inequality in the distribution of 
land, income and wealth, and in access to resources and public services; 
(ii) the extreme political and ideological polarisation in the context of the 
Cold War; (iii) the unmitigated exclusion and exploitation of the 
indigenous people (Mayas) who make up between 50% and 60% of the 
total population and who were the principal victims of the violence; and 
(iv) the lack of political channels for peaceful negotiations between 
diverging interest groups (Balencie and de la Grange, 1996). The United 
States of America, and the CIA in particular, actively backed the 
counterinsurgency policy and repression of the Guatemalan state. This led 
President Clinton to formally apologise for the US involvement in the 
Guatemalan tragedy during his visit to Central America in March 1999. 
This chapter provides a historico-analytical perspective on Guatemala, 
focusing on the period ranging from 1979 to 1996, that is from the most 
violent years of the internal conflict to the eventual signature of the peace 
12
 Figures that have never been substantiated estimate that only 15% of the casualties have 
been accounted for in direct military confrontation. 
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accords. This chronological analysis of the Guatemalan economy and 
polity does not pretend to be exhaustive in any way: we limit ourselves to 
the main elements entering into the analytical framework developed above, 
i.e. the domestic and external actors, the political events and measures (the 
polity), and the economic events and policies (the economy). 
The ultimate objective of this historico-analytical presentation is to provide 
a concrete application of the analytical framework outlined in the previous 
chapter. Thus, a thorough analysis of Guatemalan history, government, 
civil society and political forces at play would go far beyond the scope of 
this study. We restrict our presentation to the core elements entering into 
the politico-economic framework in chapter IY (see figure IV. 1), that is: 
• the three decision-making actors: the government, the social groups and 
the external actors; 
• the political and economic events or outcome; 
• the policy decisions or the economic or political measures taken by the 
. government. 
Turning to the political and economic events or outcome, we will proceed 
to review the main policy measures taken by the government between 1979 
and 1996, bearing in mind that the prime objective of such an overview of 
economic and political relations is to prepare the ground for effective and 
systematic data collection. The political and economic information will be 
processed in order to obtain quarterly indicators. These will be entered into 
a macroeconometric model which will serve to empirically assess the 
politico-economic interactions in Guatemala between 1979 and 1996 (see 
Chapter VI). 
V.1 POLITICAL EVENTS AND MEASURES 
Unless otherwise specified, our bibliographical sources are the quarterly 
Country Report of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and the monthly 
Central American Report of Inforpress Centroamericana (IC), The EIU 
reports provide systematic information on the main political events and 
economic policy decisions as well as on the evolution of the economy. The 
IC reports are summary English versions of the weekly Boletines published 
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in Spanish, also by IC, and focus on political affairs, social and labour 
issues and the economy. 
V.l.l Historical Background 
Guatemala gained independence from Spain in 1821. From the mid-19th 
century onwards, the country passed through a series of dictatorships, 
insurgencies and coups. In 1945 a civilian president, Juan Jose Arevalo, 
was elected and held the presidency until 1951. Social reforms initiated by 
Arevalo were continued by his successor, Jacobo Arbenz, who enabled the 
communist Guatemalan Labour Party to gain legal status in 1952. By the 
midpoint of Arbenz's term, communists controlled key peasant 
organisations, labour unions and the governing political party, holding 
some key government positions. Private sector leaders and the military 
viewed Arbenz's policies as a serious threat to their own interests and 
more or less actively supported the 1954 military coup against the Arbenz 
government, backed by the CIA. 
In response to an increasingly autocratic rule, a group of junior military 
officers revolted in 1960. Although the revolt failed, this group became the 
nucleus of the forces that would be in armed insurrection against the 
government for the next 36 years. Three principal left-wing guerrilla 
groups - the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary 
Organisation of Armed People (ORPA) and the Rebel Armed Forces 
(FAR) - conducted economic sabotage and targeted government 
installations and members of the security forces. These three organisations, 
plus the outlawed communist party, combined to form the Guatemalan 
National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in 1982. It is estimated that the 
URNG counted up to 6,000 troops at its peak. At the same time, extreme 
right-wing and paramilitary groups, including the Secret Anti-Communist 
Army (ESA) and the White Hand tortured and murdered students, workers 
association leaders, professionals and peasants suspected of involvement in 
leftist activities or sympathy for the opposition. 
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V.1.2 From 1979 to 1996 
Our empirical study on Guatemala covers politico-economic events from 
1979 to the end of the conflict. -The presentation which follows focuses on 
political events and decisions as well as on economic policy measures. 
This information provides the basis on which we construct the quarterly 
ordered qualitative variables entering the macroeconometric model which 
we estimate in the next chapter (see presentation of the qualitative and 
quantitative data sets in chapter VI). 
For the sake of simplicity, we can distinguish three main stages in the 
conflict during this period: 
• 1979-1983: high-intensity conflict, terror and massive repression of 
opposition. 
• 1984-1987: lower-intensity conflict and beginning of the 
démocratisation process. 
• 1987-1996: initiation of the peace process and intermittent peace talks, 
slow and partial consolidation of the democratic regime, and 
continuation of low-intensity conflict with waves of violent repression 
and recurrent human rights violations. 
At the very end of the 1970s the different guerrilla factions increased their 
activities in a stimulating regional context with the Sandinista victory in 
Nicaragua and a large-scale offensive of the guerrilla in El Salvador. But 
contrary to its neighbours, the Guatemalan government strove to remain as 
independent as possible and did not rely to the same extent on outsiders for 
politico-military and financial support. It was consequently less responsive 
to outside pressure. Nevertheless, the army found it preferable to launch a 
démocratisation process in 1983/84, leading to the devolution of power to 
a civilian government in 1986. The process was kept under control and the 
military succeeded in retaining much of their power and privileges under 
the new regime. 
In the first years of the 1980s the Lucas Garcia government launched 
massive counter-offensives and systematically repressed - or simply 
suppressed - potential popular support to the guerrilla. The first Civilian 
Defence Forces (PACs) were created by the military in trouble areas to cut 
the armed insurgency from its popular base. The number of civilians 
enrolled in PACs peaked at an estimated 900,000 in 1985-86, helping to 
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instil a climate of distrust and suspicion among the population. Repression 
led to extreme political polarisation whereby groups were classified as 
either pro-communist or anti-communist. Those that did not identify with 
one of these two categories were considered as potential allies of the 
enemy. Moderate and centre-left politicians were brutally eliminated or 
fled abroad, thus closing all doors for peaceful political alternatives. 
A March 1982 coup by junior officers brought Brigadier General Rios 
Montt to power. Responding to a wave of violence, the government 
imposed a state of emergency, while at the same time forming an advisory 
Council of State to guide a return to democracy, mainly as a result of 
mounting international pressure. In 1983 the state of emergency was lifted 
and political activity was once again allowed. Rios Montt sought to combat 
increased guerrilla attacks with both military actions and economic 
reforms. But in August 1983 he was deposed by the Guatemalan army, and 
the Minister of Defence (Mejia Victores) was proclaimed head of state. 
Constituent Assembly elections were held on 1 July 1984. On 30 May 
1985 the Constituent Assembly finished drafting a new constitution which 
took immediate effect. Mejia called a general election. The Christian 
Democratic Party candidate, Vinicio Cerezo, won the presidency with 
almost 70% of the vote and took office in January 1986. 
The first two years of Cerezo's government were characterised by a stable 
economy and a marked decrease in political violence. Two coups were 
attempted in May 1988 and May 1989 by dissatisfied military personnel, 
but military leadership supported the constitutional order. The final two 
years of Cerezo's Administration were marked by a failing economy, 
strikes, protest marches and allegations of widespread corruption. The 
government's inability to deal with many of the nation's long-standing 
problems - such as deficient health and social services and rising levels of 
criminal violence - contributed to renewed popular discontent. 
Presidential and congressional elections were held in November 1990 and 
President Serrano's government was inaugurated in January 1991. It had 
some success in consolidating civilian control over the army, replacing a 
number of senior officers and persuading the military to participate in 
peace talks with the URNG. But on 25 May 1993 Serrano illegally 
dissolved the Congress and the Supreme Court and restricted civil 
freedoms, allegedly to fight corruption. This autogolpe failed owing to the 
combined forces of strong protests by most elements of Guatemalan 
society, international pressure, and the army's enforcement of the decisions 
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of the Court of Constitutionality, which ruled against the attempted 
takeover. 
In June 1993 the Congress elected the Human Rights Ombudsman, Ramiro 
De Leon Carpio, to complete Serrano's presidential term. A package of 
constitutional reforms was approved by popular referendum in January 
1994. Under De Leon, the peace process, brokered by the United Nations 
in place of the Guatemalan Church, took on new life. The government and 
the URNG signed agreements on Human Rights (March 1994), 
Resettlement of Displaced Persons (June 1994), Historical Clarification 
(June 1994) and Indigenous Rights (March 1995). They also made 
significant progress on a key agreement on socioeconomic and agrarian 
issues. 
National elections for President, the Congress and municipal offices were 
held in November 1995 and almost 20 parties competed in the first round 
of presidential elections. PAN candidate Alvaro Arzu eventually won, 
based on his strength in Guatemala City where he had previously served as 
mayor, whereas the newly formed New Guatemala Democratic Front 
(FDNG), the first legitimate party of the left to compete in 40 years, won 
almost 8% of the presidential vote and was able to send six deputies to 
Congress (Banks and Müller, 1998). 
V.1.3 The Peace Accords 
The peace process started in the framework of Esquipulas II. The first 
official meeting between the government and the URNG took place in 
Madrid in August 1987. It was then marked during a whole decade by a 
series of breakthroughs and setbacks with long impasses in between. The 
peace negotiations between the URNG and four successive governments 
led to important commitments, going far beyond the simple laying down of 
arms. The peace accords deal with structural changes within the society 
and address some of the crucial points of contention which were at the 
origin of the conflict. The peace talks became more and more complex and 
eventually involved a whole set of actors in addition to the government and 
the guerrilla such as the Catholic Church, researchers from national and 
international institutes, NGOs, representatives of international financial 
institutions, etc. 
140 
The nine agreements establish an "agenda for constructing the peace". 
They are intended to pave the way for long-term reconciliation and 
inclusive development. They should be seen as the first step on a long road 
towards participatory democracy, stability and shared socioeconomic 
development. The final success of peace and rehabilitation will depend 
inter alia on the timely and effective implementation of commitments made 
by the government. Six of the Peace Accords are substantive while the 
others focus on more procedural matters. The main substantive accords 
are: 
• Human Rights, signed in March 1994: aimed at strengthening human 
rights organisations and putting an end to crime impunity. 
• Resettlement, signed in June 1994: established objectives for the 
resettlement and economic integration of displaced people into 
Guatemalan society. 
• Historical Clarification, signed in June 1994: established a commission 
to report on human rights violations perpetrated during the conflict. The 
final report was released in Guatemala City on 26 February 1999. 
• Indigenous Rights, signed in March 1995: calls for recognition of 
Guatemala's ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity, and for the right of 
indigenous people to live by their own cultural norms. 
• Socioeconomic and Agrarian Issues, signed in May 1996: promotes 
decentralisation and régionalisation of government services, urges for a 
more efficient and equitable budgetary and taxation policy, and timidly 
advocates for some sort of land reform and better protection of the 
environment. The main quantitative target is to increase tax revenues as 
a ratio of GDP by 50% in four years, based on a "globally progressive 
tax system". 
• Strengthening Civil Authority and the Role of the Military in a 
Democratic Society, signed in September 1996: calls for improvement, 
modernisation, and strengthening of all three branches of the state. It 
contains an agreed list of constitutional reforms which the government 
will propose and limits the role of the armed forces to defence of 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
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Table V.1: Political events and measures from 1979 to 
1996 
Year, 
Government 
1979-81 
Lucas Garcia 
government 
1982-83 
Rios Montt 
government 
1983-85 
Mejta Viotores 
government 
1986-88 
Cerezo 
government 
1988-90 
Cerezo 
government 
1991-93 
Serrano 
government 
1993-94 
De Leon 
government 
1996 
Arzu 
government 
Political Events/Measures 
Military government. 
Systematic repression of 
moderate and leftist politicians 
and sympathisers. 
Coup attempts in 1982. State of 
siege in 82, and state of alert in 
83. Montt deposed in August 
83. Senior army and business 
officials angered by the 
introduction of a 10 percent 
VAT and by the government's 
reliance on young army 
officials. 
New Constitution approved in 
May 85 and general elections 
scheduled. Military hope for a 
lift of US arms trade ban. 
Criminality increases despite 
modest economic recovery. 
Rise in strikes and 
demonstrations. Public sector's 
strikes legalised. 
Political turmoil. Two coup 
attempts fail (88 and 89). But 
mutinies go unpunished and 
government is forced to 
concessions. Increased drug 
trafficking. 
Crime rate and narco-traffic 
soar. Serrano's autocoup in 
June 1993. 
Strikes in public sector and 
riots because of price increases 
(bus fares, electricity, etc.). 
Increased violence against 
tourists. 
Conflict/Peace 
Most violent period of the 
conflict. Waves of terror 
and repression. Scorch 
earth tactics. 
Civil Defence Patrols 
involve up to 10 percent of 
the population, increased 
kidnappings and 
disappearances. 
Massive human rights 
violations continue 
unabated. 
Political violence cools 
down in 86, but rekindles 
in 87. First direct talks 
between URNG and 
government in Madrid 
(mid-87). 
Peace talks resume in 90. 
Private sector joins for first 
time. Mounting 
international concern for 
human rights abuses. 
Guerrilla increases 
economic sabotage. 
Intermittent peace talks 
and deadlocks. 
Progress In peace 
negotiations. 
Final peace agreement 
signed on 29 December 
96. 
External Actors 
US arms embargo 
since 79, but reduced 
US pressure on human 
rights under Reagan's 
administration (1981). 
US military aid frozen 
by the US Congress 
because of massive 
human rights violations. 
US financial support 
goes on despite IMF 
withdrawal. Congress 
approves small military 
support at end-84. 
Diplomatic isolation 
broken up in 86 by the 
new civilian 
government. Ties with 
UK re-established 
(territorial dispute over 
Belize). Foreign aid 
pours In. 
US military aid on the 
rise. US aid is made 
conditional upon human 
rights improvements in 
90. EC assistance 
increases. 
In 91, US ties aid to 
human rights 
Improvement and fight 
against drug dealers. 
Source: ElU Quarterly Reviews 1979 -1996, lnforpress Centroamericana 1979 -1996. 
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V.1.4 The Legacy of War 
Some analysts contend that the Guatemalan conflict has been a protracted 
social conflict with sporadic outbursts of extreme political violence rather 
than as a civil war stricto sensu. Nevertheless, the legacy left by decades of 
violence is as devastating as in the case of a civil war: social fragmentation 
and polarisation, distrust among different social groups and between them 
and public institutions, uncontrolled criminality and violence, weak 
judicial system, widespread impunity and a sense of generalised fear (War-
torn Societies Project, 1997c). 
The impact of the Guatemalan conflict on prospects for socioeconomic 
rehabilitation and development is best understood when assessed under 
NIE's (New Institutional Economics) lenses. One of the major legacies of 
war resides in a general lack of popular legitimacy of the public sector, 
including the military and security forces. Another consequence from years 
of conflict and impunity is an appalling level of criminality or banditry and 
the associated high - sometimes even prohibitive - costs linked with 
contract enforcement and protection of property rights. The disintegration 
of the social fabric and erosion of interpersonal trust are another legacy 
that profoundly affects social, political and economic relationships. The 
rehabilitation of basic social networks, interpersonal relationships and the 
restoration of the state's credibility and legitimacy are much more complex 
- and require much greater effort - than material reconstruction (War-torn 
Societies Project, 1998b). The thrust of the peace agreements actually 
attempts to tackle these problems. The accords contain commitments 
aimed at promoting an inclusive socioeconomic development, participatory 
democracy, the inclusion of marginalised yet important groups in the 
political and economic life of the country together with a wider, more 
equitable access to resources and entitlements. 
V.2 ECONOMIC EVENTS AND POLICIES 
V.2.1 Economic Policy 
Table V.l below summarises the main economic policy developments 
between 1979 and 1996. As mentioned earlier, the crisis of the early 1980s 
together with the virtual collapse of the CACM brought an end to the 
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import substitution strategy. Rîos Montt government's policy to overcome 
the deep economic crisis focused on import restrictions, foreign exchange 
controls and tight credit policy. Countercyclical policies widened the 
budget deficit while political instability contributed to continued capital 
flight. 
The first agreement reached with the IMF at the end of 1981 focused on a 
drastic reduction of the fiscal deficit (World Bank, 1996). A value-added 
tax (VAT) was eventually introduced in 1984 against strong opposition 
from various economic sectors, and the VAT rate was eventually set at 7 
per cent instead of the 10 percent originally planned. A "Socioeconomic 
Restructuring Programme" was adopted in 1985 and focused on a gradual 
liberalisation of the foreign exchange market. The quetzal was officially 
devalued in 1985 after staying pegged to the US dollar for 58 years. Yet 
attempts to restore macroeconomic stability and initiate profound structural 
reforms in the second half of the 1980s were unsuccessful. It was not until 
1991 that a standard and comprehensive economic stabilisation and 
structural adjustment programme was attempted, including tax reform, 
monetary and fiscal restraint, removal of price controls, privatisation plans, 
etc. 
At the same time, the central bank was forced to stop financing the fiscal 
deficit. Monetary and credit policies were tightened, contributing to the 
restoration of international reserves and the reduction of inflation. GDP 
growth reached 4.8% in 1992. In mid-1993 however, the economic 
situation deteriorated again, prompted by political instability as well as a 
slippage in fiscal and credit policies. High political uncertainty, large 
movements of capital outflow and inflow as well as a drop in tourism 
revenue led to declining international reserves and high inflation again. 
The situation improved in 1995 when the government that took office after 
Serrano's unsuccessful autogolpe sought to stabilise the economy and 
restarted the structural reform programme. 
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Table V.2: Main economic policies and economic 
events, 1979-1996 
Years 
Government 
1979-82 
Lucas 
Garcia 
government 
1982-83 
Rios Montt 
government 
1983-85 
Mejfa 
Victores 
government 
1986-88 
Cerezo 
government 
1988-90 
Cerezo 
government 
Main Economic 
Events 
Growth slows 
down. Economy 
enters into 
recession. 
Capital flight. 
Fall in tourism 
revenue. 
Recession. Fall 
in international 
reserves, de 
facto deva-
luation of the 
Quetzal on the 
parallel market. 
Devaluation, 
some price 
controls 
removed. 
Inflation 
increases. 
Balance of 
payments crisis 
and hyper-
inflation. Terms 
of trade deterio-
ration in 90. 
Removal of price 
controls on basic 
items. 
Fiscal Policy 
Counter-cyclical 
policy widens the 
public sector 
deficit. 
Deficit widens, 
Stagnation of tax 
revenue and 
increase in 
expenditure 
(investment and 
defence). 
VAT introduced 
in August 83, 
reduced from 10 
to 7 percent. 
Tax reforms 
approved in 86 
and 87. 
Enforcement 
fails to increase 
tax revenues. 
Public sector 
deficit at 4.2% of 
GDP in 90. 
Monetary and 
Exchange Policy 
Credit policy 
tightened to contain 
inflation, capital 
flight and fall in 
international 
reserves. Fixed 
exchange rate 
system maintained 
since 1927(1 
quetzal = 1 USD). 
Interest rate cuts at 
the end of 82. 
Official parallel 
exchange market 
for nonessential 
imports authorised 
as of mid-84. 
Adjustment policy 
focuses on 
exchange rate 
liberalisation 
(devaluation). 
Loose monetary 
policy. 
Full flotation of the 
exchange rate as of 
89. Negative real 
interest rate and 
credit expansion. 
Interest rate 
ceilings eliminated 
in August 89. 
Trade Policy 
Increased 
distortion from 
import 
substitution 
strategy. CACM 
crisis in 80. 
Virtual collapse 
of the CACM. 
Import-export 
surcharge tax 
withdrawn 
under private 
sector 
pressure. 
Caribbean 
Basin Initiative 
launched. 
Trade 
liberalisation 
and accession 
to the GATT. 
Increase in 
nontradition-al 
exports. 
External Actors 
(IMF) 
IMF stand-by 
agreement at 
the end of 81, 
increase in 
interest rate 
required. 
IMF loans 
suspended 
several times 
(fiscal target 
off-track). 
IMF suspends 
discussions in 
June 84 as 
government 
refuses to 
increase 
taxation. But 
continued US 
financial 
assistance. 
No agreement 
with IMF. 
IMF loan at the 
end of 88, but 
World Bank 
declares loan 
ineligibility in 
July 89 
because of six 
months unpaid 
arrears. 
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Years 
Government 
1991-93 
Serrano 
government 
1993-94 
De Leon 
government 
1994-95 
De Leon 
government 
1996 
Arzu 
government 
Main Economic 
Events 
First 
comprehensive 
adjustment plan 
incl. tax reform, 
monetary and 
fiscal restraint. 
Strong capital 
inflows. 
Capital inflows. 
Upsurge in 
coffee prices. 
Mexico crisis. 
Reversal of 
capital inflows. 
Privatisation of 
telephone and 
electricity 
companies 
approved. 
Fiscal Policy 
Fiscal amnesty 
in 91. Tax reform 
in 92, leading to 
a successful 
reduction of the 
deficit in 92. 
April 94 tax 
reform attempt is 
aborted. Fiscal 
deficit on the rise 
again. New tax 
reform approved 
in November 
1994. 
New tax reform 
ratified in April 
95. 
VAT raised from 
7 to 10 percent. 
Fight against tax 
evasion. 
Monetary and -
Exchange PoBcy 
Real interest rate 
becomes positive 
by end-91. Central 
Bank prohibited 
from financing 
public sector deficit. 
Credit tightened up 
to mid-92. 
Exchange: daily 
auction floating 
band. 
Tight credit policy 
up to mid-94. 
Decline in real 
interest rate by the 
end of 94. 
Expansionary credit 
policy until March 
95, then monetary 
tightening. Rise in 
real interest rate. 
Tight monetary 
policy. 
Trade Pofey 
CACM revived. 
Promotion of 
nontraditional 
exports. 
Daily auction 
floating band. 
Further 
customs tariff 
cuts (CACM 
common 
external tariff). 
Managed float 
with a quasi-
fixed exchange 
rate. 
Floating rate. 
Relative 
stability of 
national 
currency. 
External Actors 
(IMF) 
Arrears being 
cleaned up, 
IMF Standby 
approved in 
December 92 
conditioned on 
fiscal reform 
and social 
spending. 
Interrupted in 
early 93. 
IMF shadow 
programme 
resumes in 
March 94. 
Fiscal target 
off-track in third 
quarter. 
IMF shadow 
programme in 
May 95. 
Monetary target 
off-track in third 
quarter. 
Sources: EIV Quarterly Reviews 1979 -1996, Inforpress Centroamericana 1979 -1996. 
V.2.2 Socio-demographic Data 
With a population of 10.2 million in 1996, Guatemala accounts for more 
than one third of the total population in Central America. The fertility rate 
in Guatemala is among the highest in Latin America (5.1 in 1995) and the 
population is steadily growing at an average rate of 2.9 per cent. This 
growth slowed somewhat in the late 1970s and early 1980s under the 
combined effect of escalating violence and outward migration. In 1995, 
43.5 per cent was under the age of 15 and only 5.3 per cent aged over 60. 
Life expectancy at birth was 64.8 years in 1992. Urban population grew 
from 25 per cent in 1950 to an estimated 50 per cent today. 
The population is divided between Ladinos - Guatemala's dominant group 
whose cultural affiliation is Hispanic - and indigenous peoples. The latter 
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comprise approximately 23 Mayan groups, speaking their own languages, 
which together make up about 60 per cent of the total population (EIU 
1995, Wearne, 1994). Oppression and exploitation of the indigenous by the 
Ladino elite has often been referred to as a kind of apartheid. Indigenous 
peoples are concentrated in poor, rural areas and often live at the margin of 
the money economy. Most of them live in poverty or extreme poverty and 
have a very low rate of schooling13, whereas Spanish-descended elites 
("the oligarchy") have monopolised land, capital and power since 
colonisation (Loughna and Vicente, 1997). 
V.2.3 The Economy 
We refer the reader to chapter III for an analysis of the structure of the 
Guatemalan economy based on a social accounting matrix (SAM) which 
captures all economic flows in 1986. Section III.3 in particular focuses on 
the composition of total supply in terms of the share of major supply 
components for each productive sector, and on the contribution of each 
sector to total supply. In that section, we have further analysed how total 
demand is distributed among production sectors, as well as between 
primary (factorial) income distribution and secondary income distribution 
(from production factors to institutions). The objective here is different: 
the purpose is to present the main characteristics of the Guatemalan 
economy which will help us build the variables required to estimate a 
macroeconometric model in chapter VI. In this presentation of the 
Guatemalan economy, we therefore restrict ourselves to the main features 
relevant to the construction of the politico-economic model. 
Guatemalan GDP stood at USD 15,758 million in 1996, accounting 
roughly for one third of Central American GDP14. Guatemala is a low-
income economy, the GDP per capita standing at USD 1,545 in 1996. The 
poverty incidence is among the highest on the American continent. Around 
75 per cent of the population is estimated to live below the poverty line 
3
 The literacy rate is 36.9 per cent for males and 52.9 per cent for females. School enrolment 
drops from 77 per cent for primary education to 21 per cent for secondary and 9 per cent for 
tertiary education (World Bank, 1995). 
u
 Unless otherwise specified, statistical sources for socioeconomic data are the quarterly 
Boletin Estadistico of the Banco de Guatemala from 1979 to 1997, the World Bank's Global 
Development Finance statistics as well as the IMF's International Financial Statistics. 
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and 58 per cent below the extreme poverty line15 (World Bank, 1995). In 
fact, extreme poverty and inequality were present long before the conflict 
and have been rightly pointed to as among its root causes. But 36 years 
later, these twin problems remain as severe as they were at the start of the 
conflict. 
Guatemala has an extremely uneven distribution of land and income. The 
country ranks fourth in income inequality in Latin America, after Peru, 
Colombia and Mexico (World Bank, 1996). Gini coefficients calculated on 
the basis of the two latest socioeconomic surveys (1986 and 1989) were 
0.58 and 0.59 respectively (INE, 1990). It was further estimated that the 
richest 20 per cent of the population received 63 percent of total income in 
1989. Guatemala is the only country in Central America that has not 
reformed its land tenure system. Even today, the mere mention of "land 
reform" or "agrarian reform" in official circles spurs tensions, to say the 
least. The last agricultural census indicated that 2.5 per cent of Guatemala 
farms controlled 65 per cent of agricultural land in 1979 whereas 88 per 
cent of the smallest farms cultivated only 16 per cent of the total arable 
land. 
The economy grew by an average of 5.5 per cent during the 1960s and 
1970s and then stalled in the early 1980s. As shown in the table below, 
Guatemala plunged into a severe economic crisis in the late 1970s with 
negative real GDP growth rates in the first half of the 1980s. The economy 
showed signs of recovery in the second half of the 1980s but the GDP per 
capita growth rate remained extremely low until die end of the decade, 
after falling by about 20 per cent between 1980 and 1985. As a result, the 
1996 GDP per capita expressed in constant domestic currency prices was 
still below the same figure for 1976. 
The poverty line is drawn at the level of Income sufficient to purchase a basic basket of goods 
and services, while the extreme poverty line refers to the amount needed to purchase a basic 
basket of food only. 
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Figure V.1 : Real GDP and real GDP per capita growth 
rate, % change, 1960 -1996 
Source: Banco de Guatemala 
The recession was marked by a sharp drop in exports, massive capital 
outflow, an acceleration of inflation, worsening terms of trade and the 
accumulation of foreign debt arrears. This was further combined with 
escalating political unrest in Guatemala, and a major economic and 
political crises across the whole of Central America. Concomitant loose 
fiscal and monetary policies led to large fiscal and balance-of-payments 
deficits, substantial external payments arrears, inflation and a marked 
decline in GDP and export performance. 
Guatemala is a predominantly agricultural country. The economy largely 
relies on the abundance of low-cost indigenous labour in agriculture. As 
illustrated in table V.3, the sectoral composition of GDP has changed little 
over the past twenty years even though substantial industrialisation efforts 
started in the 1960s with the implementation of import-substitution 
policies, which encouraged the manufacture of consumer goods parallel to 
the creation of the Central American Common Market. 
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Table V.3: GDP by type of economic activity, 1980 and 
1996 
(Percentages of total value added) 
Sector 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Construction . 
Commerce 
Other 
1980 
24.8 
16.6 
3.1 
27.0 
28.5 
1996 
24.0 
13.9 
2.1 
24.7 
35.3 
Source: Banco de Guatemala 
Agriculture still accounts for about a quarter of GDP and for more than 
two thirds of merchandise export earnings, coffee ranking first. This is also 
confirmed by the social accounting matrix in chapter III (see table III.3). 
As Moran and Serra (1993) rightly pointed out, Guatemalan agriculture 
can be roughly divided into three categories: 
• A modern sector producing traditional export goods, mainly coffee, 
sugar, bananas, cotton, beef and cardamom. This sector is in the hands 
of large-scale and technologically advanced farms located in the Pacific 
coastal plains and the northern slopes of the Highlands. It enjoys a 
relatively good access to transportation, infrastructure and credit. 
• A backward subsistence sector producing staple food crops for domestic 
consumption: basic grains, potatoes and legumes. This sector is 
characterised by small and micro holdings located in the poor Western 
Highlands, with difficult or no access to trade-related services. 
• A more recent hybrid sector producing "nontraditional" agricultural 
exports such as fruits, vegetables, timber, rubber and ornamental plants. 
These goods are produced mainly by small farms on the western slopes. 
In the manufacturing sector, the share of capital goods and intermediate 
products has been growing, but remains modest compared to consumer 
goods production. The bulk of capital goods is imported from abroad. The 
biggest industries are found in the food and beverages as well as in the 
textile sectors. Guatemala is a net exporter to the CACM but is an overall 
net importer of manufactured goods. Exports to the regional market 
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include chemicals, plastic products, traditional textiles and shoes, whereas 
industrial exports to non-CACM countries tend to be of better quality and 
integrate more new technologies. The latter primarily consist of 
nontraditional export goods such as "maquila-type" textiles, agro-
industrial products, furniture and other wood products. As for the service 
sector, tourism came to represent the second source of foreign currency 
earnings behind coffee in the early 1990s. However, tourism revenues 
greatly fluctuate according to the political and security situation, and are 
sometimes seriously affected by publicised surges in criminality and acts 
of violence targeted at foreigners. 
Employment in the agricultural sector was 54 per cent in 1981 and 52 per 
cent in 1994, according to the two most recent population censuses 
conducted by the National Statistical Institute (INE). No more than one 
third of the economically active population benefits from the national 
social security scheme, i.e. is affiliated to the Guatemalan Institute of 
Social Security (IGSS). Registered unemployment was 2.2 per cent of the 
economically active population in 1980, increasing to 6.1 per cent in 1992. 
Yet, these figures rise to 31.2 per cent and 39.4 per cent respectively when 
including people between 15 and 65 not registered as economically active, 
notably women and indigenous people (Loughna and Vicente, 1997). The 
Guatemalan people have elaborated diversified coping strategies in 
response to endemic underemployment and hidden unemployment. Many 
of them have found opportunities in the informal sector, as exemplified by 
the numerous street vendors engaged in petty trading throughout the 
country. 
As in many low-income countries, the labour market is fragmented. The 
urban/rural wage gap has contributed to the acceleration of rural migration 
towards urban centres, together with the civil war and repression that raged 
in northern and western provinces. The rural labour force accounted for 
64.1 per cent of total labour in 1981 against 60.0 per cent in 1994 (INE, 
population censuses of 1981 and 1994). The urban labour market is itself 
segmented because of market rigidities and skill differences, mainly 
between industry and service workers. 
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Table V.4: Employment by sector, 1981 and 1994 
(Percentages of economically active population) 
Sector 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Construction 
Commerce 
Transport 
Other services 
1988 
54.0 
10.5 
5.1 
8.7 
2.6 
19.1 
1994 
52.5 
13.0 
5.8 
9.5 
3.5 
15.7 
Source: Population census 1981 and 1994, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE) 
As for the capital market, the formal sector has been highly regulated with 
interest rate ceilings and barriers to entry for new competitors. The 
deregulation process initiated in 1986 has been rather slow and modest. A 
vivid informal sector emerged as a means of avoiding excessive regulation 
of the formal banking sector, including dynamic small financieras that 
provide financial services for small projects. According to a study by the 
World Bank (1996), the nonformal financial intermediaries are 
heterogeneous but not necessarily more expensive as they charge similar 
interest rates to those practised by the formal financial system. 
Guatemala is an open economy. The total trade/GDP ratio16 increased from 
26 per cent in 1950 to a record 50 per cent in 1977. Export and total trade 
ratios were around 20 per cent and 47 per cent of GDP in the mid-90s,. 
which is high by international standards and comparable to those for 
outward-oriented East Asian countries (World Bank, 1997c). The economy 
is thus vulnerable to adverse external shocks. The United States is by far 
the country's largest trading partner. According to IaDB trade statistics for 
1995, the USA provided 58.5 per cent of Guatemala's imports and 
received 43.6 per cent of its exports. The CACM comes second with 11.5 
per cent of imports and 39.9 per cent of exports, El Salvador being the 
major trade partner in the region. The current account deficit is large, 
fluctuating between 2.5 per cent and 8 per cent of GDP in the 1990s. As 
shown in figure V.2, the trade deficit has enlarged since 1990 as a 
The ratio is calculated by the sum of total export and import divided by GDP. 
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combined result of a slight appreciation of the domestic currency and 
booming consumer good imports following trade liberalisation measures. 
Figure V.2: Exports and imports, in millions of US 
dollars 
T- OI CT 
O) O) OJ Ö) O) 
- Exports 
- Imports 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 1998 
The main export products include coffee, sugar, fruits and vegetables, 
textiles and clothing whereas the main imports consist of capital and 
intermediate goods. Export diversification efforts have led to an increased 
expansion of the nontraditional export sector since the beginning of the 
1990s, its share soaring from 47 per cent to 58 per cent of total 
merchandise and nonfactor service exports between 1990 and 1994 (World 
Bank, 1996). 
When compared with other Latin American countries, inflation was kept at 
reasonable levels, i.e. below 20 per cent, but for three years (1985, 1986 
and 1990; see table V.5 below). Access to external finance became a 
pressing requirement as the stock of international reserves melted from 
USD 741.5 million in 1978 to reach a record low of USD 112.2 million in 
1982, making negotiations with the IMF necessary. Guatemala kept a 
relatively manageable external debt and was thus less dependent on foreign 
finance than neighbouring countries. The stock of foreign debt peaked at 
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USD 2.47 billion in 1985, equivalent to 160 per cent of total exports that 
year. This ratio then improved in the following years. 
Table V.5: Selected macroeconomic variables, 1979 -
1996 
Years 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
198? 
issa 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Fiscal 
defirf»(% 
ofGDP) 
2.6 
4.7 
7.4 
4.7 
3.3 
3.8 
1.8 
1.5 
1.3 
1.4 
2.9 
2.1 
0 
0 
1.5 
1.6 
0.6 
0.1 
Current 
account 
(%of 
GDP) 
-2.56 
-2.24 
-6.65 
-4.58 
-2.47 
-3.99 
-6.37 
-0.3 
-6.55 
-5.49 
-5.33 
-3.9 
-2.28 
-7.01 
-5.94 
-5.3 
-3.9 
-3.5 
Net International 
Reserves (mio, 
USD) 
n.a. 
348.6 
70 
-28.5 
-85 
-67.2 
-112.4 
-3.2 
-363.6 
21.7 
-72.4 
24.7 
556.2 
531 
736.6 
796.4 
639.1 
815.5 
Exchange 
rate (Qtz. For 
1 USD)" 
2.67 
2.6 
2.52 
2.7 
3.41 
4.92 
5.03 
5.31 
5.76 
5.63 
6.03 
5.99 
external 
Debt (mio. 
USD) 
602.7 
722.5 
1092.7 
1372 
1924.3 
2312.4 
2473.2 
2467.4 
2465.2 
2340.5 
2456.9 
2491.8 
2402.8 
2251.6 
2085.9 
2160.4 
2107.1 
2074.9 
Inflation 
13.77 
9.08 
8.64 
-1.96 
8.42 
5.18 
31.46 
25.67 
10.05 
10.97 
17.94 
60.64 
9.17 
13.73 
11.64 
11.59 
8.61 
10.85 
interest 
rate 
(tending) 
11 
11 
15 
12 
12 
12 
12 
14 
14 
16 
16 
22.6 
22.1 
21.2 
25.7 
20.26 
22.23 
22.48 
Interest rate 
(3-montti 
deposit) 
9 
9 
13 
9 
9 
9 
9 
11 
11 
13 
13 
14.5 
14 
11.3 
13.3 
12.52 
14.17 
13.3 
»Average buying exchange rate of the banking system, December each year. 
Source: Economic Studies Department, Banco de Guatemala. 
While the private sector generates around 85 per cent of GDP, the public 
sector remains particularly weak. It accounted for 8.7 per cent of total 
consumption in 1980 and 10.1 in 1995. The government share in gross 
domestic investment fell from 39.1 to 26.1 respectively (IMF Staff Country 
Report, 1996). The business activities of the public sector are limited to 
some public utilities which are to be privatised and several development-
oriented financial institutions (known as "social funds"). 
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The tax revenue to GDP ratio is the lowest in Latin America, standing at 
7.9 per cent in 1996 compared to 9.2 per cent in 1980. Taxation of 
personal income and wealth is very weak: the share of direct taxes in total 
tax revenues was 24.76 per cent in 1996, this ratio being only 0.13 per cent 
for taxation on wealth and property. Although many economic studies have 
called for a major reform of the tax system and an end to endemic fiscal 
evasion, all attempts have failed so far. Partial explanation for this may be 
found in decades of internal war that have eroded the legitimacy and 
credibility of the state apparatus. The internal conflict has also perpetuated 
a sense of impunity for breaking the law, including vis-à-vis fiscal 
obligations. As underlined by Gonzales (1987: 10): "The legitimation of 
government tax collection is not widely accepted and there is a weak 
tradition for voluntary compliance." Service delivery by public employees 
remains poor which does not help restore taxpayer trust in public 
institutions. Remuneration is substantially lower than in the private sector, 
especially for top positions in the administration. Low wages in the public 
sector provide more incentives for corruption than for quality delivery 
services. One of the major challenges for compliance with the 
commitments made by the government in the peace accords, and in 
particular in the Agreement on Land and Socioeconomic issues17, is to 
break out of the vicious circle of fiscal fraud and distrust between the 
taxpayer and the state. 
The target is to raise tax revenue to 12 per cent of GDP from 1997 to 2000 in order to pay for 
peace-related expenses. 
155 
V.3 APPLYING THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC 
FRAMEWORKTO GUATEMALA 
V.3.1 ne Actors 
The Government 
The government includes here the politicians in power, the military and 
police forces as well as the paramilitary groups. In the Guatemalan case, it 
is the military commanders who agreed to launch a démocratisation 
process from 1984 onwards. They managed to keep it under control and 
avoid any major shift in the distribution of power within Guatemalan 
society. At times, the military has been split between different tendencies. 
There has been a whole series of coup attempts, some successful and 
others not. Coups have traditionally not altered the balance of power in 
Guatemala and are thus treated in our framework as an additional factor of 
political instability rather than as a turning point in policy orientation. 
The Social Groups 
For the purpose of our politico-economic analysis, we distinguish between 
the following social groups: 
• Capitalists, including large landowners, agro-exporters and 
industrialists. The private sector has traditionally been very close to the 
military and the politicians in power. It has exerted a considerable 
influence over economic policy-making through permanent, formal and 
informal, consultations with the government. The landed elite has been 
the most powerful group in Guatemala since the European conquest. 
Some authors argue that one of the major causes of the high incidence of 
poverty and the low level of economic development in Guatemala 
precisely resides in the overwhelming power of the landed oligarchy 
over the past decades. They contend that the politically dominant 
position of agro-exporters constituted a major obstacle to 
industrialisation as the concerns of industrialists and nontraditional 
exporters tended to lose out in cases of conflict of interests between 
them and traditional agro-exporters (Marti, 1994). From the end of the 
1980s, the influence of representatives of the modern export-oriented 
sector has been growing and has often opposed the old protectionist 
156 
oligarchy over economic policy issues . The private sector as a whole 
has nonetheless succeeded in remaining relatively united under a 
powerful umbrella organisation (CACIF). 
• Urban groups, including labour unions, public- and private-sector 
workers, students and the urban informal sector. While unionised labour 
in the private sector has been politically vocal for many years, organised 
labour in the public sector was forbidden until 1986. The mobilisation 
capacity of the latter grew rapidly thereafter, while union leaders in the 
private sector were literally decimated at the beginning of the 1980s by 
harsh repression. The state university (Universidad San Carlos) has been 
a focal point of political opposition and debates. Students and professors 
alike have faced tough, systematic repression. 
• Rural groups, including small landowners, farmers and rural 
organisations. These groups were somewhat politically divided during 
the war. Some actively supported the guerrilla while others enrolled in 
the civil defence patrols set up by the government to contain the rebels. 
Rural groups expressed discontent through many different ways 
including land occupation, protest marches onto - and demonstrations in 
- the main urban centres. 
Interestingly, a positive outcome of 36 years of conflict in Guatemala has 
been the strengthening of civil society and the emergence of a myriad of 
grass-roots and popular organisations. Local and national NGOs have 
flourished, most of which with the support of international counterparts. 
Many co-operatives have been created and the citizenry has been 
mobilised at the municipal and provincial levels. The organisation of the 
Mayan groups was given a major impetus during the conflict in the 
1980s19. Peasant associations became more active both in rural areas and in 
the capital, and families of the repression's victims also organised 
themselves (War-torn Societies project, 1997c). 
Expansion of new economic activities at the end of the 1980s contributed to the emergence of 
a new fraction of the elite active in the financial sector, and in incipient export-oriented industry 
such as maquila textile production and nontraditional agricultural exports. This fraction clashed 
with the old state-protected oligarchy over economic policies and supported the victory of the 
National Action Party in 1994 (Arzu's government). 
18
 The Mayan groups succeeded in attracting increasing attention and support from abroad. One 
of their prominent leaders, Rigoberta Menchû Tum, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1992. 
i 
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The External Actors 
The main external funding sources in the early 1980s were the Inter-
American Development Bank, the World Bank and the USA (USAID). The 
United States of America was the main protagonist in the exercise of 
political conditionality. On a number of occasions the US Congress made 
bilateral assistance to Guatemala - and military support in particular -
contingent upon improvements in the (appalling) human rights record and 
progress in the peace talks20. European countries also attached conditions 
to the provision of economic assistance in the form of improvements in 
human rights and peace-building. 
The IMF had no programme with Guatemala in the 1980s but for short 
periods in 1981 and 1988. Later, the Guatemalan authorities were 
successful in signing three successive IMF arrangements between 1992 
and 1996. Yet, the implementation of the agreements was another story: 
the IMF kept insisted inter alia on a profound fiscal and tax system reform, 
with a view to increasing fiscal revenues and the delivery of basic social 
services. Attempts by successive governments systematically failed in the 
face of political opposition by influential agro-exporters and industrialists, 
and violent reactions in urban centres and rural areas (demonstrations, 
strikes in the public sector, etc.). As a result, IMF programmes repeatedly 
went off-track. It is however important to note that the international 
financial institutions had less influence on economic policy than in other 
countries of the region, since Guatemala managed to keep its stock of 
foreign debt and its international reserves at reasonable levels. 
Based on the above presentation of the main protagonists shaping 
economic and political interactions in Guatemala, we can tailor the generic 
framework illustrated in figure V.l to the specific case of Guatemala. This 
is precisely what we will show in the next chapter (see figure VLl) to 
illustrate the politico-economic relationships captured by the behavioural 
equations of our macroeconometric model as applied to Guatemala. 
Even so, Guatemala was less dependent on American military support than neighbouring El 
Salvador and found alternative arms suppliers (e.g. Israel, Taiwan). 
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V.3,2 Economic and Political Optima and Conditionality 
We elaborate on the basis of the model of political support presented in 
chapter IV. This model highlighted the gap between the optimal policy mix 
from a political perspective and the economic optimum in the specific 
context of war-torn countries. Drawing on the historico-analytical 
presentation above, we now discuss key politico-economic interactions in 
Guatemala over the past twenty years along the lines of the microeconomic 
considerations developed in the previous chapter. 
As underlined, one of the most dramatic consequences of the Guatemalan 
conflict has been the erosion of social capital, coupled with a loss of 
credibility and legitimacy of the state. The relative price of popular support 
consequently increased during the civil war. To maintain its probability of 
survival, the political elite could either increase political expenditures 
and/or intensify repression. The latter option was preferred not only for 
political reasons, but also because the resources available to muster 
support were seriously constrained by weak government revenues, and the 
international financial institutions kept advocating for economic reform, 
meaning less political expenditure. Thereafter the room for repression 
became somewhat limited under increasing political conditionality exerted 
vis-à-vis Guatemala. Among the main conditions explicitly imposed by 
donor countries in the 1980s and 1990s, economic assistance from 
European countries was made conditional upon improvements in the 
démocratisation and peace-building processes, while the Congress of the 
United States voted through an arms-trade embargo a number of times in 
order to push for clarification and punishment for gross human rights 
abuses (especially those involving American victims). 
The severe economic recession at the turn of the 1970s reduced the stock 
of international reserves and made access to foreign finance a necessity. 
The latter was made conditional upon the introduction of orthodox 
economic reforms which involved a relative diminution of political 
expenditure and the introduction of unpopular economic measures such as 
increased taxation to finance basic social services as well as a tightening of 
the credit and monetary policy (increase in E in figure IV.9). Effective 
implementation of these reforms would have implied increased political 
opposition from powerful sectors such as the business community and 
public employees. The political costs of economic reform were often 
sensed as prohibitive in the face of continued armed insurgency and 
increasing peace conditionality. 
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Theoretically, external financial assistance could have relaxed the 
government's resource constraint. But this has hardly been the case. First, 
the absorption capacity of the public administration with regard to foreign-
funded projects remained low, owing to its limited human and institutional 
capacities. Second, some development agencies reduced their assistance to 
Guatemala following repression outbursts. In addition, external actors 
often bypassed government channels to provide direct assistance to the 
civil society. As much of the aid went directly from foreign agencies to 
beneficiaries, the Guatemalan government did not benefit much from the 
provision of external assistance in the form of increased popularity (low 
attributability factor). 
With little scope for additional repression, the government repeatedly 
withdrew part or all the reforms shortly after - or even before - their 
effective implementation. Politically motivated expenditures were also 
reintroduced to muster support, which would correspond to an increase in 
P in figure IV.9. The outcome of this dynamic has been an erratic policy-
making pattern over the past two decades. This might continue to frustrate 
any serious modernisation attempt (e.g. fiscal reform, agrarian reform) as 
long as the Guatemalan authorities are not able to gather broader support 
for change. This requires another fundamental reform, this time in the 
process of policy formation itself: dialogue and consensus-building 
mechanisms should be promptly established to muster sufficient support 
for a long-term, coherent development strategy. Restoring policy dialogue 
between all major stakeholders is a time-consuming exercise which often 
takes years. This endeavour may appear incompatible with the urgency of 
many postconflict priorities - some of which set in the peace accords -
which require quick decisions. However, we argue that it is preferable to 
"lose time" promoting a new culture of consensus-building and dialogue 
rather than to introduce sweeping reforms that are doomed to fail under the 
combined forces of popular discontent and opposition by the ruling 
oligarchy21. Policy dialogue mechanisms are desirable not only to improve 
the chances for successful economic reform. They would at the same time 
serve to rebuild bridges between former enemies and contribute to restore 
the social capital that has been torn apart by decades of distrust, violence 
and impunity. 
21
 The withdrawal of a new law on properly tax (IUSI) shortly after its adoption by the parliament 
in February/March 1998 illustrates this well. 
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Vl. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF WAR-
TORN COUNTRIES 
VI.1 INTRODUCTION 
Politico-economic relations have long been neglected, even in the case of 
war-torn countries. Econometric modelling is traditionally restricted to 
quantitative, economic variables and does not allow for interrelations 
between the economy and the polity to be captured. When political factors 
have been introduced in macroeconometric models as independent 
variables, it has very often been in the form of dummies, although their 
inclusion as ordered qualitative dependent variables would already have 
been possible in the 1970s, at least at a theoretical level (see for instance 
Amemiya (1978 and 1979), and Nelson and Olson (1978) for references). 
Yet it is only very recently that the computational difficulties associated 
with the resolution of complex models combining both quantitative and 
ordered qualitative dependent variables have been addressed by 
econometric software packages in a simpler and user-friendly manner. 
Besides computational difficulties, another reason for neglecting the 
political dimension resides in the traditional conception of the division of 
labour between economics and other social sciences, whereby politico-
economic interactions have been relegated outside the realm of economics. 
The objective of this chapter is precisely to test a macroeconometric model 
that comprises both economic and political dependent variables in the 
context of a country case study on Guatemala, ranging from the conflict's 
peak to the signature of the peace accords. We expand on a politico-
economic model (hereafter referred to as the "P-E model") constructed by 
Dessus, Lafay and Morrisson (1997), which was successfully tested on a 
panel of 23 African countries over the 1980s. The P-E model makes it 
possible to assess the influence of external actors such as the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) while the exercise of economic and political 
conditionality by the international community is often decisive for the 
success of a peace process. Yet Dessus, Lafay and Morrisson excluded 
countries at war from the panel on the grounds that the origin of armed 
161 
conflicts is not related to economic policy (e.g. interethnic tensions, 
conflict between military commanders). 
With regard to the specification of our model, we depart from the work of 
Dessus, Lafay and Morrisson (1997) in several ways. First, we add specific 
variables related to the armed conflict and the peace process. We also 
include a variable on the political - or peace - conditionality exerted by 
major donor countries and trading partners. Second, we opt for a 
longitudinal rather than a cross-sectional analysis and test the model in a 
country case study on Guatemala. This is motivated by the recognition that 
generalisation is often inappropriate when dealing with conflict-ridden 
societies (see chapter II). Third, we switch from an annual to a quarterly 
frequency analysis to account for the fact that several policy shifts often 
occur within the same year as a result of sudden political reactions to 
planned reforms and the evolution of the conflict. This has required us to 
construct quarterly national accounts for Guatemala as well as a detailed 
political database ranging from 1979 to 1996, i.e. from the conflict's peak 
to the end of the hostilities. Fourth, our specification allows us to assess 
how far the inclusion of political variables improves the model's 
descriptive capacity compared with more traditional econometric models. 
In the following pages, section 2 presents the econometric model's 
specification. Section 3 deals with the political and economic data sets. 
Section 4 elaborates on estimation issues while section 5 compares the 
goodness of fit of our model with equations specified along more 
traditional lines. Various simulations are presented in section 6 together 
with a discussion of estimation outputs. Section 7 concludes. 
VI.2 MODELLING POLITICO-ECONOMIC 
INTERACTIONS 
Figure VLl, which is based on the conceptual framework outlined in figure 
V.l, illustrates the fundamental relationships that the behavioural 
equations of the macroeconometric model trace. 
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Figure VI.1: Economie and politicai relations, 
with specific reference to Guatemala 
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We follow the specification of the P-E model, which is a conventional 
macroeconomic model for a small open developing economy, with 
additional equations describing the interactions between the political 
sphere and the macroeconomic aggregates. The behavioural equations 
describing the economy are based to a large extent on the specification 
suggested by Haque, Lahiri and Montiel (1990)22. The model is a flexible-
These authors elaborated a macroeconometric model for a typical small open developing 
economy and tested it against data from 31 developing countries, Including Guatemala. They 
found strong statistical evidence that it is an appropriate framework for macroeconomic analysis 
of developing countries. 
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price dynamic variant of the traditional Mundell-Fleming model with 
specific developing country characteristics. A single good is produced 
domestically and can be sold at home or abroad. The country is a price-
taker in the market for its imports. Real gross domestic product is driven 
by its demand components. The price level is obtained by clearing of the 
market of goods, through a Phillips curve, modified with Okun's law. 
Following Dessus, Lafay and Morrisson (1997), we introduce the domestic 
political constraints facing the government as well as political repression 
and liberalisation measures as endogenous variables. In the case of 
Guatemala, the model is determined with initial conditions and the external 
environment which primarily consists of the intensity of conflict and 
insurgency activity, international interest rates, debt supply, foreign 
income and prices, and IMF interventions. The time lags associated with 
the variables result from a chronological analysis of the politico-economic 
cycle in Guatemala combined with the usual process of testing for different 
lag structures. 
Arrows 1, 2 and 3 in figure VLl concern the government policy response 
to political and economic events: 
• Arrow 1 shows the reactions of the government to economic conditions, 
e.g. restrictive economic measure to control for the deficit of the balance 
of payments, or to contain inflation. 
• Arrow 2 focuses on the government's response to political events such 
as strikes, unrest, threats by the guerrilla, etc. The response may be 
political (repression or liberalisation), economic (e.g. relaxation of 
stabilisation measures to regain popular support), or a mixture of the 
two. 
• Arrow 3 concerns the response of the government to economic and 
political conditions set by the international community for access to 
external support and funding. Economic conditionality lies in the realm 
of the international financial institutions and the IMF in particular. 
Political conditionality is usually exerted by the largest donor countries, 
major trading partners as well as regional political powers. 
We write the above relationships (arrows 1, 2 and 3) as follows in 
equations 1 to 5: 
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e P* D e P" D CP 
Mn1 = A + PfltF, +AlogÄM,_2 +A( ' V y '"'~ Vt '"^ + ft^+ft^ W 
The decision to introduce restrictive economie measures (Mn) depends on 
(i) external pressures measured as whether there is an agreement with the 
IMF during the period (IMF), (ii) the external economic situation measured 
with the ratio of international reserves in terms of imports (RM) with one 
semester lag and (iii) the lagged ratio of indebtedness to GDP, where 
e P" (-1-1-) is the real exchange rate, (P*) and (P) standing for the foreign and 
domestic price level respectively, and (e) being the nominal exchange rate, 
(D) the real stock of external debt in foreign currency, and (Y) real GDP. 
The decision to stabilise further hangs on (iv) the inflation rate where (CP) 
reflects consumer prices. Coming to the political sphere, we assume that a 
surge in armed insurgency (Gu for Guerrilla) refrains the government from 
implementing unpopular or restrictive economic measures. (See section 
VI.3.3 for an explanation on how the data sets have been constructed, and 
the variables measured. See also annexe VLl for a presentation of all 
behavioural equations and accounting identities, as well as of all 
endogenous and exogenous variables). 
Y 
W, = Ä+ftlog-r^+Q2Un1+ Ij)3Rp + ^ Mn,_2 (2) 
It is assumed that economic growth (Yt-l/Yt-2) is positively correlated with 
expansionary economic measures (Mp), which might de facto correspond 
to a withdrawal of stabilisation measures. (Mp) also depends on the level 
of civil unrest (Un) in the sense that a relaxation of economic policy may 
be a response of last resort to strikes, demonstrations, or discontent among 
powerful groups such as the private sector or the army when repression is 
not a realistic alternative. The government is further tempted to adopt 
short-term popular economic measures to muster sufficient support in 
times of political repression. Finally, a chronological analysis of economic 
policy-making in countries at war, such as Guatemala, suggests that the 
authorities often relax tight economic measures shortly after their 
introduction under domestic political pressures. 
Ul, e, ,P''J), , 
logG, =<!>„ + ¢ , l o g r , + ¢ , l o g — ^ + 4.3log -2 -1 -2 (3) 
"t *l-2*t-2 
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Real public expenditure (G) is a function of government income and 
expenditure. It can be financed either through taxes (determined in the long 
run by the level of economic output (Y)), by printing money (M2), or by 
borrowing abroad (D) which in turn is expected to depend negatively on 
the level of foreign indebtedness. 
Rp1 = X0+Xi Rp1-, + X2Un, + X3Co, (4) 
Lb1 = (O0 + O)1 Lb1^ + O)2Un, + O)3Co1 + (otCond,_2 (5) 
Repression (Rp) is the traditional response of the government to popular 
unrest (Un) and conflict (Co). We add a lagged endogenous variable as 
repression tends to expand over several quarters once it is launched. We 
assume that political liberalisation (Lb) is negatively correlated with the 
intensity of civil unrest and conflict, in addition to a lagged endogenous 
variable. The equation further suggests a positive relationship between 
liberalisation and the political or peace-related conditions (Cond) that 
external actors attach to economic assistance and political support. In this 
respect, we assume that there is a time lag of one semester between the 
exercise of outside pressure and the ensuing decision on the domestic 
front. 
Arrows 4, 5 and 6 show how the economy and the polity are shaped by 
government decisions, interventions by foreign actors (IMF, donors) and 
the external economic environment. 
• Arrow 4 reflects the reaction of the economy to both economic policy 
and political decisions by the government. For example, inflation is 
expected to fall as a result of a tight monetary policy. Progress in peace-
building and enhanced political stability may have a positive impact on 
domestic and foreign direct investment. 
• Arrow 5 focuses on the response of social groups to economic and 
political measures. A sweeping fiscal reform may encourage capital 
flight. A reduction of the subsidy granted to public transportation may 
trigger mass demonstration and increased unrest in urban areas. 
Unpopular economic measures, or political repression, may reinforce the 
level of popular support enjoyed by the armed insurgency. 
• Arrow 6 depicts the impact of foreign aid and economic conditionality 
on the economy. As an illustration, the evolution of demand, prices and 
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interest rates abroad has a direct impact on exports, inflation and debt 
servicing, 
These relationships are written in equation form as follows (equations 6 to 
13): 
Real GDP (Y) is the sum of its demand components, public (G) and private 
(C) real consumption, gross domestic real investment (I), and the trade 
balance: 
e P* M Y^q+G,+!, + ^ - ^ ^ - (6) 
where (X) denotes real exports, (e) is the nominal exchange rate (price of 
foreign currency in terms of domestic currency), (M) is real imports 
measured in units of the foreign good, (P jthe foreign currency price of 
import, and (P) is the domestic currency price of domestic output. 
The consumption per capita (C/N) function is specified as follows: 
C C _ Y 
logTT-= «o +Ioga, -77"5-+¾ log-r- + a3Mp, +atRp, +or3Co,_, (7) 
where (C,_J is the lagged value of consumption and (Y/N) the GDP per 
capita. Expansive economic measures adopted one quarter before the 
period under review has a positive impact on consumption per capita, 
while the reverse is expected from political instability as measured with 
two variables, namely violent repression (Rp) and lagged conflict (Co). 
Investment is derived from the usual flexible accelerator model, where the 
capital stock, (K), adjusts to its desired level depending on income: 
logü^nlog/C+a-tOlogi^ and log< = fitogY, (8) 
The capital stock is estimated along the permanent inventory method: 
K1=I1Hl-S)K,^ (8') 
where (5) is the quarterly depreciation rate and (I) the total gross domestic 
fixed investment. The latter equation is the solution of the capital stock's 
law of motion which is written: 
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where the second term on the right-hand side of the equation can be 
eliminated when n is large enough. 
Coming to the behavioural equation for investment, it is important to make 
a distinction between investment plans and actual disbursements as they 
appear in national account statistics. In the context of our quarterly 
frequency model, the investment equation obviously does not capture 
changes in investment plans as the latter generally do not materialise 
before one or two years. The equation rather traces whether a disbursement 
is postponed or an investment plan is withdrawn. Bearing this in mind, we 
turn to the equation specification. Lagged contractionary measures (Mn) 
negatively affect investment while lagged expansionary measures (Mp) are 
positively correlated with it. High inflation discourages capital formation 
since it reveals economic uncertainty. The more the country is indebted, 
the less it can borrow on international markets to invest. A financing 
constraint is thus added to the flexible accelerator model, expressed by the 
ratio of indebtedness in foreign currency of the country, lagged one period. 
We assume a negative relationship between investment and political 
instability, consistent with the findings of recent empirical growth studies 
(e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1993)23. Conflict (Co) is thus negatively 
correlated with investment. Common sense would dictate the same for 
social unrest. In the case of Guatemala however, it appears that the 
instability accruing from violent repression (Rp) is a much better 
explanatory variable then unrest. Together with equation (8'), investment 
behaviour is determined by the following equation: 
logK, = A + A log*,., +ft log^ + AM«,., + AMp,-i + 
A fog*'- ff"
 +ft iog|i+ß,Rp, + Ac0,., (8"1 
Alesina and Perotti (1993) assessed the relationship between political violence and economic 
growth in a study of 70 countries over 25 years. Based on data drawn from the World Handbook 
of Political and Social Indicators by Taylor and Jodice (1983) as supplemented by the data set of 
Barro and Wolf (1989), the authors found strong evidence of a negative relationship between 
investment and political violence (assassinations, deaths from political violence, coups and 
dictatorship). 
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We specify the real export equation as a function of the real foreign 
e P' income (Y*) and real exchange rate (-LJ-) levels. A lagged dependent 
variable is added to account for partial adjustment. 
log X1 = Y0 + r, log X,_, + Y2 log Y1I1 + Y 3 ^ (9) 
The conventional specification for real import (M) equation states a 
negative relation between the real exchange rate and a positive one with 
the real domestic income. Expansionary economic measures are expected 
to increase imports while restrictive ones have the opposite effect. High 
levels of political violence (conflict and repression) tend to discourage 
imports. 
P Y 
log Af, =% +ç>, logM1^ +(P1 log '"''.''+(P3Mp,.! +p4M«,_, +(P5Co,.., +(P6Rp, 
(10) 
The balance of payments identity is written as follows: 
R, =R,_, +^r-M, + D1 -(1 + OD1^+NT, (11) 
where (R) denotes real foreign reserves, (i*) the international interest rate 
and (NT) the net flow of other savings24 in constant foreign currency units. 
log-5-=+T0 +T1(IOg^2 -T2 logKP,_2) + T3 log-^!- (12) 
As mentioned earlier, the value-added price is determined by clearing the 
goods market. Inflationary pressure intensifies when the gap between the 
effective and potential outputs (Y and YP) closes down (see Christiano, 
1981; Liischer and Ruoss, 1996). We further assume that the price level 
adjusts partially. 
Other savings encompass external assistance, foreign direct investment, net tourism receipts, 
workers' remittances and other net transfers from abroad. 
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The consumption price level (CP) derives from domestic and foreign 
prices, weighted by the share of imports in total domestic absorption. 
l o g c ^ l o g ^ d - ^ l o g ^ * and q - q ^ f f i ^ (13) 
Arrows 7 and 8 describe the interactions between the economy and the 
polity. The focus here is on the reaction of the economy to political unrest 
as well as on the response of social groups to changes in the economic 
situation. In the case of countries affected by an internal conflict, it is 
particularly relevant to assess the relationships between political instability 
and peace-building on the one hand, and economic outcome on the other. 
Conversely, we can analyse the impact of growth on peace-building. 
Equation 14 (together with equations 7 and 8'" above) focuses on these 
relationships. 
CP 
Un, = \ +X1Mn1 +X1 log— '-+X1Rp1^ +XtLb,_2 +X5Un1^ (14) 
Unrest (Un) comprises demonstrations, strikes and coups d'état, whether 
successful or not. (The rationale for including coups in (Un) rather than 
introducing them as a separate variable is provided below). Unrest is 
positively correlated with restrictive economic measures and inflation in 
consumer goods prices. In the short run at least, repression is supposed to 
be negatively associated with social unrest while the reverse holds for 
lagged liberalisation. Strikes and demonstrations often expand from one 
sector or from a given urban centre to another. We thus add a lagged 
endogenous variable. 
Finally, arrows 9 and 10 denote the response of the international 
community to economic and political decisions by the government as well 
as to political events. The behaviour of external actors is treated here as 
exogenous to the model. 
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VI.3 CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATA SETS 
The model consists of 11 behavioural equations and 4 accounting 
identities. There are 12 endogenous variables out of which 5 are qualitative 
ones. These figures are 12 and 3 respectively for exogenous variables. AU 
the equations and the variables of the model are listed in annexe VI. 1. This 
section examines the construction of our politico-economic data sets for 
Guatemala, The estimation of our macroeconometric model requires the 
construction of two distinct databases for the quantitative and ordered 
qualitative variables respectively. The quantitative data set contains 
information on the economy. The qualitative database refers to political 
and economic policy measures as well as to the external actors and the 
conflict. We first elaborate on the major difficulties related to the 
construction of the quantitative database and turn then to the ordering of 
qualitative information. 
VI.3.1 The Quantitative Database 
Unless otherwise specified, the economic data has been collected from the 
International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics, the Banco 
de Guatemala (central bank) quarterly Boletin Estadistico and the World 
Bank World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance. 
The major difficulty is to estimate quarterly values for the national account 
aggregates that are provided on a yearly basis only (Y, C, I, P). This 
requires the estimation of a whole set of quarterly national accounts for 
Guatemala. Before expanding on this issue, we first provide a series of 
comments on practical difficulties related to the construction of the 
economic data set. 
The base year for the existing Guatemalan national accounts is 1958. We 
derive a price deflator for each economic aggregate to express all variables 
in 1990 constant prices. Capital stocks statistics (K) are provided on a 
yearly basis until 1990 by Nehru and Dhareshwar (1994). Like these 
authors, we assume a 4% annual rate of capital depreciation (1% 
quarterly). We obtain the values for 1990-1996 with the permanent 
inventory method (see equation 8'). As for the variables on foreign income 
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(Y*) and prices (P*), we take the values of the US GDP and GDP deflator 
for practical simplicity. The United States is by and large the main trading 
partner of Guatemala. According to IaDB trade statistics for 1995, the 
USA provided 58.5 per cent of Guatemala's imports and received 43.6 per 
cent of its exports. The CACM comes second with 11.5 per cent of imports 
and 39.9 per cent of export, El Salvador being the major trade partner in 
the region. 
The foreign interest rate (i*) is given by the average interest rate on 
Guatemala's external debt. As for the ratio of international reserves to 
imports (RM), we introduce a dummy that takes the value "1" when the 
stock of international reserves is below the equivalent of three-month 
imports, which corresponds to the standard level advocated by the IMF 
(for reference on currency crisis indicators, see Kaminsky et al, 1998). 
The nominal exchange rate (e) is the official exchange rate to the US 
dollar, except for 1985 and 1986 where it is a weighted average between 
the official and the parallel market rates25. Consistent with the statistics of 
Guatemala's central bank and the IMF, we retain a weighted average that 
is 2/3 of the official exchange rate and 1/3 of the parallel market rate. The 
latter roughly corresponds to the share of essential goods in total imports. 
VI.3.2 Distribution and Extrapolation of Quarterly Data 
We opt for an indirect estimation method that is based on a linear 
regression model and takes the aggregation constraint into account. More 
concretely, we build a best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) of a quarterly 
reference series by related series based on the model presented by Chow 
and Lin in an article published in the Review of Economics and Statistics in 
1971. We then use a programme developed for the software Eviews by 
Parnisari (Parnisari and Schwaller, 1997) to obtain quarterly data for the 
Guatemalan national account aggregates26. The estimation method 
suggested by Chow and Lin (1971) is reproduced in annexe VI.2. 
The Guatemalan currency (quetzal) kept at par with the US dollar for 58 years. An official 
parallel exchange market for nonessential imports was authorised as of mid-84. Within the 
framework of a "Socioeconomic Restructuring Programme" adopted in 1985, the quetzal was 
officially devalued in 1985, leading to the full flotation of the exchange rate as of 1989. 
26
 The reader is referred to Chow and Lin (1971) and Schwaller and Parnisari (1997) for a 
complete presentation of the model. 
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The quarterly explanatory variables - or related variables - have been 
selected according to rigorous statistical and economic criteria regarding 
their indirect relationship with the yearly aggregates for which we seek to 
estimate quarterly values. In the process of selecting related series, we 
regress the annual growth rate of the reference series on the annual growth 
rate of the related series. Various goodness-of-fit statistics are then used to 
select the best disaggregated quarterly series, on the basis of the best yearly 
model that we have found. 
In addition to trend and cyclical fluctuations, quarterly series of the 
national accounts incorporate seasonal fluctuations which usually 
disappear at the yearly level. The discussion on whether or not to make 
seasonal adjustments before introducing quarterly data in an econometric 
model is still the subject of much debate among specialists27. For the sake 
of simplicity, we correct all our time series for seasonal fluctuations before 
introducing them into our models28. 
Related Variables 
The related variables have been selected on the basis of standard economic 
theory as well as the specific characteristics of the Guatemalan economy. 
For example, Guatemala is not a producer of capital goods and has to 
import its equipment and machinery. We have thus obtained quarterly 
values for investment with the help of the quarterly variations in the import 
figures for capital goods. As for the minimal statistical criteria retained for 
the explanatory or related variables, we use those applied for the 
construction of quarterly national accounts in Switzerland. TheiJ2 adjusted 
between the yearly fluctuations of the reference and related variables 
expressed in percentage change must be greater than 0.5. The Durbin-
Watson statistics shall be comprised between 0.5 and 2.5. Table VLl 
indicates for each reference variable (column 1) which related variable has 
been retained to estimate quarterly values. The table also provides the 
Until the end of the 1980s, the common practice was to make prior seasonal adjustments. It 
has then been recognised that all adjustment methods are not neutral and introduce artificial 
short-term fluctuations in the data. As a result, econometricians have introduced dummies to 
account for seasonal variations or more complex modélisation (trigonometric for instance, with 
additional stochastic components). Yet dummies are no perfect solution as they cannot capture 
the stochastic components of seasonal variations. 
28
 We use the CensusX.11 method developed by the US National Statistical Office to correct the 
time series for seasonal fluctuations. 
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coefficient of determination adjusted (R2 adj.), the probability associated 
with the t-statistic (Prob.) and the Durbin-Watson Statistics (D-W). 
Table VI.1 : related variables 
R2 adj., t-statistic (Prob.) and Durbin-Watson (D-W) 
Ret Variable 
Privata Consumption 
Public Consumption 
Investment 
GDP deflator 
Export Deflator 
Import deflator 
Related Variable 
Imports of nondurable goods 
Consumption of the central government 
Imports of capital goods 
Consumer price index 
GDP deflator 
Export deflator 
R2adj. 
0.5208 
0.7802 
0.6373 
0.9558 
0.6322 
0.7423 
Prob. 
0.0170 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
D-W 
0.7150 
2.0878 
1.2017 
2.4837 
1.9102 
2.4402 
The quarterly values of the Guatemalan gross domestic product are then 
calculated by summing the quarterly values of its demand-side components 
(see equation 6 above). A detailed presentation of the quarterly national 
accounts for Guatemala is provided in the table that follows (table VI.2). 
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Table VI.2: Guatemalan quarterly national accounts, 
1979-1996 
(In million quetzales of 1990) 
Quarter 
1979:1 
1979:2 
1978:3 
1979:4 
1980:1 
19802 
1980:3 
1980:4 
1981:1 
1981:2 
1981:3 
1981:4 
1982:1 
1982:3 
1982:3 
1982:4 
1983:1 
1983:2 
1983:3 
1983:4 
1984:1 
1984:2 
1984:3 
1984:4 
1985:1 
1985:2 
19853 
1985:4 
1986:1 
1986:2 
19863 
1986:4 
Heat GDP 
7369.15 
7607.23 
7'507.84 
7834.60 
7'953.31 
8'068.32 
7724.63 
7708.78 
7'980.93 
8'148.00 
7794.78 
7740.73 
7673.26 
7840.86 
7'525.29 
7501.36 
7265.75 
7559.76 
7366.00 
7570.01 
6916.76 
7482.45 
7580.87 
7922.58 
7691.80 
7682.68 
6'919.09 
7'432.09 
7168.72 
7337.21 
7755.25 
7'506.12 
Private 
Consumption 
5'975.76 
6133.85 
6242.25 
6285.59 
6310.79 
6369.24 
6'415.42 
6402.32 
6386.91 
6451.33 
6507.27 
6449.42 
6315.22 
6271.71 
6274.85 
6259.03 
6187.27 
6'201.89 
6'229.19 
6242.41 
6249.09 
6276.58 
6274.33 
6242.53 
6230.17 
6'240.55 
6217.64 
6170.83 
6150.97 
6245.65 
6375.38 
6455.15 
Gvt 
Consumption 
432.91 
414.60 
405.42 
334.72 
448.36 
426.56 
459.60 
437.69 
456.53 
467.74 
461.44 
463.91 
498.06 
441.35 
435.72 
451.08 
473.44 
430.19 
470.15 
455.34 
487.77 
465.95 
457.68 
465.73 
508.86 
421.49 
458.11 
454.92 
461.33 
434.65 
563.32 
472.24 
Investment 
1'911.82 
1773.00 
1*462.47 
1'242.37 
1404.17 
1'314.88 
1407.47 
1'273.73 
1460.23 
1'615.26 
1720.58 
1435.81 
1'233.21 
V230.40 
1'101.10 
1'475.00 
1'018.87 
1'155.55 
930.07 
1'083.55 
1'038.80 
1'322.94 
1'177.48 
925.44 
«77.18 
875.33 
827.50 
776.79 
673.63 
802.14 
1'192.22 
905.24 
Exports 
1'811.27 
1'999.14 
2'249.40 
1761.87 
2'024.10 
2'528.08 
2'148.20 
1'534.17 
2'065.61 
1767.44 
1'565.12 
1'534.71 
1722.37 
T 598.47 
1'544.72 
1'614.63 
1'454.01 
1'374.85 
1'496.68 
1'484.79 
1'575.43 
1'416.48 
1'363.26 
1'227.39 
T845.56 
1'470.21 
V184.67 
1*271.63 
1*036.21 
1*005.61 
1*269.96 
1706.47 
imports 
3*001.45 
2*955.13 
2731.64 
2741.60 
2969.47 
2*458.12 
2*647.94 
2*374.93 
2*507.20 
2'279.01 
2*801.89 
2*375.41 
2*036.48 
1*947.43 
1*774.47 
2*131.46 
1*528.10 
1*568.94 
1*570.16 
1*648.29 
1*838.15 
1*961.74 
1*493.45 
1*438.49 
1775.90 
1*491.65 
1*342.01 
1*243.98 
910.02 
1*103.51 
1*576.55 
1*432.75 
SDP 
Prfce 
DeH. 
0.22 
0.22 
0.23 
0.24 
0.24 
0.25 
0.25 
0.26 
0.26 
0.27 
0.27 
0.28 
0.28 
0.29 
0.29 
0.29 
0.29 
0.30 
0.32 
0.31 
0.31 
0.32 
0.31 
0.33 
0.33 
0.35 
O.40 
0.43 
0.47 
0.53 
0.56 
0.57 
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Quarter 
1987:1 
1987:2 
1987:3 
1987:4 
1988:1 
1988:2 
1988:3 
1988:4 
1989:1 
19892 
1989:3 
1989:4 
1980:1 
19902 
1990:3 
1990:4 
1991:1 
19912 
1991:3 
1991:4 
1992:1 
19922. 
1992:3 
1992:4 
1993:1 
19932 
1993:3 
1993:4 
1994:1 
19942 
1994:3 
1994:4 
1995:1 
199S2 
1995:3 
Real GDP 
7830.46 
7688.71 
7'466.79 
7B36.48 
7828.82 
7'990.58 
8'056.63 
8'145.92 
8-099.73 
8'261.01 
8256.91 
8667.02 
8880.29 
8'389.99 
8733.22 
8313.43 
8845.88 
8815.68 
8893.19 
9'038.62 
9220.58 
8895.52 
9'387.30 
9790.74 
9512.74 
9324.90 
9906.41 
9994.27 
9362.58 
10'049.46 
10'608.06 
10312.00 
H'003.93 
10'351.19 
10'652.77 
Private 
Consumption 
8501.77 
8517.65 
8532.30 
8612.69 
6706.29 
8774.79 
8829.41 
8917.14 
8994.55 
8990.30 
8978.29 
7019.32 
7088.03 
7141.75 
7185.48 
7'289.80 
7384.88 
7414.81 
7472.85 
7'584.50 
7722.08 
7767.93 
7824.33 
7919.66 
8026.60 
8092.13 
8184.77 
8290.69 
8'415.47 
8493.41 
8581.72 
8722.49 
8889.21 
8963.30 
9012.68 
Gvt 
Consumption 
483.69 
496.67 
541.33 
544.14 
493.90 
628.31 
459.76 
591.55 
572.06 
562.54 
518.21 
602.20 
568.98 
577.93 
533.96 
647.94 
509.22 
564.11 
582.93 
706.01 
589.49 
651.77 
613.37 
647.30 
677.11 
682.55 
715.53 
629.53 
666.84 
713.35 
752.00 
647.89 
693.93 
699.24 
726.45 
Investment 
978.96 
1'269.90 
1296.38 
1'205.28 
V327.61 
1'261.57 
1'073.33 
1'070.02 
1'212.08 
1'166.25 
1'184.24 
1'173.01 
1'340.91 
1'092.09 
1'076.36 
1'192.94 
1'244.45 
1'369.84 
1'472.60 
1'652.50 
1740.62 
1790.22 
1726.34 
2148.01 
1'833.81 
1'619.50 
1'654.68 
1'893.85 
1757.04 
1723.05 
1775.98 
1'845.70 
1'808.34 
171428 
1768.47 
Exports 
1'438.14 
1'446.17 
1236.82 
1227.96 
1'176.68 
1'361.44 
1'503.56 
1'632.64 
1'537.01 
1739.27 
1'477.71 
1'515.25 
1'622.34 
1'633.52 
1-811.13 
1'871.95 
1'549.36 
1-571.10 
1-601.64 
1-933.83 
1-656.61 
1-696.59 
1-917.29 
1'969.72 
1'681.97 
1'821.OO 
2-074.41 
1'957.70 
1'598.82 
1'935.72 
2-159.19 
2'104.36 
2-364.16 
2'149.93 
2217.46 
Imports 
1'576.14 
2'057.39 
1'975.34 
1'872.26 
1756.34 
1'953.24 
1'906.95 
2172.66 
2290.14 
2219.83 
1791.42 
1-885.66 
2-117.67 
1'927.19 
2005.40 
1'999.90 
2138.62 
2111.63 
2139.48 
2305.31 
2493.48 
2730.34 
3258.80 
8408.51 
8089.78 
2893.88 
3170.31 
3330.18 
2971.62 
8339.70 
3221.00 
8338.07 
3761.65 
8592.80 
3418.45 
H
I 
0.57 
0.57 
0.58 
0.59 
0.61 
0.62 
0.66 
0.67 
0.68 
0.69 
0.71 
0.76 
0.83 
0.94 
1.05 
1.19 
1.30 
1.32 
1.34 
1.35 
1.37 
1.42 
1.47 
1.53 
1.58 
1.65 
1.68 
1.71 
1.78 
1.83 
1.87 
1.93 
1.94 
1.99 
2.03 
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Quartär 
Ï99S:4 
1996:1 
1996:2 
1996:3 
1996:4 
Real GDP 
10'309.43 
10'987.62 
10Ï86.66 
10913.81 
11'077.59 
Private 
Consumption 
9'090.25 
9'197.02 
9'211.21 
9'204.08 
9'225.03 
Gvt 
Consumption 
697.27 
667.53 
767.38 
708.73 
707.70 
Investment 
1738.48 
1'611.89 
1'418.83 
1'376.49 
1'469.13 
Bçiorts 
2'113.88 
2'438.57 
2'487.35 
2331.27 
2'319.44 
Imports 
3303.93 
3'575.84 
3428.22 
2'936.70 
3112.49 
GDP 
Price 
Defl. 
2.09 
2.12 
2.16 
2.22 
2.27 
VI.3.3 The Qualitative Database 
Empirical studies on politico-economic interactions have concentrated on 
cross-sectional studies comparing different countries over one or several 
years. Measures of political variables for developing countries are scarce 
or nonexistent. The main data set used in empirical literature on political 
violence and economic growth is the World Handbook of Political and 
Social Indicators by Taylor and Jodice (1983). The main reference for 
empirical research on armed conflict and growth is the Correlates of War 
Project: International and Civil War Data by Singer and Small (1994). In 
addition, several researchers constructed their own political database on 
the basis of a systematic review of the economic and political information 
published in newspapers or in weekly/monthly magazines (e.g. Paldam, 
1995). 
We follow the latter approach and build an ad hoc politico-economic 
database for Guatemala through a detailed and systematic analysis of the 
quarterly Country Report of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 
supplemented with the monthly Central American Report of Inforpress 
Centroamericana (IC) when necessary. The EIU reports provide systematic 
information on the main political events, on economic policy decisions and 
on the evolution of the economy. The IC reports are summary English 
version of the weekly Boletines published in Spanish also by IC. They 
focus on political affairs, social and labour issues and the economy29. As 
In addition to country-specific information, both sources contain information on Central 
America as a whole. 
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for specific indicators on the conflict and political violence, we consulted 
several sources providing statistics for and analysis of the civil war, i.e. the 
Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH, 1999), the Human Rights 
Office of the Archbishopric of Guatemala (REMHI, 1998), the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science (Ball, 1999), and yearly 
statistics from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. 
We first collect five sets of data on political measures and economic 
policies: 
• Economic measures are classified as either expansionary (Mp) or 
restrictive (Mn) depending on whether they are popular or unpopular 
with a given social group, several groups or the society as a whole. We 
distinguish primarily between three groups: capitalist, urban workers 
and rural workers. In Guatemala, (Mn) comprises for instance repeated 
tax reform attempts aimed at increasing government revenues. These 
reforms were often withdrawn a few months later (Mp) against strong 
opposition from various sectors. The following examples further 
illustrate the spectrum of measures considered here: a tightening of 
monetary policy or the introduction of a new consumption tax are taken 
to be unpopular with all economic agents. A subsidy cut raising the 
price of public transportation in Guatemala City is unpopular with the 
urban group. The introduction of a special tax on capital income is 
deemed to affect the interests of capitalists. The lifting of price controls 
on basic food items is particularly unpopular with the urban group, 
whereas an increase in public sector wages is a popular measure with 
this group. An increase in export taxes on coffee meets with opposition 
from agro-exporters (capitalists). 
• Interventions fry foreign actors are primarily captured by the provision 
of external assistance and the conditions attached to it. Economic 
conditionality (IMF in the model) refers to stand-by and shadow stand-
by agreements with the IMF as well as to the opening and closing of 
credit lines on the basis of explicit economic policy targets. Political 
conditionality (Cond) traces peace-related or political targets set by 
Guatemala's major trading partners and aid providers, i.e. the USA, 
European countries and the UN. Conditions include clarification of 
human rights abuses, progress in the peace process, démocratisation, etc. 
For example, the US Congress insisted on several occasions on 
improvements in the (appalling) human rights record as a condition for 
lifting the American arms trade embargo. 
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• Conflict and political violence (Co) involves a combination of battle-
related deaths, extra-judicial killings, disappearances and the number of 
Guatemalan refugees registering in neighbouring countries30. (Gu) 
reflects a surge in armed insurgency. 
• Political instability (Un) comprises demonstrations (whether for 
political or economic reasons), strikes (incl. private and public sector, 
schools and universities), land occupation etc. In the case of Guatemala, 
we add coup attempts - whether successful or not - as an additional 
factor of political instability. For coups have traditionally not altered the 
balance of power in Guatemala. They add to the political instability as 
they reveal internal struggles within the army and/or the political elite, 
but cannot be associated with turning points in policy orientation as is 
the case in other countries. 
• Political measures are categorised under repression (Rp) and 
liberalisation (Lb). They concern all legal decisions that restrict or 
expand civilian liberties as well as violent acts by governmental forces 
against political opponents. In Guatemala, repressive measures for 
instance include prohibition of political parties, state of emergency, 
incarceration or elimination of political and labour union leaders, 
prohibition of strikes, etc. The opposite measures fall under 
liberalisation, which also includes substantive progress in the peace 
process. 
• Each economic or political measure and event is coded into binary or 
ordered qualitative indicators. The information related to exogenous 
variables in the model serves for the construction of dummies. The data 
corresponding to dependent variables is coded along a four-step scale 
(from 0 to 3) depending on its occurrence and intensity31. We then 
aggregate this ordered qualitative data in different composites 
corresponding to the model's variables described above. Following 
Dessus, Lafay and Morrisson (1997), the resulting aggregates are then 
re-scaled in new composites according to an arbitrary rule: (i) if the 
The final report of the Commission for Historical Clarification (1999) was released at the time 
our study was concluded. The detailed monthly statistical information provided on the 
Guatemalan conflict confirms the adequacy of our qualitative variable related to the conflict (Co). 
It would further allow us to construct a quantitative variable on the conflict for future analysis. 
31
 This ordering method implies that a strike or a restrictive economic measure coded 2 has a 
higher occurrence or a larger impact that the same event coded 1, but does not indicate in any 
way that the former is twice as intense as the latter. 
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aggregate equals O, then the composite equals 0; (ii) if the aggregate 
equals 1 or 2 then the composite equals 1; (iii) if the aggregate equals 3 
or 4 then the composite equals 2; and (iv) if the aggregate is strictly 
greater than 4, we assign a value of 3 to the composite. 
The main weakness of this method is that the ordering of qualitative data is 
in essence a subjective process. Yet, this is compensated by several factors. 
First, all events have been coded by the same researcher, i.e. according to 
the same subjective criteria over the whole period and for all variables. 
Second, the data has been collected from a very limited number of regular 
publications which provide chronological information on all major 
political and economic events and measures in a systematic and consistent 
manner. Third, and more importantly, our approach focuses on the 
subjective perceptions of key actors on policy decisions and politico-
economic events, to the extent that the publications from which we draw 
our indicators also help shape their judgement. Recent studies on politics 
and growth have precisely concluded that subjective perceptions are a 
better explanatory variable than objective, quantitative data when assessing 
politico-economic interactions (e.g. Brunetti, 1997)32. 
VI.4 ESTIMATfON 
The overall model consists of equations 1 to 14 except equations 8 and 8". 
Equations 6, 8', 11 and 13 are accounting identities while the other 
equations are to be estimated. Following the method used for the P-E 
model, our model is estimated in two stages. First, we regress the 
quantitative variables on a set of instruments comprising lagged 
32
 Brunetti (1997) reviews the empirical links between economic growth and five categories of 
political variables, namely democracy, government stability, political violence, policy volatility and 
subjective perception of politics. The author concludes that measures of democracy are least 
successful as explanatory variabtes in cross-country growth regressions, whereas measures of 
policy volatility and subjective perception of politics are most successful. The best criteria does 
not reflect any objective measure of political stability but is based on the subjective perception of 
the agents that make the growth-relevant decisions. The author further highlights two major 
methodological problems related to cross-section regression surveys. First, there is a problem of 
"simultaneity", as the usual ordinary least square (OLS) regressions used in most empirical 
studies do not reveal the direction of causation. Authors generally assume that the political 
process determines the growth rate, but some theoretical arguments indicate that the direction 
of causation could be the other way round. The second problem relates to the robustness of the 
econometric results to variations in the specification of the growth equation. 
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endogenous variables, exogenous and lagged exogenous variables with 
ordinary least squares. Contemporaneous and lagged qualitative variables 
are regressed on the same set of instruments using the ordered probit 
model. The presence of endogenous qualitative ordered variables requires 
the model to be estimated with the maximum likelihood method. We then 
estimate the structural equations with the quantitative predictors of both 
quantitative and qualitative variables as the explanatory variables in the 
equations with two-stage least squares. We refer to Dessus, Lafay and 
Morrisson (1997) for an exhaustive presentation of the estimation issues. 
The particularity of this method is that the qualitative ordered information 
is quantified. The quantitative predictors of ordered qualitative variables 
can be introduced as explanatory variables in the other equations. The 
standard error of the predictors is not estimable and is normalised to unity. 
Consequently, only the sign of the estimated parameters of linear 
predictors can be interpreted, not their absolute value. This is not the case 
of the t-statistics and probabilities associated with the discrete values 
which can be directly interpreted as they do not depend on the hypothesis 
for the variance of the predictors. The estimated parameters are unbiased 
and asymptotically normal. 
The quality of the overall model is evaluated with the adjusted coefficient 
of determination (Ä2 ). This measure is however inappropriate to test the 
fitness of the qualitative equations, i.e. to assess the extent to which the 
estimated model respects the ordinal distribution of the qualitative 
variable. In such cases, we compare actual and fitted values by calculating 
the concordance rate, which is the ratio of the number of concordant pairs 
of observation on the total number of pairs33. We test the quality of each 
parameter with the WaId and maximum likelihood ratio tests34. 
The concordance rate is given by the following equation: if I and / are the discrete values for 
two observations and / * / a pair of observations is concordant if and only if: 
( i < j and y" < y* - e) or ( i > j and y" > y* + e) 
where y is the fitted value of the linear quantitative predictor and G is the 5% confidence 
interval tory*. 
34
 Our objective here is not to discuss at length on the estimation method. We thus opted to 
apply the approach developed by the OECD Development Centre as such and do not here 
specifically control for serial autocorrelation of errors. 
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VI.4.1 Estimation Output 
The model generally fits the data well. AU the estimates are of the expected 
sign, except for the coefficient on foreign indebtedness in the government 
consumption equation, which is explained by the relatively low level of 
Guatemalan external indebtedness throughout the period considered. The 
eleven structural equations all satisfy the maximum likelihood ratio test of 
global significance at the 0.01 level. Our estimation outputs confirm to a 
very large extent the results obtained by the P-E model in a horizontal 
study on 23 African countries over the 1980s. Our results suggest that the 
politico-economic approach is well suited for the econometric analysis of 
conflict-ridden countries such as Guatemala. These results are presented 
and interpreted below as well as in section 5 hereafter. 
Table VI.3 reports for each equation the R2 adjusted - or the concordance 
rate (Cr) - depending on the nature of the dependent variable. In 
parentheses, we find the p-value for the parameter estimations. Most of the 
parameters are significantly different from zero at conventional levels. As 
one could expect, the probability associated with a few parameters on 
quantitative economic variables lies above 5 per cent. This comes as no 
surprise as the behavioural equations describing the economy have been 
directly drawn from the P-E model which was constructed for a "typical, 
small, open, developing economy," not specifically for Guatemala. For 
these few cases, specific features of the Guatemalan economy provide an 
explanation for the weak statistical significance of the parameter, as 
discussed below. The same applies to the parameters on qualitative 
variables which are statistically significant at the 95 per cent level in 19 
cases out of 27. 
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Table V1.3: Estimates of structural parameters 
Variable 
Restrictive Economic Measures 
IMF intervention 
Lagged ratio foreign reserves/imports 
Lagged change in indebtedness ratio 
Lagged inflation 
Guerrilla activity 
Expansionary Economic Measures 
Lagged GDP growth 
Unrest 
Repression 
Lagged restrictive economic measures 
Government Consumption 
Gross domestic product 
Money supply 
Lagged indebtedness ratio 
Political Repression 
Lagged endogenous variable 
Unrest 
Conflict 
Political Liberalisation 
Lagged endogenous variable 
Unrest 
Conflict 
Lagged political conditionality 
Per Capita Private Consumption 
Lagged endogenous variable 
GDP per capita 
Expansionary economic measures 
Repression 
Lagged conflict 
Parameter 
P1 = 0.3541 
P2 = 0.1401 
P3 = 2.7797 
P4 = 7.8714 
P5 =-1.0893 
¢1 = 1.1221 
$ , = 0.5485 
03 = 1.4854 
<j>t = 0.1862 
¢ , =1.1581 
$2=0 .1024 
<t>3=0.1322 
X1 = 0.6067 
Z2 = 0.0212 
X3 = 0.0146 
(O1 = 0.3161 
UJ2 =-0.1739 
(U3 = -0.5140 
O)4 = 0.5986 
a , = 0.8950 
O2 = 0.0732 
0¾ = 0.0008 
a 4 = -0.0086 
0¾= -0.0021 
Tests 
Cr=0.6996 
(0.0209) 
(0.5922) 
(0.0001) 
(0.0274) 
(0.0001) 
Cr=0.7409 
(0.6178) 
(0.0001) 
(0.0039) 
(0.1495) 
B?=0.819 
(0.0001) 
(0.3738) 
(0.0001) 
Cr=0.6S56 
(0.0001) 
(0.3719) 
(0.0448) 
Cr=0.7S83 
(0.0071) 
(0.0111) 
(0.0273) 
(0.1619) 
W^O.987 
(0.0001) 
(0.0209) 
(0.2074) 
(0.0383) 
(0.2745) 
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Table VI.3 (continued): Estimates of structural 
parameters 
Variable 
Capital formation 
Lagged endogenous variable 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic product 
Lagged restrictive economic measures 
Lagged expansionary economic measures 
Lagged indebtedness ratio 
Lagged Inflation 
Repression 
Lagged conflict 
Lagged endogenous variable 
Lagged foreign income 
Real exchange rate 
Lagged endogenous variable 
Domestic income 
Lagged expansionary economic measures 
Lagged restrictive economic measures 
"Lagged conflict 
Repression 
Price of value added 
Gross domestic product 
Unrest 
Potential output 
Lagged endogenous variable 
Restrictive economic measures 
Inflation (consumption price) 
Repression 
Lagged liberalisation 
Lagged endogenous variable 
Parameter 
/¾ =0.9647 
0 , =0.0318 
jß, = -0.0008 
04 =0.0007 
/¾ =-0.0218 
ft =-0.0219 
ß, =-0.0033 
/¾ =-0.0018 
Y1 =0.7546 
Y2 =0.1828 
Y3 =0.0418 
¢), = 0.8323 
Cp2 = 0.2003 
% =0.0329 
% = -0.0090 
C)5 =-0.0529 
% = -0.1690 
T1 = 0.1209 
T2 = 1.0433 
T3 = 0.6389 
X1 = 0.2406 
K2 =2.2063 
X3 =-1.8799 
A4 =0.4422 
X5 =0.6516 
Note: Only the signs of the estimated parameters related to linear predictors of ordereo 
qualitative variables can be Interpreted, but not their absolute value. 
Tests 
R'=0.999 
(0.0001) 
(0.0002) 
(0.0351) 
(0.0137) 
(0.2614) 
(0.0517) 
(0.0194) 
(0.0074) 
R'=0.620 
(0.0001) 
(0.2728) 
(0.3305) 
R?=0.8S9 
(0.0001) 
(0.0990) 
(0.0309) 
(0.6408) 
(0.1786) 
(0.0318) 
R2=0.422 
(0.3395) 
(0.0001) 
(0.0001) 
Cr=0.7667 
(0.0409) 
(0.6522) 
(0.0002) 
(0.0527) 
(0.0001) 
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Our estimation outputs confirm to a very large extent the results obtained 
for the P-E model. We limit ourselves to the main differences between our 
results for Guatemala and those of the P-E model for a panel of 23 African 
countries: 
The decision to stabilise Mn primarily derives from balance of payments 
constraints and the aggravation of indebtedness. In the Guatemalan case 
however, the parameter on the reserves/imports ratio is not statistically 
significant (p-value of 0.6), as the country was able to avoid the type of 
foreign currency crisis experienced by African countries in the 1980s. But 
there is a strong positive correlation between lagged inflation and 
restrictive economic policy in the case of Guatemala, reflecting a deep 
concern for price stability among the political elite in the country. To 
remain close to the original P-E Model, we do not attempt to exclude non 
significant variables from the model in this study. 
Public consumption expenditures depend on gross domestic product via 
fiscal revenues, money creation and the level of external indebtedness. 
Contrary to results obtained for the P-E model, foreign debt is positively 
correlated with government expenditures. This is explained by the fact that 
Guatemala succeeded in keeping its stock of foreign debt at a lower level 
than many African countries, with a total debt service remaining below 6 
per cent of GNP, or one third of total exports, over the whole period under 
review. The explanation also resides in the fact that Guatemala has the 
lowest government expenditure to GDP ratio in Latin America (between 
6% and 9%). Conditions attached to foreign grants thus concentrated more 
on raising fiscal revenue than on curbing public spending. 
When testing for the effect of restrictive economic policy on private 
consumption, the correlation is totally insignificant for Guatemala. This 
confirms that reform attempts were systematically withdrawn or altered 
before substantially affecting consumption. The variable Mn was 
consequently not introduced in the consumption equation. 
In the estimated capital formation function, the negative impact of external 
indebtedness on investment is not as severe as one would expect from 
theory. Once again, this can be explained by the reasonable level of external 
indebtedness. 
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The long-term elasticity of export demand with respect to foreign income 
and the impact of changes in relative prices, is somewhat small. This may be 
due to the fact that foreign income and prices are limited to the US GDP and 
dollar, the United States being Guatemala's main trading partner (58.5 per 
cent of total imports and 43.6 per cent of total exports in 1995). 
Lagged restrictive economic policy does not appear to be significantly 
correlated with imports (statistically different from zero at the 76 per cent 
level). This indicates that reform attempts failed to substantially reduce 
external imbalances to the extent that restrictive economic measures were 
often relaxed shortly after their implementation. 
Finally, the coefficient on lagged unrest shows that turmoil often spreads 
over several quarters. As is well documented, demonstrations and strikes 
have contagious effects and tend to expand from one sector or a given 
urban centre to another. 
VI.5 COMPARISON ACROSS MODELS 
This section assesses the merit of the politico-economic approach versus 
more traditional quantitative analysis of war-torn economies. To this end, 
we consider all the quantitative dependent variable equations in the model 
we presented above that are specified with both quantitative and ordered 
qualitative explanatory variables, i.e. the consumption, investment and 
import functions (here we call this model as presented earlier "Model I"). 
We then compare their goodness of fit with the same three equations from 
which we exclude the ordered qualitative variables (Model III) and then 
also the dummies (Model II). The descriptive capacity of the models is 
evaluated with two forecast error statistics: the root mean squared error 
(RMSE) and the Theil inequality coefficients (Theil Coef.). The value of 
the RMSE depends on the scale of the dependent variable and is used as a 
relative measure to compare forecasts for the same series across different 
models: the smaller the error, the better the performance of that model. The 
Theil coefficient is scale invariant and always lies between zero and one, 
zero indicating a perfect fit. The R2 adjusted is also given for information. 
As shown in table VI.4, the RMSE and the Theil inequality coefficients are 
smaller for Model I than for the two others, meaning that our politico-
economic model has the strongest descriptive capacity. Note also that the 
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Theil inequality coefficient lies below 0.01 for the three equations in 
model I. Model III fares second while Model II has the highest - or the 
worst - values for both RMSE and the Theil coefficient. This implies that 
the inclusion of ordered qualitative dependent variables concerning the 
politico-economic cycle improves the model, and that the dummies very 
substantially reinforce its performance. Yet this may be partly explained by 
the usual fact that the more variables in the model, the better the fit. 
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Table VI.4: Goodness of fit of the three equations with 
quantitative dependent variables and ordered 
qualitative explanatory variables 
Coef. 
R2 adjusted 
Per Capita Private Consumption 
Modell 
Model II 
Model III 
Cavitai formation 
Model I 
Model II 
Model III 
Imvorts 
Model I 
Model II 
Model III 
0.9875 
0.9874 
0.9861 
0.9998 
0.9997 
0.9996 
0.8591 
0.8405 
0.8148 
RMSE 
142.89 
200.45 
143.05 
530.54 
1240.83 
591.19 
296.58 
749.62 
382.01 
Theil 
0.0098 
0.0140 
0.0099 
0.0033 
0.0077 
0.0037 
0.0628 
0.1580 
0.0795 
Note: 
Model I: politico-economic model with quantitative, dummy and 
ordered qualitative variables. 
Model II : traditional economic model with the quantitative economic 
variables only. 
Model III: mixed model with quantitative economic variables and 
dummies {IMF, Gu, Co). 
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VI.6 SIMULATIONS 
Running simulations on the basis of our macroeconometric model can 
provide interesting indications of the impact of a series of short-term 
exogenous shocks on the economy and the polity. We simulate two types 
of interventions by external actors to assess the implications of economic 
conditionality and peace-related or political conditions for both the 
economic and political spheres. As for the first simulation, the initial shock 
is introduced by giving the value "1" to the dummy variable on economic 
conditionality (IMF in equation 1 of the model)33. We then run the 
simulation over twelve quarters and report the differences between the 
original values and the simulation outputs in figures VI.2 and VI.3. These 
differences capture the direct and indirect effects of the external shock 
under the ceteris paribus assumption. They are technically equivalent to 
traditional multipliers except that only the direction of change can be 
interpreted, not the magnitude (see below). The same applies to figures 
VI.4 and VI.5 which illustrate the effects of an increase in political 
conditionality (Cond in equation 5). 
The interpretation of the simulation outcome requires some caution: 
• Changes in real GDP only reflect short-term fluctuations on the demand 
side. The simulations do not capture long-run growth effects that would 
result from shifts in supply, which explains why the model returns to its 
steady state a few periods after the initial shock (Dessus, Lafay and 
Morrisson, 1997). The model's short-term bias derives from the very 
purpose of our study, which is to trace short-run politico-economic 
interactions during the transition from war to peace. We consequently 
run the simulations over three years only and focus our attention on the 
reactions taking place within the four quarters after introducing the 
shock. 
• Our model is not a quantitative forecasting model. The simulation 
outputs indicate in which direction the endogenous variables fluctuate, 
but do not provide information about the magnitude of these 
fluctuations. For, as noted above, only the signs of the estimated 
parameters of the predictors calculated for the ordered qualitative 
IMF interventions are treated here as exogenous shocks, contrary to a growing body of 
literature that treat them as endogenous reactions. 
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variables can be interpreted, not their absolute values. To reflect this 
limitation, we introduce two different scales in figures VI.2 and VI.4. 
The left scale refers to GDP variations in percentage points and the right 
one to ordered qualitative variables, i.e. restrictive and expansionary 
measures, political unrest, repression and liberalisation. The 
corresponding curves show how these variables vary in absolute values 
following the external shock36. As only the signs of these values can be 
interpreted, we place positive and negative signs on the right scale to 
indicate the directions of change. Logically, the same holds for the left 
scale in figures VI.3 and VI.5. 
Figures VI.2 and VI.3 reflect well the politico-economic dynamics 
observed in Guatemala over the past 20 years. They highlight fundamental 
politico-economic interactions following an intervention by the IMF in the 
form of a stabilisation measures advocated under stand-by agreements. The 
interactions between the economic and political spheres thus help explain 
why economic reform attempts have repeatedly failed or have been 
withdrawn shortly after their introduction in the case of Guatemala. 
Reporting simulation outputs in percentage points for the predictors of the ordered qualitative 
variables would make no sense as their absolute value level has been determined by the set of 
instruments introduced in the probit model. 
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Figures VI.2 and VI.3 - Simulation 1 : IMF intervention 
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As expected, IMF intervention involves restrictive (stabilisation) measures 
in the following quarter, which in turn induces a contraction of GDP (fig. 
VI.2). Unpopular measures spur social unrest, which the government 
addresses with additional repression (fig. VI.3). In parallel, the authorities 
seek the strategic support of key groups, e.g. granting them specific 
advantages or bribes (expansive measures). After two or three quarters -
191 
once the IMF pressure has diminished - the authorities further relax 
economic policy (fig. VI.2), withdrawing part or all of the reform attempts. 
The rapid policy-shift pattern is partly grounded on the willingness to 
reduce popular discontent in the face of continued instability caused by the 
civil war. Yet in the Guatemalan case it also reflects a lack of political 
commitment to reforms, combined with strong opposition from the 
domestic political and economic elites37. Figure VI.2 also suggests that the 
impact of an IMF intervention on economic growth turns slightly positive 
after two years (considering only short-term adjustments on the demand 
side). 
The results of the model estimation (see table VI.3) provide additional 
insights that help substantiate the simulation outputs. Restrictive economic 
measures are indeed an important factor of social unrest (statistically 
significant at the 0.95 level)38. The latter induces the government to 
abandon the reforms with a lag of two quarters, as confirmed by the strong 
correlation between unrest and expansionary economic measures with a lag 
of one semester. The estimation outputs further indicate that the 
government generally avoids taking unpopular economic measures in times 
of increased threat from the guerrilla, in order to minimise the risk of 
concomitant social unrest. The government is also inclined to adopt 
populist measures in parallel with political repression, with a view to 
mustering sufficient political support from key groups within the society 
while repressing others. In short, the Guatemalan politico-economic cycle 
suggests that political instability is associated with lax economic policy 
and is incompatible with sustained stabilisation programmes. 
The second simulation aims at assessing the impact of political conditions 
associated with rewards or sanctions by external actors. Political 
conditionality vis-à-vis Guatemala for instance includes economic 
assistance from European countries in return for improvements in the 
Powerful political and economic groups have successfully resisted several tax reform attempts 
and sectorial trade liberalisation (e.g. cement, poultry). 
38
 Restrictive economic policy is actually much more significant in triggering unrest than an 
increase in consumption prices, inflation being statistically insignificant at conventional levels. 
This might seem contradictory to the extent that economic reforms often imply a price increase 
in basic commodities and public services as a result of subsidy cuts and increased taxation. But 
this actually confirms that the mere announcement of reforms (e.g. involving an increase in 
public transportation fares) triggered strong opposition which in turn led to the amendment or 
withdrawal of the contested measures before translating Into substantial price increases. 
Moreover, inflation was able to be Kept at the two-digit level and did not exceed 15 per cent over 
the whole period under review, except in 1985-87 and 1990-91. 
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peace process, or a lifting of the American arms-trade embargo conditional 
upon clarification and punishment of human rights violations. Figures VI.4 
and VI.5 present the outputs in graphical form along the same logic as 
figures VI.2 and VI.3. What is striking is that the results go in the opposite 
direction when compared with the outcome of the first simulation, 
implying that economic and political conditionalities have opposite effects 
over short-term income fluctuations, economic policy decisions, political 
unrest, repression and liberalisation. 
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Figures VI.4 and VI.5 - Simulation 2: political 
conditionality 
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Figure VI.5 shows that political liberalisation intensifies in response to 
foreign pressures after one semester, which corresponds rather well with 
the time required to take legislative action following external pressure. 
Liberalisation tends to unleash civil unrest two periods later, accompanied 
by renewed repression. But the government cannot contain the ensuing 
political turmoil with repressive measures only, all the more if the external 
political pressure is maintained. To preserve its survival probability, the 
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government introduces expansionary economic measures (fig. VI.4). As a 
result, GDP growth slightly accelerates before turning negative one 
semester later. Once the initial shock is partly absorbed, the government 
seeks to introduce corrective or restrictive economic measures. 
Here too, the results of the model's estimation in table VI.3 provides 
further information to interpret the simulation outputs. The particular 
nature of state repression in Guatemala requires specific comments: the 
most significant factor explaining repression is its own lagged value. 
Conflict also appears to be significantly correlated with repression, but the 
value of the parameter is much smaller. The coefficient on unrest is 
statistically different from zero at the 37 per cent level only39. These results 
suggest that repression does not primarily respond to civil unrest and is 
partly self-generated by the government and the security forces. Recent 
investigations into the Guatemalan civil war echo this conclusion, in that 
over 90 per cent of the 200,000 deaths and disappearances related to the 
conflict are attributed to the army, the police and paramilitary forces (CEH, 
1999; Ball et al., 1999). Even so, the estimated parameters for the political 
liberalisation function indicate that repression cannot go unabated for ever 
in the face of increasing costs. This is not only due to the threat of foreign 
sanctions. But it is also dictated by the reactions of economic agents to the 
extreme levels of political repression exerted by the Guatemalan 
authorities: the investment, consumption and import functions in table VI.3 
all suggest that high repression levels have a negative impact on the 
economy. 
VI.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL 
The methodological approach presented in this chapter offers a promising 
avenue for future research on the crucial interactions between the political 
and economic spheres during sensitive postwar periods. Empirical studies 
will be considerably facilitated as the major practical difficulties are 
removed. First, advances in econometric software programmes allow for 
easier and user-friendlier resolution of simultaneous equation systems, 
The correlation between repression and unrest (demonstrations, strikes and coup attempts) is 
statistically insignificant at usual levels. The same holds true when testing for lagged unrest. 
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comprising both quantitative and ordered qualitative dependent variables. 
Second, the collection and public release of systematic data on conflicts, 
human rights violations and political violence make it easier to construct 
reliable and comparable political indicators. Yet it is necessary to 
underscore some serious limitations associated with our politico-economic 
model in its present form. These derive from (i) the assumption of constant 
coefficients in the structural equations; (ii) the short-term bias mentioned 
above; and (iii) the merging of all the data related to distinct social groups 
into one single category that covers all of the domestic nonstate actors. 
First, the assumption that equation coefficients remain constant throughout 
the study period is erroneous if the war fundamentally alters the socio-
political and economic structures of a given country. The literature review 
precisely underlined that wars tend to shift the sectoral distribution of GDP 
in favour of activities which are less intensive in capital and transactions 
(see chapter II). To the extent that a conflict inflicts severe physical 
damage to production facilities and the infrastructure of a country, 
coefficients should be adjusted to account for the ensuing structural 
changes. In the Guatemalan case however, the assumption of constant 
coefficients can be considered as a valid one. For as shown in tables V.3 
and V.4, the sectoral composition of Guatemala's GDP and employment 
structure did not change much between 1980 and 1996. It probably 
remained even more stable than if there had been no civil war: the share of 
agriculture did not change and still accounted for one fourth of GDP by 
1996, whereas in neighbouring countries at peace during the same period, 
it tended to decline while the share of the secondary and tertiary sectors in 
GDP increased. In addition, the Guatemalan conflict did not cause 
substantial direct damage to the physical capital nor to the infrastructure. 
This is not surprising as governmental repression in rural areas accounted 
for the majority of political violence, while the main economic centres 
were not severely affected. 
The second limitation of our model results from the fact that GDP - as 
specified in our model - only captures short-term fluctuations on the 
demand side. In order to be able to trace the long-term growth effects, the 
model should account for shifts on the supply side. Future research could 
build on the empirical literature on violence and growth to assess the 
relationship between conflict, peace-building and growth. But in our study, 
as argued above, the model's short-term bias is consistent with our initial 
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objective to assess the short-term interactions between the political sphere 
and the economy during the transition from war to peace40. In our model, 
external interventions and the guerrilla activity level are treated as 
exogenous variables, although one may argue that these variables can be 
treated as endogenous ones. 
In our model, the different Guatemalan social groups are merged into a 
single category that includes all domestic actors except the government 
and the security forces. This third limitation is the result of the politico-
economic model's specification. To estimate the behaviour of the different 
social groups and how these interact with each other, it would be necessary 
to add group-specific variables into the model. We would then face 
collinearity problems (many economic measures being popular or 
unpopular with several groups) as well as identification difficulties 
(Greene, 1993). That is why, in the model, the variables on expansionary 
and restrictive measures (Mp and Mn) are composites that reflect whether a 
policy is popular with a specific group, various socioeconomic groups or 
the civil society as a whole. To obtain these composites, we initially 
distinguished between three socioeconomic categories: capitalists, urban 
workers and rural workers. We then estimated how far economic measures 
are popular, unpopular or neutral with each group, and aggregated the 
results in a single composite (see section VI.3.2 above). 
By doing so, we lost interesting data that would allow for improved 
political and distributional analysis. This is where the social accounting 
framework presented in chapter ITI offers a useful method to complement 
the macroeconometric model above with distributional analysis. Both 
approaches thus complement each other, as in our Guatemalan case study. 
This objective was based on the assumption that short-term reactions have the potential to 
derail a fragile peace process and should therefore be our primary focus of attention. 
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Annexe VI.1 : List of the model's equations and variables 
Behavioural Equations in the Model 
e P* D e P* D CP 
Mn, = P0 +pJMF, + p2logÄM,_2 + p3( " ' '"J, " l ~ "I '~l "Z) + P t ~ + PsGu, 
ri-\Xl-\ ri-2ri-l ^-1-2 
0) 
y 
Mp, = </>„ +¢, log—+Q2Un1 + <^Rp + ^ Mn,_2 O) 
*t-2 
Ml, e,
 2P,'2D.2 
logG, = <K0 +S1IOgF, +4> 2 l og—^ + « , l o g - ^ ^ r - ^ (3) 
Rp, = Xo +XiRp1-I +X2Un1 +X3Co, (4) 
Lb1 = û)0 +(O1Lb1-1 +W2TJn, +(O11Co1 + m4Cond,_2 (5) 
C C Y 
log-*- = a„ +toga, T f^a 2 l°g-7^ -+0¾*¾), +«4% +¾*¾,, P) 
" i "i-i " i 
\ogK, = A+A log*:,-, +A iogr, +A^",-, +A^,- . + 
A tog ' ' - ^ " +A log-jK H1Rp, + AC0,., 0 ^ 
e P' 
log X, = Y0 + Yi log X,-i + r2 log C i + Ys ~ <« 
p y 
logAf, = % +¢), log Af,., +C)2 log ' - 1 ' ; 1 +C)3AfP,., +(P4AfB1-, +<p5Co,_, +%Äp, 
(10) 
P /> 
log—- = +¾ + ^ 1 (log K,-2 - T2 log KP,.j ) + T3 l o g - r ^ (12) 
* ( - l * , - 2 
CP 
Un, = AQ+A1Mn, +X1 log-—^-+A3Ap,,, + AJJb1-2 + A5Un1-1 (H) 
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Annexe VI.1 (continued): Accounting identities in the 
model 
e P*M 
Y1 = C1+G1+I1 + X , - ^ . 
K1=I1+(I-S)K1^ 
R1 = R M + VL-M, + D, -a + i")D,_i + NT, 
e,r, 
\ag,CP,=Q,,iogP,+(l-£l,)loge,P* and Q, 
C1 + I1+G, 
' C, +1, +G,
 +eP'M,\P, 
(6) 
(8') 
(U) 
(13) 
Endogenous Variables 
Quantitative 
G 
C 
I 
X 
M 
P 
CP 
Y 
R 
NT 
K 
Public consumption 
Private consumption 
Gross domestic investment 
Real exports (goods and services) 
Real imports (goods and services) 
GDP deflator 
Consumption prices 
Real GDP 
Real international reserves 
Other net transfers from abroad 
Capital stock 
Qualitative 
Mn 
Mp 
Rp 
Lb 
Un 
Restrictive economic measures 
Expansive economic measures 
Political repression 
Political liberalisation 
Political unrest 
Exogenous Variables 
Quantitative 
D 
e 
M2 
p* 
N 
Y* 
i* 
Real stock of foreign debt 
Nominal exchange rate 
Monetary aggregate M2 
US GDP deflator 
Population 
US real GDP 
Av. Interest rate on foreign 
debt 
Qualitative 
IMF 
Gu 
Co 
Cond 
IMF interventions 
Guerrilla activity 
Conflict intensity 
Political conditionality 
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Annexe VI.2: Estimation Method for the quarterly 
national accounts 
This estimation method is reproduced from Chow and Lin (1971). The 
estimator can be derived as follows. During the sample period of A T 
quarters, the relation is 
z=Xß+u (15) 
where z is a quarterly vector of AT x 1, X a matrix of quarterly indicators 
AT x k, and « is a random vector with mean 0 and covariance matrix 
V=E(uu '). In the case of flow variables, we have: 
C=c'®I, (16) 
where C is a conversion matrix from quarterly to yearly data, c= (1,1,1,1)', 
® the Kronecker Product and / the Tx Tidentity matrix. Then, 
y = Cz = CXß + Cu = x*ß + u* (17) 
Here, y represents the vector of annual reference values TxI,* signals the 
annual component of the equation. For «*, we have V* = E(u*u*') = CVC. 
Chow and Lin (1971) construct a BLUE to estimate a vector z of quarterly 
data which satisfies equation (15) and the aggregation constraint z=y: 
z= Xß+(VCV *-')«* (18) 
where 
ß = (X*'V *"' X*)-1 X*'V »-1 y (19) 
is the generalised least squares estimate of the regression coefficients for 
the aggregated model and 
ä* = y-X*ß (20) 
represents the vector of residuals in the aggregated regression. 
The first part of equation (18) (Xß) applies the estimated regression 
coefficient to the disaggregated observations of the related variables (in the 
matrix X) in order to estimate a preliminary disaggregated series. The 
200 
second part of equation (18) (VCV *"')«* can be considered as an 
additional component that uses a weighted combination of the aggregated 
regression residuals in order to satisfy the aggregation constraint (e.g. that 
the sum of the four quarters and the yearly figures are the same in the case 
of flow variables). Practically, we make a first estimation on the basis of 
first-order differences and then make a regression on the level using 
Chow-Lin's BLUE. The aggregation constraint is thus respected and we 
obtain: 
Cz = Cxß + CVCV*-'u* = x*ß + u* = y (21) 
The application of this estimator to stock variables requires a 
transformation of the conversion matrix C: 
C = c'®i/,. (22) 
The model presupposes the estimation of a covariance matrix C=E(uu') 
which requires lengthy and complex calculations. The comprehensive 
estimation of the covariance matrix would not bring substantial 
improvements to the model output. For our objective is not to extrapolate 
values over several years, but to estimate quarterly values for known yearly 
reference variables. We thus set an arbitrary first covariance value for the 
residuals of 0.5, which roughly corresponds to an average value found in 
empirical data. Our hypothesis on the distribution of errors does not 
significantly alter the results: we obtain similar values with different 
hypotheses such as a strong or a weak correlation of residuals (0.8 and 0.2 
respectively). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
A critical survey of the economic literature on conflicts and reconstruction 
shows that dealing with today's war-torn economies and rebuilding 
postconflict societies represents a complex and somewhat novel field for 
scholars and practitioners alike. Reconstruction encompasses many 
intertwined variables that coexist and simultaneously interact with the 
consolidation of peace: humanitarian, economic, political, cultural, 
religious, environmental factors and so on. In this dissertation, we started 
from the assumption that political stability cannot be relegated to a lower 
priority economic efficiency, in so far as rebuilding efforts are in vain if 
the conflict rekindles. 
The costs of contemporary conflicts are enormous — not only in terms of 
human suffering and destruction of physical and social capital, but also 
when considering opportunity costs, making civil war a major cause of 
underdevelopment. Yet, the civil war factor has been widely neglected or 
treated as an exogenous event not amenable to economic analysis. There 
has been a tendency to conduct economic analysis on conflict-ridden 
countries only once some sort of normality has returned. This may be due 
to severe methodological and statistical limitations, but has been further 
compounded by the traditional boundaries that delineate the realm of 
economics from that of other social sciences. 
After surveying relevant literature, we concluded that the interactions 
between economic reform and political stability are crucial during the 
fragile transition from war to peace. This doctoral research thus focused on 
how to better integrate the political dimension into economic analysis and 
policy advice to conflict-ridden countries. To this end, we explored and 
tested two main avenues: (i) the social accounting framework and (ii) the 
modelling of politico-economic interactions. 
We resorted to the social accounting framework because SAMs offer a tool 
to reconcile the sparse and inconsistent data that is often available for war-
torn economies. SAM-based models can further serve to assess the 
distributional impact of policy shocks and analyse how policy decisions 
affect various socioeconomic groups. We constructed a simple social 
accounting matrix for Guatemala, taking the beginning of the peace 
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process as the base year (1986). We used the SAM to analyse the economic 
structure of the country, including the sectoral contribution to total supply 
and demand, and the secondary income distribution. We then partitioned 
the SAM into endogenous and exogenous accounts and obtained the 
matrix of accounting multipliers. We decomposed this matrix following the 
method initially presented by Pyatt and Round (1979) and further 
developed by Defourny and Thorbecke (1984) to calculate the transfer, 
open-loop and close-loop effects resulting from exogenous injections. 
We then ran simulations of various exogenous shocks in the tax accounts, 
and assessed their distributional impact. Tax reform is particularly relevant 
in the case of postconfiict Guatemala, in so far as it was singled out as the 
major economic policy challenge, and the government committed itself in 
the peace accords to addressing this issue. The four simulations related to 
an increase in government expenditure as well as to budget-neutral shifts 
between direct and indirect taxes. Even if the limitations inherent to all 
SAM-based models call for caution in interpreting the results, the 
simulation outputs help explain why some measures were successfully 
introduced, while attempts to implement reforms advocated by the 
international financial institutions repeatedly failed: 
• The government succeeded in gradually reducing customs tariffs and 
increasing the value-added tax rate. The simulations showed that these 
measures did not harm any household group in a dramatic manner and, 
consequently, did not spur major opposition from powerful groups 
within the Guatemalan society. 
• But all attempts to introduce a more progressive tax system failed, 
whether a new income tax, or efforts to reduce tax evasion and increase 
the level of existing direct taxes. The simulations help explain why the 
ruling oligarchy and the economic elite, who rightly felt that they would 
be bound to lose, expressed outright opposition. The successive 
governments were unable or unwilling to go against these powerful 
interests and did not try to muster sufficient popular support for these 
reforms, which were also advocated by the international financial 
institutions. 
We then developed a specific methodological approach for the analysis of 
war-torn economies that comprises a basic conceptual framework, 
microeconomic considerations and a macroeconometric model to capture 
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crucial politico-economic interactions. The politico-economic framework 
is based on a model of demand for and supply of government support 
developed by Frey and Eichenberger (1992). We elaborated on the 
contributions brought by Haggard, Lafay and Morrisson (1995) to 
highlight that the politically optimal policy mix from a government's 
standpoint radically differs from the economic optimum advocated by the 
international financial institutions (IFIs). We integrated civil unrest and 
government repression in the model and assessed the impact of political 
conditionality exerted by major foreign partners with respect to 
démocratisation, peace-building and human rights. We showed how 
political or peace-related conditionality contradicts with the traditional 
economic conditions set by the IFIs and how foreign aid may partly help 
postconflict countries cope with the diverging requirements imposed by 
the international community. 
We constructed a macroeconometric model consisting of both quantitative 
and ordered qualitative dependent variables, with a view to capturing the 
relationships between the economy, the government, the social groups and 
key external actors during the transition from civil war to peace. Taking 
Guatemala as a case study, we provided a historico-analytical overview of 
the Guatemalan economy and polity over the past twenty years. We then 
had to build quarterly national accounts for Guatemala based on annual 
figures. We further elaborated a political database which included the main 
events related to the conflict and civil unrest, as well as policy decisions 
and conditionality in the political and economic spheres. Once the model 
was estimated, we assessed the specific contribution of the political 
variables: the results confirmed that our politico-economic model has a 
stronger descriptive capacity than more traditional models relying strictly 
on quantitative, economic data, thus supporting our argument to duly 
include political variables in economic analysis on war-torn countries. 
Our results suggest that the methodological approach presented in this 
dissertation is a promising route for further research on war-torn countries, 
all the more that the major technical difficulties are being removed: 
• the computational intricacies associated with the resolution of models 
combining both quantitative and ordered qualitative dependent variables 
are being efficiently addressed by ongoing progress in econometric 
software packages; 
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• the construction of conflict-related data sets shall be greatly facilitated 
by a more systematic monitoring and reporting of political violence and 
human rights violations worldwide (e.g. Commission for Historical 
Clarification in Guatemala). 
The macroeconometric model served to simulate the influence of external 
actors over war-torn countries. The outputs highlighted on the one hand 
stark contradictions between economic and peace conditionality, or 
between démocratisation and political liberalisation one the one hand, and 
the introduction of drastic economic reforms to stabilise the economy on 
the other. The results clearly showed that peace or political conditionality 
induces the government to adopt lax economic policy in order to muster 
sufficient political support to stay in power against the background of 
démocratisation. But economic conditionality often means political turmoil 
and civil unrest, which in turn spurs increased repression from the 
government. In short, the side effects of traditional economic conditions 
associated with IMF stand-by arrangements and those associated with 
political or peace conditionality go in the opposite direction. This calls for 
a more coherent approach from the international community. External 
actors can play a pivotal role in smoothing the political impact of 
stabilisation measures during the fragile transition from war to peace. 
Foreign aid is required in particular to finance adequate compensatory 
measures and safety nets. As for domestic actors, extensive policy dialogue 
and participatory processes are necessary to lessen the risk of violent 
confrontations between diverging interests, even if this causes some delay 
in the reform timetable. 
As far as we know, this study represents the first attempt to apply 
econometric modelling and testing in the framework of a specific case 
study on a war-torn country. The macroeconometric framework differs 
from traditional models by integrating political variables. It also differs 
from the standard politico-economic models in public choice in that it 
accounts for the specific institutional settings of developing countries, in 
particular the autocratic nature of political regimes and the violent means 
through which popular discontent is channelled. Another novelty has been 
to introduce several variables that reflect the subjective perception of 
politico-economic events rather than purely objective or quantitative data, 
consistent with recent conclusions drawn by psychologists and economists 
on the interactions between politics and growth. 
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The originality of this doctoral research lies in the inclusion of political 
and conflict-related variables in macroeconometric modelling, as well as in 
the interpretation of simulation results of SAM-based and politico-
economic models. The relations between public policy choices and the 
economy are assessed via the whole politico-economic cycle, including the 
armed conflict, repression and social unrest. Another novelty has been to 
focus on the direct and indirect effects of economic and political 
conditionality in the case of war-torn countries to highlight contradictions 
between the economic and political agendas of external actors. For the 
simulation outputs showed that the simultaneous implementation of 
political and economic reforms required in the aftermath of a protracted 
conflict tends to undermine the political and social environment required 
to restore confidence among economic agents and mend relations between 
former rival groups. 
The shortcomings of the two methodological approaches developed in this 
doctoral research have been clearly singled out. The main limitation 
derives from the assumption of constant coefficients in the SAM 
framework, as well as in the behavioural equations of the politico-
economic model. This limits the applicability of both SAM-based models 
and the macroeconometric model to contexts where the war did not 
radically alter the sociopolitical and economic structures, thus excluding 
many countries ravaged by an armed conflict. Yet the hypothesis of 
constant coefficients holds for countries such as Guatemala, in which the 
war did not destroy the physical capital nor the infrastructure, but slowed 
down or even halted the pace of modernisation. 
The remaining comments situate our results within the current debates 
among scholars and practitioners. The discussions on economic reform 
versus peace-building are becoming less controversial. Few structural 
adjustment critics would deny the desirability of macroeconomic stability 
and reasonable fiscal and monetary policies, even in the aftermath of civil 
strife. On the other hand, international economic institutions, and the 
World Bank in particular, have come to recognise the need to tailor 
appropriate programmes for each war-torn country so that economic 
reforms do not frustrate, but enhance peace efforts. There has indeed been 
some progress when comparing rebuilding strategies in El Salvador in 
1992 and Guatemala in 1997. The IMF Director General Camdessus 
publicly declared on a visit to Guatemala in May 1997 that the principal 
requirement attached to financial assistance was the timely implementation 
of the Peace Accords signed in December 1996, implying close parallelism 
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between peace and economic conditionally. But one may still question to 
what extent large institutions with different cultures and mandates are 
committed and just how able they are to translate new guidelines and 
official statements into operational reality in postconflict countries. 
Discussions on peace and economic conditionality are ongoing. Effective 
conditionality obviously requires concerted efforts by the international 
community and presupposes some consensus on the objectives of - and 
criteria for - conditions attached to aid, together with improved 
transparency between donors and recipients. Indeed, the contradictions 
highlighted in this doctoral research call for more coherence in the overall 
approach of bilateral and multilateral organisations vis-à-vis war-torn 
societies. There is a pressing need to reconcile political and economic 
conditionality as much as possible, and to devise well-targeted assistance 
programmes that include compensatory measures as appropriate. 
Improving coherence in donor countries is not a simple task, as it involves 
a whole range of ministries and organisations with different mandates and 
prerogatives. On the other hand, participation of domestic constituencies in 
policy dialogue is essential to the success of both economic reform and 
peace-building processes. This directly relates to the debate on the merits 
and disadvantages of technocratic insulation for optimal economic policy 
design and implementation. While technocratic insulation has been praised 
in the case of the East-Asian economic "miracles"41, it may revive tensions 
and be counterproductive in the case of war-torn countries. For it 
contradicts the main objectives of the transition from war to sustainable 
peace, i.e. (i) the establishment of institutional mechanisms to settle 
disputes; (ii) the creation of checks and balances on the exercise of power; 
and (iii) the promotion of a culture of dialogue between former warring 
parties. 
Coming to external assistance, a series of lessons and best practices have 
recently been produced. One of the most important findings relates to the 
necessity of adapting aid and its delivery to local circumstances. Domestic 
actors should be involved in the design and distribution of externally-
funded assistance at all stages, with the objective of strengthening local 
capacities and self-reliance. For the long-term success of reconstruction 
programmes relies first and foremost on the capacity of domestic actors to 
be reconciled. One of the key components is the restoration of the 
41
 World Bank, 1993. 
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institutional mechanisms and human potential for peaceful management of 
conflict and competition. A first step should be to involve domestic actors 
in research on - and design of - locally accepted solutions. It is true that 
doing so is a time-consuming exercise. But we contend that it should 
nonetheless be promoted, even at the expense of delays in the 
reconstruction timetable. 
Turning to income inequality and distributional issues, the traditional 
argument is that reducing income and asset inequality contributes to 
lessening tensions and strengthening political stability. However, we argue 
that postconfiict situations often require a more cautious approach. In 
specific circumstances, redistribution in favour of the poorest may provoke 
a violent backlash in the aftermath of a civil war: former combatants, 
impoverished middle-class representatives and former economic elites are 
often politically more vocal than the poor. This has been the case in 
Guatemala, as shown in our case study based on the SAM framework. If 
the former elites feel threatened by redistribution policies, they may defend 
their interests with unexpected violence42. A fundamental challenge for 
policy makers is thus how to accommodate pressing demands for more 
equity while avoiding at the same time a resurgence of violence. To this 
end, distributional issues should not be confined to income gaps or 
differences in wealth only. In postconflictual situations, inequality should 
be assessed in the wider context of individual and collective power, 
removal of specific privileges, decentralisation, access to public services, 
etc. 
A last word on reconstruction and globalisation. Postwar countries face the 
immense task of (reintegrating into the global world economy. This is 
more arduous now than it was decades ago: the process of world-wide 
liberalisation and technological progress has accelerated and regional 
integration has intensified, outsiders lagging ever more behind. While 
many war-torn societies have fallen prey to the internationalisation of 
criminal and speculative activities, they are in a much more difficult 
position to seize the potential benefits of globalisation. Peace being settled, 
they have to strive to become gradually able to compete on regional and 
world markets as well as to promote their interests in economic and trading 
fora. Here again, a coherent approach of the international community is 
42
 In oases where the economic elites think in a long-term perspective, they may agree to allow 
some fiscal redistribution to protect their own asset holdings against renewed violence in the 
medium to long term. 
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required to help war-torn countries join the world economy while 
simultaneously laying the ground for a firm and lasting peace. 
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